Secure Data Sharing and Collaboration in the Cloud by Thilakanathan, Danan
University of Sydney
Doctoral Thesis
Secure Data Sharing and Collaboration
in the Cloud
Author:
Danan Thilakanathan
Supervisors:
Professor Rafael A. Calvo, Dr.
Shiping Chen
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the
Faculty of Engineering and Information Technologies
School of Electrical and Information Engineering
June 2016
UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY
Abstract
Faculty of Engineering and Information Technologies
School of Electrical and Information Engineering
Doctor of Philosophy
Secure Data Sharing and Collaboration in the Cloud
by Danan Thilakanathan
Cloud technology can be leveraged to enable data-sharing capabilities, which can benefit
the user through greater productivity and efficiency. However, the Cloud is susceptible
to many privacy and security vulnerabilities, which hinders the progress and widescale
adoption of data sharing for the purposes of collaboration. Thus, there is a strong
demand for data owners to not only ensure that their data is kept private and secure in
the Cloud, but to also have a degree of control over their own data contents once they
are shared with data consumers.
Specifically, the main issues for data sharing in the Cloud include key management,
security attacks, and data-owner access control. In terms of key management, it is vital
that data must first be encrypted before storage in the Cloud, to prevent privacy and
security breaches. However, the management of encryption keys is a great challenge.
The sharing of keys with data consumers has proven to be ineffective, especially when
considering data-consumer revocation. Security attacks may also prevent the widescale
usage of the Cloud for data-sharing purposes. Common security attacks include insider
attacks, collusion attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks. In terms of access control,
authorised data consumers could do anything they wish with an owner’s data, including
sending it to their peers and colleagues without the data owner’s knowledge.
Throughout this thesis, we investigate ways in which to address these issues. We first
propose a key partitioning technique that aims to address the key management problem.
We deploy this technique in a number of scenarios, such as remote healthcare manage-
ment. We also develop secure data-sharing protocols that aim to mitigate and prevent
security attacks on the Cloud. Finally, we focus on giving the data owner greater control,
by developing a self-controlled software object called SafeProtect.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Cloud computing is a rapidly growing technology trend in the world today, and nearly
all Internet users and enterprises alike use the Cloud, in some form or another [1].
Ever since Cloud computing began to evolve from the early days of grid and utility
computing [2], its popularity has grown immensely. One of the main reasons for the
Cloud’s popularity is that it allows for the ability to access data anywhere, and at any
time. The most popular usage of the Cloud includes: viewing emails via Hotmail or
Gmail; writing, sharing and collaborating on documents via Google Docs; developing
applications via the Google App Engine; and storing files via Amazon S3, Google Drive
or Windows SkyDrive. Amazon EC2/S3 was one of the first widely available Cloud-
computing services [2]. Cloud computing provides many benefits, such as: low costs
due to the Pay-As-You-Go model: the ability to provide services and resources on-
demand, anywhere, and at any time; high availability, as data is usually replicated
among a number of servers; lowering the chance of data loss; and providing elasticity,
whereby more computing resources can be used when required [3]. Cloud computing also
provides benefits to many fields, such as healthcare [4]. There is also a strong push by
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IT organisations to share their data with one another, which is achieved via the Cloud.
Thus, Cloud technology is very popular amongst both end users and organisations.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) [5] defines Cloud computing
as a “paradigm for enabling network access to a scalable and elastic pool of shareable
physical or virtual resources with on-demand self-service provisioning and administra-
tion” To better understand the problem, it is important to have an understanding of
Cloud computing. Thus, we provide the essential characteristics, types of services and
deployment methods, below.
ISO also defines five essential characteristics of the Cloud:
• Broad network access - A feature where the physical and virtual resources are
available over a network and accessed through standard mechanisms that promote
use by heterogeneous client platforms. The focus of this key characteristic is that
cloud computing offers an increased level of convenience in that users can access
physical and virtual resources from wherever they need to work, as long as it is
network accessible, using a wide variety of clients including devices such as mobile
phones, tablets, laptops, and workstations.
• Measured Service - A feature where the metered delivery of cloud services is such
that usage can be monitored, controlled, reported, and billed. This is an important
feature needed to optimize and validate the delivered cloud service. The focus of
this key characteristic is that the customer may only pay for the resources that
they use. From the customers’ perspective, cloud computing offers the users value
by enabling a switch from a low efficiency and asset utilization business model to
a high efficiency one.
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• Multi-tenancy - A feature where physical or virtual resources are allocated in
such a way that multiple tenants and their computations and data are isolated
from and inaccessible to one another. Typically, and within the context of multi-
tenancy, the group of cloud service users that form a tenant will all belong to the
same cloud service customer organization. There might be cases where the group
of cloud service users involves users from multiple different customers, particularly
in the case of public cloud and community cloud deployments. However, a given
cloud service customer organization might have many different tenancies with a
single cloud service provider representing different groups within the organization
• On-demand self-service - A feature where a cloud service customer can provi-
sion computing capabilities, as needed, automatically or with minimal interaction
with the cloud service provider. The focus of this key characteristic is that cloud
computing offers users a relative reduction in costs, time, and effort needed to take
an action, since it grants the user the ability to do what they need, when they need
it, without requiring additional human user interactions or overhead.
• Rapid elasticity and scalability - A feature where physical or virtual resources
can be rapidly and elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to quickly
increase or decrease resources. For the cloud service customer, the physical or
virtual resources available for provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can
be purchased in any quantity at any time, subject to constraints of service agree-
ments. Therefore, the focus of this key characteristic is that cloud computing
means that the customers no longer need to worry about limited resources and
might not need to worry about capacity planning. From the customers’ perspec-
tive, if new resources are needed, they are available automatically, immediately,
and can appear to be infinite, subject to constraints of service agreements.
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• Resource pooling - A feature where a cloud service provider’s physical or virtual
resources can be aggregated in order to serve one or more cloud service customers.
The focus of this key characteristic is that cloud service providers can support
multi-tenancy while at the same time using abstraction to mask the complexity of
the process from the customer. From the customer’s perspective, all they know is
that the service works, while they generally have no control or knowledge over how
the resources are being provided or where the resources are located. This oﬄoads
some of the customer’s original workload, such as maintenance requirements, to
the provider. Even with this level of abstraction, it should be pointed out that
users might still be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g.,
country, state, or datacenter).
The Cloud provides a number of different types of services, and we list the three most
common ones as follows:
• Software as a Service (SaaS) - The consumer can choose to run the application
on demand but has no control of the underlying application. The Cloud provider
has full control over the application.
• Platform as a Service (PaaS) - This allows the consumer to deploy consumer-
created and/or acquired applications created using programming languages, li-
braries, services and tools supported by the Cloud provider [3]. The Cloud provider
has control over the platform and its applications. The Cloud provider has full
control of the hardware, while the client has control over the application.
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) - Basic computing infrastructure such as
servers, storage, software, processing and network equipment is provided as a ser-
vice to Cloud consumers.
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There are four different deployment models for the Cloud [6]. These include:
• Private cloud - The Cloud infrastructure is owned, operated and managed within
an organisation. Only entities within the organisation are provisioned for using the
services provided by the Cloud. The servers may exist on or outside the premises
of the organisation.
• Community cloud - The Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for use by a com-
munity of users from various organisations who share common goals and concerns.
• Public cloud - The Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for use by the public. The
servers generally exist on the Cloud provider’s premises.
• Hybrid cloud - A composition of two or more of the above deployment models.
1.1 Motivation
Data sharing is becoming increasingly important for end users, enterprises and even
health industries. There is currently a push for IT organisations to increase their data-
sharing efforts. According to a survey by Information Week [1], nearly all organisations
shared their data in some way, with 74% sharing their data with customers and 64%
sharing it with suppliers. A fourth of the surveyed organisations consider data sharing
to be a top priority. The benefits that organisations can gain from data sharing are
higher productivity and revenue. People in general love to share information with one
another. Whether it is with friends or family, or even strangers around the world, many
people benefit greatly through sharing data, as they achieve higher levels of productivity
and a better education. The National Institute of Health (NIH) states that data sharing
“reinforces open scientific inquiry, encourages diversity of analysis and opinion, promotes
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new research, makes possible the testing of new or alternative hypotheses and methods
of analysis, supports studies on data collection methods and measurement, facilitates
the education of new researchers, enables the exploration of topics not envisioned by the
initial investigators, and permits the creation of new datasets when data from multiple
sources are combined” [7]. Data sharing can also help businesses understand more
about their customers and provide better services for them [8]. Thus, data sharing is
very crucial among users from all walks of life, regardless of their age, gender, race, or
whether they work in industry.
The Cloud [3] can be used to enable data-sharing capabilities, which can provide an
abundant number of benefits to the user. With multiple users from different organisa-
tions contributing to data in the Cloud, less time and money will be spent, compared
with having to manually exchange data that creates a clutter of redundant and possibly
out-of-date documents. Thus, the Cloud makes data sharing with anyone in the world
both more convenient and easier than any other method of sharing.
Some benefits of data sharing in the Cloud include more data reliability and availability,
the ability to work from anywhere, not being constrained to one machine, no server
maintenance, and saved costs to name a few [9].
There are many examples of Cloud usage in today’s world, which brings with it a huge
number of benefits. There are social networking services such as Facebook and Twitter.
The benefits of sharing data through social networks are numerous [10], such as the
ability to share photos, videos, information and events, which creates a sense of enhanced
enjoyment in one’s life and can enrich the lives of some people who are amazed at how
many people are interested in their life and well-being. The sharing of research data
has been shown to benefit the general scientific community [11]. Group collaborative
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tools have been of major importance to students and group-related projects [12]. Google
Docs provides data-sharing capabilities, whereby groups of students or teams working
on a project can share documents and effectively collaborate with each other. This
allows for higher productivity than the previous method of continually sending updated
versions of a document to members of the group via email attachments. Also, in modern
healthcare environments, healthcare providers are willing to store and share electronic
medical records via the Cloud and hence remove the geographical dependence between
the healthcare provider and the patient [13]. The sharing of medical data allows for the
remote monitoring and diagnosis of patients, without the patient having to leave their
home.
The Cloud, however, is susceptible to many privacy and security attacks [14]. As high-
lighted in [15], the biggest obstacles hindering the progress and wide adoption of the
Cloud are the privacy and security issues associated with it. According to a survey
carried out by IDC Enterprise Panel [16] in August 2008, Cloud users regard security
as the top challenge, with 75% of surveyed users worried about their critical business
and IT systems being vulnerable to attack. Once the data owner stores their data on
the Cloud, they effectively lose full control over their data. The Cloud Service Provider
is able to do whatever they wish with the data, without the data owner’s knowledge.
Evidently, many privacy and security attacks occur from within the Cloud providers
themselves [17], as providers usually have direct access to stored data and steal data to
sell to third parties, in order to gain profits. There are many examples of this happening
in the real world, as highlighted in [18]. In today’s world, there is a strong need to share
information to groups of people around the world. Since the Cloud is riddled with so
many privacy issues, many users are still apprehensive about sharing their most critical
data with other users. Such threats also affect the trust of the data owner.
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We now list some of the key requirements of secure data sharing in the Cloud, which we
derived by reflecting and reviewing the literature in Chapter 2.
• Firstly, the data owner should be able to specify a group of users that are allowed
to view his or her data.
• Any member within the group should be able to gain access to the data at any
time, and anywhere, without the data owner’s intervention.
• The data owner should have some degree of control over their own data, no matter
where the data is stored.
• No-one other than the data owner and the members of the group should be able
to gain access to the data, including the Cloud Service Provider.
• The data owner should be able to add new users to the group.
• The data owner should also be able to revoke the access rights of any member of
the group to his or her shared data.
• No member of the group should be allowed to revoke rights or join new users to
the group.
1.2 Key Research Problems
Our research aim is to achieve an environment where the data owner is able to store
and share data in the Cloud while maintaining both privacy and security. A few of the
major privacy and security issues related to data sharing in the Cloud include:
• Key Management: One of the main issues related to data sharing in the Cloud
is key management. One trivial solution to achieving secure data sharing in the
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Cloud is for the data owner to encrypt his data before storing it on the Cloud,
and hence the data remains secure against the Cloud provider and other malicious
users. When the data owner wants to share his data to a group, he sends the
key used for data encryption to each member of the group. Any member of the
group can then obtain the encrypted data from the Cloud and decrypt the data
using the key, thereby not requiring the intervention of the data owner. However,
the problem with this technique is that it is computationally inefficient and places
too great a burden on the data owner, when considering factors such as user
revocation. When the data owner revokes access rights to a member of the group,
that member should not be able to gain access to the data. Since the member
still has the data access key, the data owner has to re-encrypt the data with
a new key, rendering the revoked member’s key useless. When the data is re-
encrypted, he must distribute the new key to the remaining users in the group,
which is computationally inefficient and places too great a burden on the data
owner, when considering large group sizes. Therefore, this solution is impractical
for deployment in the real world, with regards to highly critical data such as
business-, government- and/or medical-related data. Thus, there needs to be a
solution whereby encryption keys are managed on/off the Cloud, which does not
place a significant burden on the data owner/consumer.
Note that the data consumer still has access to the data already decrypted before
he was revoked access. Although he can still view the old data, he can no longer
view any new data shared within the group or data that had yet to be accessed
before he was revoked.
• Security Attacks when Sharing Data: There are many different types of
security attacks when sharing data in the Cloud. We describe a few of the most
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common types of attacks, below:
– Insider Attacks: This is the most prevalent type of attack in relation to data
sharing in the Cloud [17]. Cloud providers have full and direct access to
the data owner’s data and are thus able to steal critical data without the
data owner’s permission. Insider attacks are common and the stolen data are
generally sold to third parties in order to gain profit [19].
– Sniffing Attacks: A malicious user intercepts the public communication net-
work and attempts to retrieve sensitive information such as a username, pass-
word, and critical data. Such attacks are likely to be successful when there
are no forms of encryption, when data is sent over public communication
channels. Thus, it is crucial to ensure that data is always encrypted before
sending it over the network. Man-in-the-middle (or Man-in-the-Cloud) based
attacks can steal data stored in Cloud services such as Google Drive, Dropbox
and OneDrive, to name a few, by stealing the user’s synchronisation token
[20].
– Collusion Attacks: These types of attacks occur when two or more parties
agree to reveal some secret information, illegally. For instance, a Cloud
provider and a dishonest data-sharing consumer can combine their secret
keys to reveal some critical information about the data owner’s data. This
can affect the entire privacy and security of all of the data stored in the Cloud,
thus severely affecting the trust of the data owner with regards to using the
Cloud for data sharing and collaboration purposes. Collusion attacks are
mainly prevalent in eCommerce services [21].
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Consequently, security protocol(s) need to be in place to protect against these
types of attacks.
• Dishonest Data Consumers: Since the data owner has chosen to entrust his
specified data consumers with his data, the data owner assumes that the data
consumer will use the data as expected and will not inadvertently or accidentally
leak the data to outsiders. For instance, a dishonest data consumer might find
the data owner’s data interesting enough to decide to share it with his friends. He
might copy the data to a USB device and send it to friends, or send the data via
email attachments. This can be easily done without the knowledge of the data
owner, which affects the trust of the data owner when their own consumers are
the culprits of the data leakage. Thus, there needs to be some form of mechanism
that provides the data owner with greater access control over his data. The data
owner should be able to specify complex policies that data consumers must adhere
to when using the data.
1.3 Key Contributions
To address the above specific issues, we make the following contributions in this thesis.
1.3.1 Key Partitioning Algorithm
As discussed, the main problem with encryption-key management related to data sharing
in the Cloud is that it is computationally inefficient and places too heavy a burden on
the data owner to manage an authorised group of users. This problem is especially true
when considering factors such as user revocation, or managing large groups of users in
excess of thousands to hundreds of thousands.
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A few studies have attempted to address this problem, with the most popular techniques
being Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [22] and Proxy Re-encryption [23]. Tu and
Niu et al. [24] have used a technique called CP-ABE (discussed in detail in the next
chapter), which bundles unique attributes in a secret key and sends the key to authorised
users. In terms of user revocation, the data is re-encrypted in the Cloud, which reduces
the burden on the data owner. Tran et al. [25] have proposed a proxy re-encryption
scheme whereby a key is divided into two parts, with one partition kept by the consumer
and the other by the Cloud proxy. This allows for a more efficient way to handle user
revocation, as the data owner does not need to re-encrypt the data and re-distribute the
keys.
The main problems with current solutions, however, are that they either do not handle
the sharing of data with large numbers of Cloud users, or they lack a more efficient
solution. For instance, the solution provided by Tran et al. [25] relies on the proxy to
carry out encryption/decryption operations and might therefore be too much for the
proxy to handle. Also, the solution does not handle the scenario where a revoked user
and the proxy are colluding, which will ultimately reveal the full plaintext key and thus
the data, as well. The solution of Tu and Niu et al. [24] is inelegant, since there is still
a heavy computational overhead as the data needs to be re-encrypted when a user is
revoked. The solution also lacks transparency in terms of sharing data with a variety
of users around the world, and is more focused on sharing data with users who have
defined attributes that are more suited to enterprises.
In our approach, we have extended the work of Tran et al. [25] to allow for more efficient
key sharing amongst a large number of users. We propose a key partitioning crypto-
graphic algorithm that allows the data owner to share data with many users and revoke
them on-the-fly, without the need to undertake the re-encryption or re-distribution of
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keys. Our solution is also secure against collusion-based attacks, and places no burden
on the data owner or the Cloud to manage keys. To demonstrate our algorithm, we
developed prototypes in a number of healthcare scenarios. We evaluated the proto-
types in terms of performance, usability and scalability. This helped to demonstrate the
feasibility of implementing a similar system in the real world.
1.3.2 Secure Data Sharing Protocol
One of the biggest issues preventing the widescale adoption of the Cloud for the sharing
and collaboration of data, is privacy and security [14],[15]. Attacks can occur in transit,
on Cloud storage and on backup media. In fact, the worst culprits are malicious Cloud
providers themselves, as they have full, direct access to the data [17]. In order to
keep data secure, it is thus crucial that data must be kept encrypted at all times, even
when stored on the Cloud. However, encryption alone is not enough, as hackers and
Cloud providers continue to find new ways to access data. This can occur through
collusion-based attacks where the Cloud provider colludes with an authorised consumer
to reveal some vital information about the data. As mentioned earlier, other forms of
attack include sniffing attacks, accidental or intentional leaking of data by authorised
consumers, or even over-the-shoulder attacks.
There is currently on-going research on how to protect the confidentiality and security of
data stored in the Cloud. Jayalatchumy et al. [26] have proposed implementing security
as a Cloud service using a discretion algorithm, and have implemented an intrusion
detection system for the Cloud. Cavoukian [27] has argued the need for flexible and
user-centric identity management so that in the future, a user would not have to re-
enter credentials for a website and could rely on an identity service to manage website
access. There has also been research on using access control as a form of security. Access
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control provides restrictions on who can view the data and who cannot. Access Control
Lists (ACLs) were originally used [28] for data protection. XACML [29] is a generic,
open-source access control policy language built on XML allowing the data owner to
specify complex policies governing how their data should be used. The ABC4Trust EU
Project proposed the use of Privacy Attribute-Based Credentials (Privacy ABCs) [30]
as a way to enhance the privacy of individual authentication without ever requiring
them to reveal their full personal details and thus allowing their identity to be kept
anonymous. The AU2EU project aims to implement an integrated eAuthentication and
eAuthorisation framework for trusted collaborations and delivery of services by utilising
identity/attribute providers and policy enforcement mechanisms to name a few [31].
However, effective protocols need to be in place to simultaneously prevent privacy and
security breaches and reduce the burden on data owners to manage their groups of
authorised consumers. For instance, although ACLs provide a degree of control over
who can access the data, this is not effective, as it is too coarse-grained and unscalable,
which is one of the primary features of the Cloud.
In this thesis, we develop secure data-sharing protocols that allow the data owner to
efficiently and securely share and manage their data with many users. Through our pro-
tocols, we aim to improve the trust of the data owner in using the Cloud to share and
collaborate data with other users. Our protocols prevent insider attacks, collusion-based
attacks, sniffing/man-in-the- middle attacks, and a number of other common security
attacks. We demonstrate our protocols through our software-based self-protecting data
object called “SafeShare.” We also carry out performance tests on on SafeShare. We
later improve upon this work and propose a hardware-based self-protecting data object,
using a physical device, the Trusted Extension Device (TED). We discuss the perfor-
mance of this approach and ways to improve performance overall.
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1.3.3 Self-Controlling Data Object
One of the growing problems related to data sharing in the Cloud is the data owner
access-control problem. Once the data leaves the trusted premises of the data owner’s
machine, he no longer has any control over it. The data owner has no knowledge of
where the data is stored, who has access to the data, or how many copies of the data
are being kept. On top of the privacy and security issues discussed above, an authorised
data consumer might inadvertently leak the data owner’s data, either accidentally or in-
tentionally. This can happen when an authorised data consumer uses the fully decrypted
plaintext and sends it to their peers via email attachments and/or USB transfer.
Currently, the data owner has no knowledge of who is leaking the data, which makes
auditing and accountability difficult. The data owner also has no control over prevent-
ing the data owner from leaking the data or carrying out an illegal operation on the
data. There have not been many research projects that have focused on dishonest data
consumers who might leak data either accidentally or intentionally. Squicciarini et al.
[32] have proposed the idea of a Self-Controlling Object (SCO), which bundles data and
access control policy in a JAR file. The JAR file includes an executable that logs every
operation of the data consumer and periodically flushes the log file to the Cloud, in
order for the data owner to access and subsequently hold the offending data consumers
accountable. The main issue with this solution is that management of the SCOs is te-
dious and still does not prevent a dishonest consumer from leaking data; it only reports
the leak to the Cloud. Chen et al. [33] have proposed DataSafe, which similarly bundles
the data and policy in a file, with data access occurring on DataSafe machines. The
issue with this solution, however, is that it requires specific hardware and thus would
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not work with the Cloud. This is due to the Cloud feature that data can be accessed
from anywhere, at any time.
We introduce the idea of self-protecting data objects. Self-protecting data objects are
a fairly new contribution to research, and aim to provide the data owner with greater
access control over their data. With self-protecting data objects, the data owner now has
some level of control over their data, even if they store their data on the Cloud. This can
help to increase the data owner’s level of trust when sharing data. We demonstrate this
idea through our proposed policy-based self-protecting data object called “SafeProtect
Object.” We develop the object as well as a plugin to Microsoft Word which can be
used to access the object to demonstrate the feasibility of our idea. This work was well
recognised and achieved the Best Poster Award in CCGrid 2015.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
In this thesis, we focus on enabling private and secure data sharing in the Cloud, while
providing the data owner greater access control over their data. By enabling greater
access control, the data owner has greater confidence and trust in storing his data in
the Cloud, without worrying about sensitive data leakage by Cloud insiders and/or
authorised data consumers. Throughout this thesis, we tailor solutions that specifically
address the problems of key management in terms of user revocation and the need for
greater data-owner access control.
• In Chapter 2, we review the existing literature on the methods for achieving pri-
vate, secure and efficient data sharing in the Cloud.
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• In Chapter 3, we provide a formal description of the problem statement and de-
scribe our trust model.
• In Chapter 4, we describe and detail our solution to the problem of key manage-
ment, in terms of user revocation in the Cloud. This solution will enable data
owners to share data with very large groups of data consumers, whilst providing
the data owner with the low-burden ability to revoke data consumers. Our solution
uses a key partitioning technique, which splits the encryption key and distributes
partitions between consumers and the Cloud. We also demonstrate our solution
in the context of healthcare.
• In Chapter 5, we present solutions that prevent security attacks carried out by
malicious insiders and outsiders, related to data sharing in the Cloud. Our solu-
tions focus on preventing collusion attacks between attacker, revoked user and/or
CSP, insider attacks, sniffing attacks, and man-in-the-middle attacks, to name a
few.
• In Chapter 6, we present our solution to the data owner access control problem.
In our solution, we do not primarily focus on the Cloud but instead, focus on
ensuring that the data is used by data consumers in the way that the data owner
expects. We present a solution ensuring that data access by data consumers abides
by policies set out by the data owner. For example, if a data owner states in the
policy that his data should not be copied, a mechanism will prevent the data from
being copied by the data consumers via USB transfer or email attachments, etc.
• In Chapter 7, we lay out the directions for future work and conclude the thesis.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we present a review of the research literature related to secure data
sharing in the Cloud. We first present a summary of reviews on the privacy and security
of data in the Cloud. We then detail the privacy issues in the Cloud, provide some
examples, and list a few requirements for secure data sharing in the Cloud. We then
describe, compare and contrast work done on key management in the Cloud and data
owner access control. We conclude the review by providing future directions for private
and secure data sharing in the Cloud.
2.1 Reviews on Privacy and Security in the Cloud
There have been a number of reviews on security and privacy in the Cloud. Xiao et
al. [34] have identified the five concerns of Cloud computing – confidentiality, integrity,
availability, accountability and privacy – and have thoroughly reviewed the threats to
each of the concerns, aswell as defence strategies. Chen and Zhao [35] outline the
requirements for achieving privacy and security in the Cloud and also briefly outline
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the requirements for secure data sharing in the Cloud. Zhao [36] provides a survey
on privacy and security in the Cloud, focusing on how privacy laws should also take
Cloud computing into consideration, and what work can be done to prevent privacy and
security breaches of one’s personal data in the Cloud. Wang et al. [37] have explored the
factors that affect the management of information security in Cloud computing. They
explain that the necessary security need for enterprises is to understand the dynamics
of information security in the Cloud. Saravanakumar et al. [38] surveys related works
on Cloud interoperability, security, privacy and trust. Hosseinzadeh et al. [39] surveyed
works that proposed techniques to enhance privacy and security via obfuscation and
diversification techniques. Raja et al. [40] analyses works and emphasises the need
for privacy preserving identity management in a public Cloud environment. Kumari
et al. [41] reviews works on security issues and concerns in the Cloud as well as some
countermeasures. Oza et al. [42] have carried out a survey on a number of users to
determine the user experience of Cloud computing, and have found that the main issue
for all users is trust and how to make a choice between different Cloud Service Providers.
Wang [43] carried out a study on the privacy and security compliance of Software as a
Service (SaaS) among enterprises.
Table 2.1 shows a summary of the reviews of privacy and security in the Cloud. The
table categorises the related work in two aspects; Cloud security and Data sharing. The
table depicts whether the related work addresses the threats, provides defense strategies
and/or provides a number of requirements in order to achieve Cloud security or data
sharing privacy. The table also depicts whether the related work addresses how much
of an impact the Cloud and/or data sharing has had on society in general.
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Cloud
Security
Data
Sharing
Threats Defense
Strategies
Require-
ments
Impact on
society
Xiao Z. et al. [34] Y N Y Y N Y
Chen and Zhao
[35]
Y Y Y N Y Y
Zhao [36] Y N Y Y Y Y
Wang et al. [37] Y N Y Y Y Y
Saravanakumar
et al. [38]
Y N Y N N N
Hosseinzadeh et
al. [39]
Y N N Y N N
Raja et al. [40] N N Y Y N Y
Jen-Sheng Wang
et al. [37]
Y N N Y Y Y
Yu-Hui Wang [43] Y N N Y Y N
Oza et al. [42] Y N Y N Y Y
Y = Yes N = No
Table 2.1: Summary of reviews
2.2 Privacy and Security Issues in the Cloud
Privacy has many definitions in the literature. Some examples of the different definitions
of privacy are: “being left alone,” “the control we have over information about ourselves”
and “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others” [44], to
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name a few. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
[35] defines privacy as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual
(data subject).” The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) in the Generally Accepted
Privacy Principles (GAPP) standard [35], define privacy as, “The rights and obligations
of individuals and organizations with respect to the collection, use, retention, and dis-
closure of personal information.” From these definitions, it is clear that a person has
some level of control over what they want to disclose about themselves and what they
want to keep secret about the rest of their information. Privacy should not be assumed
to have the same meaning as confidentiality. Confidentiality involves allowing only au-
thorised users to gain access to that information, and no one else. Confidentiality can
be regarded as a subset relation of privacy.
Security, on the other hand, is defined by NIST [45] as “A condition that results from
the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that enable an enterprise
to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by threats to its use of
information systems. Protective measures may involve a combination of deterrence,
avoidance, prevention, detection, recovery, and correction that should form part of the
enterprise’s risk management approach.”
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Attacker 
Figure 2.1: Attack Model
Figure 2.1 highlights a basic attack model. An attacker will use attack methods to carry
out a privacy and security attack on an attack space. We now describe each of these
components in detail, as well as provide guidelines and discuss the current approaches
used to mitigate and/or prevent these attacks.
2.2.1 Attackers
There are many different types of attackers, with different reasons to attack users [46],
[47]. The following are examples of the motives of attackers.
• To steal valuable data - Hackers love to steal data, as there is sensitive data stored
in the Cloud worth millions of dollars. With access to valuable data, they can then
generate revenue; for example, WikiLeaks [48].
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• To cause controversy - Some attackers purely love the thrill and excitement of
causing chaos on the Internet, and the Cloud is one of the best mediums to tar-
get, mainly because of the popularity of the Internet and it being easier to steal
data over the Internet in comparison to a personal computer system. The attack
on Apple iCloud is one example, which revealed a number of private pictures of
celebrities that were posted all over the Web [49].
• To obtain revenge - Former workers recently stripped of their position at an organ-
isation might express their dissatisfaction by hacking the organisation’s network.
When an organisation makes use of the Cloud, this becomes all too easy for the
former employee, and there have been many cases of this happening. For instance,
the case of a former employee who managed to access the Cloud provider’s server
and delete an entire season of a children’s TV show [17].
• To help - In contrast, a hacker might try to help an organisation by identifying
the security flaws in their system. A hacker might be confident enough to bypass
the existing security protocol and implant his or her own mechanisms in order to
expose the protocol. For example, in 1988, a first-year graduate student created
the devastating Morris worm to demonstrate the inadequacies of the computer
network’s security measures at the time [50].
• To prove intellect and gain prestige - Attackers may also want to show off their
skills and gain prestige among their peers through hacking a large organisation
with solid security mechanisms. Some hackers make a career out of hacking or-
ganisations. For example, the attack on the New York Times website exposed
many sensitive records. The attack was partly motivated by the need to prove
the hacker’s intelligence, as the attacker included his own name in the expertise
category [51].
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• Are just curious - Some hackers are curious to learn something about a company
and/or an organisation. These types of hackers do not usually have a malicious
intention, as they may not be aware of breaking security rules; however, this does
not mean that these hackers are less dangerous. For example, the Morris worm in
1988 was also partly motivated by curiosity [50].
2.2.2 Attack Methods
There are a number of types of privacy and security attacks that are possible in the
Cloud. The following is a summary of the common types of attacks that could occur in
the Cloud.
• Insider Attacks - As discussed in Chapter 1, a malicious insider has full and direct
access to the data. They can do anything they wish with the data, including selling
them for profit [19].
• Sniffing Attacks - Attackers intercept the public communication channels and re-
trieve sensitive information, such as passwords.
• Collusion Attacks - When two or more parties have secret information and agree
to reveal this illegally.
• XML Signature Wrapping Attacks - Using different kinds of XML signature wrap-
ping attacks, one can completely take over the administrative rights of the Cloud
user and create, delete and modify images, as well as create new instances in the
victim’s Cloud [52].
• Cross-site scripting attacks - attackers can inject a piece of code into web applica-
tions to bypass access control mechanisms. Researchers found this possible with
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Amazon Web Services [52], in November 2011. They were able to gain free access
to all customer data, authentication data, tokens, and plaintext passwords.
• Flooding Attack Problem - Provided that a malicious user can send requests to
the Cloud, he or she can then easily overload the server by creating bogus data
requests to the Cloud [53]. The attempt is to increase the workload of the Cloud
servers by needlessly consuming lots of resources.
• Insecure Interface - A vulnerability in the interface which users use to interact
with the Cloud may divulge sensitive information [6].
• Denial-of-Service Attacks - Malicious code is injected into the browser to open
many windows and as a result, deny legitimate users access to services.
• Law Enforcement Requests - When law enforcement demands access to the data
of a Cloud Service Provider, the Cloud Service Provider is unlikely to deny such a
request. Hence, there is an inherent threat to user privacy and data confidentiality.
• Data Stealing Problem - A term used to describe the stealing of a user account
and password by any means [53], such as through brute-force attacks or over-
the-shoulder techniques. The privacy and confidentiality of a user’s data will be
severely breached. A common mechanism to prevent such attacks is to include an
extra value during the authentication process. This value can be distributed to the
correct user via SMS, thus mitigating the likelihood of data confidentiality issues.
• Over-The-Shoulder Attacks: In these types of attacks, a user attempts to steal
critical information via direct observation, such as looking over one’s shoulder or
taking a snapshot, or even taking video footage. It is the responsibility of the data
consumer to keep the data secure and ensure that no secret information is leaked.
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These types of attacks will not be covered within the thesis, as this is outside the
scope of our work.
2.2.3 Attack Space
Whilst an attacker may have the motivation and methods to undertake an attack, they
usually then seek to target specific contexts such as healthcare, social networks, etc.,
depending on how sensitive the data is or how easy it is to obtain the data. We look at
a few contexts from which an attacker may seek to retrieve sensitive data, below.
Healthcare: In the context of healthcare, patients reveal their health-related infor-
mation to healthcare professionals in order to diagnose and treat illnesses [54]. In the
United States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [55]
provides federal protection for an individual’s personal health information and provides
individuals with rights to their information. The HIPAA Privacy Rule provides protec-
tion for a patient’s personal health information and guidelines on how external entities
such as doctors and nurses can gain access to the patient’s data, with the patient’s con-
sent. While the HIPAA guidelines are also followed by other countries around the world,
it is not followed in Australia. The Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 aims to protect
all personal information including health data in Australia [56]. In NSW, all health
information is covered by the Health Records and Information Privacy Act (HRIPA)
[56]. As [54] argues, since the patient decides to share their data with one or more
healthcare professionals, their data is no longer private, but is confidential. In 2014,
Community Health Systems, which was one of the largest hospital operators in the US,
notified 4.5 million patients that their personal information was stolen by cybercriminals
[57]. Hackers were able to access patient names, addresses, dates of birth, and telephone
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numbers. Similarly, another attack on a diagnostic radiology service provider exposed
the billing information and medical data of over 300,000 patients [58].
Social Networking: Social networking has changed the lives of today’s generation.
There are many social networking sites with millions of users communicating with each
other. Some examples are Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, YouTube, and the list goes on.
Internet privacy has been determined as the “right to be left alone” [59]. The technology
that is built to support social networking does not effectively support privacy and may
even sell personal information about the individual to third parties, and it is mainly up to
the individual to disclose information while maintaining privacy. The individual needs to
make sure that they do not unknowingly disclose personal information about themselves.
Simply disclosing their age, suburb and nationality is enough for malicious users to
identify the person. Facebook has undergone scrutiny in the past for not strengthening
its privacy measures on user profiles, as private photos could still be viewed by non-
private viewers through a friend-of-a-friend, by simply having a friend comment on the
image [60]. Facebook was also the target of phishing attacks in early 2012, which involved
attempting to steal user accounts and learn financial information [61]. Once accounts
were stolen, the user’s profile would be locked out and the profile picture would change.
In fact, Facebook has been the target of a number of phishing attacks, such as Ramnit
[62], which affected up to 45,000 users. Google revealed in June 2011 that hackers from
China stole passwords and attempted to break into email accounts to steal information
[63]. More than 100 people were affected, including senior government officials. People
began to discuss whether this, and the Sony incident, was the start of the downfall of
Cloud computing [64]. Hotmail and Yahoo Mail users were also targeted in phishing
attacks [65],[66]. The attacks involved a user either clicking a malicious link in the
email or viewing the email itself, which would then run a malicious code and attempt to
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compromise the user’s account. In April 2011, Sony was involved in a massive security
blunder that potentially gave away 100 million credit card numbers. Hackers claimed to
have stolen millions of credit card numbers from Sony’s PlayStation Network [67].
Government: Nearly all governments collect information about their citizens and res-
idents, such as education, finance, gender, loans, earnings, medical costs, criminal of-
fences, and so on [68]. Governments also release data to the public, for their citizens
to view. This might not guarantee the privacy of citizens, as some users might be able
to infer information about a particular user through government data. In Australia,
the Commonwealth Privacy Act of 1988 aims to protect the privacy of any personal
information [56]. This includes the collection, use, storage, disclosure and access to any
personal information. The Act permits the handling of health information for health
and research purposes. In the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 aims to protect
an individual’s privacy [69]. According to the Act, individuals have the right to view
the information that the government has about them, to modify or remove incorrect
information, and to also sue the government for violations of the Act, including, but
not limited to, unauthorised access to personal information. Governments also need
to keep data private from other governments [70], as the results can be devastating if
information is leaked, as with WikiLeaks [48].
Education: Schools usually collect personal health information on all students. This
includes the name, telephone number, address, contact details, financial details, al-
lergies/disabilities and family history, to name a few. It is usually strongly implied that
schools keep this information confidential and private [71]. Privacy and security breaches
may also affect student grades and even open up avenues for stealing and plagiarism.
For example, Google Docs (used by many students for assignments and homework) con-
tained a flaw that inadvertently shared user documents with unauthorised users [18].
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Other users could access and edit documents without the permission of the Google Docs
owner.
Corporations: Major businesses and organisations also require the privacy and con-
fidentiality of their data. The leakage of sensitive information can result in the loss
of revenue for a company, even to the extent of ruining the business. In 2007, Sales-
force.com leaked customer contact lists after an employee revealed the list to a phisher,
and in turn allowed scammers to target phishing attacks against Salesforce.com cus-
tomers [19]. A Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack on Amazon Web Services
in 2009 forced many companies to shut down temporarily, such as Bitbucket [72].
Attacks contribute heavily to user suspicion, which affects their trust in storing sensitive
data in the Cloud. In order to gain users’ trust in using the Cloud to store critical data,
mechanisms need to be implemented that guarantee data is kept both confidential and
secure from unauthorised users.
2.2.4 Existing Solutions to Privacy and Security Issues
We now discuss the guidelines for a private and secure Cloud, as well as the current
technologies in place to prevent privacy and security attacks on the Cloud.
2.2.4.1 Guidelines
According to [73], the above issues could have the following impacts on the Cloud:
Governance - Organisations usually have standards, practices, protocols, policies and
procedures that employees must abide by, which can cover application development,
testing, implementation, monitoring, and so on. When an organisation makes use of
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Cloud services, there is always the possibility that employees bypass these rules, as
there is a lack of organisational rules regarding the Cloud.
Compliance - This refers to an organisation’s responsibility to operate in agreement
with established laws and regulations. There are a number of privacy and security laws
within different countries and states, and when using the Cloud, an organisation has to
consider whether they are likely to breach any privacy or security laws, as data stored in
the Cloud is usually stored in multiple locations around the world, and at times without
the knowledge of the user.
Trust - It is a well-known fact that when a user or organisation chooses to outsource
their data to the Cloud, they relinquish full control of their data and provide a high level
of trust to the Cloud provider. As discussed in the introduction and the next section,
most privacy and security attacks on data arise from insider attacks. The Cloud provider
usually has direct access to data and is thus more likely to steal data for illegal purposes.
In terms of trust, there is also the issue of data ownership, such as who owns the data,
and contracts specifying whether the Cloud has some or no access to parts of its data.
Architecture - The architecture of the Cloud needs to be designed in a way that prevents
privacy and security attacks. For instance, IaaS Cloud providers can provide Virtual
Machine Images to consumers. An organisation that makes use of these images could
store highly critical data. An attacker may examine the images to see whether they
leak information. An attacker may also supply a corrupted virtual machine image to
users and thus steal confidential data. It is important that the architecture of the Cloud
is developed such that it ensures privacy and security, as attackers are always on the
lookout for security holes within Cloud architecture.
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Identity and Access Management - As data sensitivity and privacy are becoming an ever-
increasing issue for organisations, the identity and authorisation framework present in
the organisation may not extend to the Cloud, and malicious users may be able to gain
unwarranted and unauthorised access to the data.
Software Isolation - With multi-tenant Cloud computing architectures, computations
for different consumers are carried out in isolation, even if the software remains in a
single software stack. Applications running in the Cloud are susceptible to attack and
compromise; therefore, isolation is needed to prevent such attacks.
Data Protection - Data stored in a public cloud usually reside with other data from other
organisations. When an organisation places their sensitive data in a public cloud, they
must account for the possible privacy and security attacks by ensuring proper access
control mechanisms, such as encryption. Since data is stored “in the open,” there is a
world of opportunity for malicious users to steal data. Similar concerns exist when data
is in transit.
Availability - As defined in the NIST Security and Privacy Guidelines [73], availability
is the extent to which an organisation’s full set of computational resources is accessible
and usable. Attacks such as Denial-of-Service attacks, server downtime and natural
disasters, affect availability and stored data and, more importantly, cause downtime,
which greatly affects an organisation. Incident Response - An incident response is an
organised method of dealing with the consequences of a security attack. The Cloud
contains many layers such as applications, the operating system, network, database and
so on, and a log is generated of any event as part of its intrusion detection system. Such
a complexity of layers means that it will take many hours to identify an attack in the
Cloud.
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2.2.4.2 Technologies
In this section, we discuss what is currently being done to protect and/or mitigate
privacy and security attacks on the Cloud.
Currently, there is on-going research into how to protect the confidentiality and security
of data stored in the Cloud. Jayalatchumy et al. [74] propose the implementation of
security as a service in the Cloud and the implementation of an intrusion detection
system for the Cloud. They develop a discretion algorithm which processes data to
make it anonymous and sends this to various service providers in the Cloud for further
processing. Although the data is anonymous, it still presents a considerable risk to
store data in plaintext in the Cloud. Cavoukian [26] argues the need for flexible and
user-centric identity management so that in the future, a user will not have to re-enter
their credentials for a website and can rely on an identity service to manage website
access. This of course has its problems, including that there is potentially a single point
of failure in the identity service unless it is carefully designed.
The THEWS architecture proposed by Ruotsalainen et al. [75] has developed a privacy
management architecture to help the data owner create and manage the network and
maintain the privacy of ubiquitous health information. Routsalanien et al. point out
that there is an asymmetric relationship between health information systems and their
users because users rarely have the power “to force a system to put personal rules into
effect.” The architecture makes uses of policies and one of the main challenges with
this work is how to translate narrative rules defined by the user into machine-readable
policies.
In order to protect a user’s data confidentiality, some form of access control needs to be
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implemented in the Cloud. Access control should allow a user to choose who can view
his data and who cannot. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Access Control Lists (ACLs) [28]
were originally used, however, this is ineffective as it is too coarse-grained and unscalable,
which is one of the primary features of the Cloud.
An alternative and effective access control technique is encryption. Encrypting data
ensures that data is protected from unauthorised users. There are two types of encryp-
tion: symmetric and asymmetric. In symmetric encryption, a key is used to encrypt the
data to make it virtually unreadable. The same key is also used to convert the unread-
able ciphertext into its original plaintext. This key must be kept confidential with the
data owner. In asymmetric encryption, public and private keys are used to encrypt and
decrypt data. A user encrypts the data using another person’s public key. The other
person then uses his private key to decrypt the data. The public key can be broadcast
to the world but the private key must remain confidential with the user.
(a) Symmetric Encryption
(b) Asymmetric Encryption
Figure 2.2: Symmetric and Asymmetric Encryption
Encryption of data held in the cloud is crucial for preserving the security of the data.
Much of the literature suggests the need for encrypting data in the Cloud in some form
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or another. RuWei et al. [18] state that encryption must occur in transit, at rest, and
on backup media. Gentry [76] proposes the use of homomorphic encryption to keep data
secure and confidential. With homomorphic encryption, it is possible to perform oper-
ations such as querying and searching encrypted data without ever having to decrypt
the data, thus exposing privacy. Yao et al. [77] propose a system called “TrustStore,”
which encrypts and partitions data on the client side and sends each partition to differ-
ent Cloud storage providers. This greatly enhances the confidentiality of data, as the
probability of compromising two or more storage providers is low. However, it does not
handle the case of data sharing and collaboration, which is the focus of our thesis. Silva
et al. [78] present a data encryption solution for mobile health apps and have conducted
a performance evaluation comparing both symmetric and asymmetric encryption algo-
rithms. Even when data is encrypted, it may still be possible for a malicious Cloud
provider to deduce information from the encrypted data. Zhang et al. [79] propose a
novel solution that adds noise obfuscation based on a time-series pattern, to client data
stored in the Cloud. This can help to protect the privacy of the owner’s data, since
it prevents malicious service providers from deducing information from the encrypted
data.
Paul et al. [80] proposes a “Good Enough” method for privacy-preserving Cloud data
storage which aims to balance cost efficiency and security. The method utilises hashed
data splitting techniques to anonymize and separate uniquely identifiable data and also
preserves privacy by taking advantage of multiple Cloud providers. Rahaman et al. [81]
proposes the Preserving cloud computing Privacy (PccP) model which aims to preserve
the privacy of user information in the Cloud.
Table 2.2 presents works related to privacy and security protection in the Cloud. We
categorise and distinguish between papers that focus on privacy, security or both.
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Method Privacy protection Security protection
Jayalatchumy et al. [74] N Y
Cavoukian [26] N Y
Ruotsalainen et al. [75] Y N
RuWei et al. [18] Y Y
Gentry [76] Y Y
Yao et al. [77] Y Y
Silva et al. [78] Y N
Zhang et al. [79] Y N
Paul et a. [80] Y N
Rahaman et al. [81] Y N
Y = Yes N = No
Table 2.2: Related works on privacy and security protection in the Cloud
When considering data sharing and collaboration, simple encryption techniques do not
suffice, especially when considering key management. To enable secure and confiden-
tial data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud, there first needs to be proper key
management in the Cloud. This will be explained in detail, in the next section.
There are research (and implementation) opportunities covering areas such as optimal
key management and distribution amongst a set of identified users. How is revocation
implemented and if a key or other credential is revoked, can the user rejoin the group
while preserving their rights in the system? We will provide a solution to this in Chapter
4.
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2.3 Private and Secure Data Sharing in the Cloud
In this section, we discuss the traditional approach to sharing data via the Cloud and
why the traditional approach is not effective. We also discuss the key management
problem and review a number of works that address this issue. We then review recent
works that aim to provide private and secure data sharing in the Cloud, and discuss the
latest techniques used to achieve this.
2.3.1 Traditional Approach
A trivial solution to data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud involves a data owner
distributing encryption keys to every user that he authorises. Each user that has autho-
rised access can then obtain the encrypted data from the Cloud and decrypt the data
using the supplied key. This ensures that no unauthorised user gains access to data even
if the user manages to download the ciphertext from the Cloud, as the user does not
possess the decryption key.
This solution, however, is both inefficient and ineffective. Once the data owner decides
to revoke a user’s access to their data, one trivial solution would be for the data owner to
decrypt the data and then re-encrypt the data, this time with a new key, and distribute
this new key to the remaining users in the group. This can become extremely costly
and places an immense burden on the data owner, when considering group sizes between
thousands and millions of users. Furthermore, as members of the group continually join
and leave, continually re-encrypting data and sending re-encryption keys to a group of
this size, becomes impractical for the data owner and infeasible to implement in the real
world. Currently, there is on-going research on this problem.
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2.3.1.1 The Need for Key Management in the Cloud
Key management covers the creation/deletion of keys, activation/deactivation of keys,
transportation of keys, storage of keys, and so on [82]. It does not cover encryption
and decryption. Most Cloud Service Providers provide basic key encryption schemes for
protecting data, or they might leave it to the user to encrypt their own data.
Either way, there is a need to encrypt data involved in the Cloud. This raises a few
questions, namely:
• How do we handle the keys that are used for encryption?
• Where should the keys be stored and who has access to those keys?
• How do we recover data if keys are lost?
The solution we propose in Chapter 4 will address these questions. Both encryption and
key management are very important to help secure applications and data stored in the
Cloud [83]. In recent times especially, there has been a strong need for Cloud providers
to adopt a robust key management scheme for their services. However, there are still
key management issues affecting Cloud computing, as described in [84]. We discuss the
three requirements of effective key management, below.
• Secure key stores: The key stores themselves must be protected from malicious
users. If a malicious user gains access to the keys, they will then be able to
access any encrypted data that the key corresponds to. Therefore, the key stores
themselves must be protected in storage, in transit, and on backup media.
• Access to key stores: Access to the key stores should be limited to the users that
have the rights to access the data. The separation of roles should be used to help
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control access. The entity that uses a given key should not be the entity that
stores the key.
• Key backup and recoverability: Keys need secure backup and recovery solutions.
The loss of keys, although effective for destroying access to data, can be highly
devastating for a business, and Cloud providers need to ensure that keys are not
lost, through backup and recovery mechanisms.
Tim Mather [85] states that key management in enterprises today is broken, and that
key management in the Cloud is a failed model that is neither effective nor scalable.
Fortunately, there are a number of standards for key management in the Cloud, which
are briefly described, below.
• OASIS Key Management Interoperability Protocol (KMIP) - Used to define a sin-
gle, comprehensive protocol for communication between encryption systems and
enterprise key management systems [86]. KMIP is becoming a widely accepted
standard within industries, who are looking to implement it within their frame-
works.
• NIST SP 800-57 - Provides general guidelines on key management, the recom-
mended types of encryption schemes and protection requirements, as well as infor-
mation on key recovery [87].
• IEEE 1619.3 Key Management - covers storage encryption and key management,
mainly for IaaS storage [84]. The standard has been dissolved since December
2010.
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• ISO/IEC 11770-5:2011 - Specifies key establishment mechanisms for multiple en-
tities to provide procedures for handling the cryptographic keys used in symmetric
and asymmetric encryption algorithms [88].
• Other standards include ISO 11568-2:2012 [89] and IETF KeyProv.
Bruce Schneier [83] states that “Key management is the hardest part of cryptography
and often the Achilles’ heel of an otherwise secure system.” [83] argues that since
technology is so broad, as it spans various operating systems, storage, encryption and
key management, virtualisation, VM mobility and Cloud, key management solutions
in the Cloud need to be broader. Luther [65], on the other hand, states that key
management is more difficult than cryptography; where cryptography boils down to
mathematics, key management involves technology, people, and processes. He states
that strong encryption is nearly impossible to beat compared to key management, which
is not as robust.
2.3.1.2 Review of works on Key Management
Zhao et al. [90] proposed a progressive elliptic curve encryption scheme (PECE),
whereby a piece of data is encrypted a number of times using multiple keys, and later
decrypted using one key. Data sharing involves one user, say, Alice, encrypting her
data by using her private key and storing the encrypted data in the Cloud. Another
user, say, Bob, sends a request for data access permission by sending his public key to
Alice. Alice sends a credential to the storage provider for the re-encryption of data,
and sends a credential to Bob to decrypt the data. This is an effective technique, as it
keeps data confidential because data is encrypted throughout all of the stages, thereby
never allowing a malicious user to view the plaintext data. This technique also does not
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allow the permission bearer (in our case, Bob) to share the file owned by the permission
holder (Alice) with other users. The main problem with this technique, however, is that
it requires the data owner to be online at all times, making it inefficient for everyday
users. This technique also assumes that the private key of the Cloud provider is shared
with the data owner. Realistically, no system administrator would want to share their
keys with users, thus making it impractical to deploy this technique.
Lei et al. [91] have illustrated the need for proper key management in the Cloud environ-
ment. A Cloud Key Management Infrastructure (CKMI) is proposed, which contains a
Cloud Key Management Client (CKMC) and Cloud Key Management Server (CKMS).
The protocol includes: objects that contain keys and certificates, etc.; the operations
upon them, such as creation, deletion, retrieval and the updating of keys and certifi-
cates; and attributes related to the object in question, such as the object identifier. The
method is effective for proper key management; however, if the server is broken, all of
the user’s data is lost and there is no proper backup and recovery mechanism, which is
a key requirement of key management, as described above.
Huangi et al. [18] have built on the Leakage Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange
(LR-AKE) first proposed by Fathi et al. [92], and they have proposed the LR-AKE
Cluster mode protocol for effective key management. The LR-AKE involves the user
remembering a password whilst additionally storing a high-entropy secret on the client
machine, to allow communication between different servers. In the LR-AKE Cluster
mode, the client generates authentication secrets for each server and partial data keys.
Each pair authenticates and communicates with each other to combine partial keys, in
order to reveal full data keys when the user requests this. The main weakness with this
protocol is that if any one of the client servers fail, the data is lost, as the keys used
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to access the data will be unavailable. The LR-AKE Cluster+ mode builds on the LR-
AKE Cluster mode, where, aside from the user’s personal password, the client chooses
a random password (256 bits long), and this random password and the authentication
secrets are stored on another device (e.g., a USB drive), for added security and higher
availability. Secrets are required from both communication parties and hence the data
remains information – theoretically secure and confidential. One of the drawbacks to
this approach is that it requires the maintenance of a number of servers and the client,
which adds unwanted complexity when trying to attract large number of users to the
Cloud.
Sanka et al. [93] have proposed capability lists for effective key management and data
access, where the data owner does not have to be online at all times. The model
involves using a capability list, where the data owner creates a list containing an entry
for each user and the permissions for file access, and stores this list in the CSP. When a
user requests access to a file, he makes this request directly to the CSP; therefore, the
data owner does not have to be online at all times, and only needs to be online when
registering new users or revoking users from the list. The model is confidential and
secure against the Cloud and unauthorised users, since they never know the contents of
the encrypted data because the key is a shared symmetric key between the data owner
and the user. The main issue with the model, however, is that it assumes that the CSP
will not alter the capability list. The CSP has access to the unencrypted capability list
and can maliciously alter files or prevent users from accessing them.
Bennani et al. [94] propose a model that replicates the database in the cloud n times,
where n represents the number of roles. When a role is revoked access rights, the
corresponding database is removed. In the worst case, changing the access rights of a
role leads to the creation from scratch of a new view, and re-keying the corresponding
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database. One of the main problems with this model is that it is unfeasible to implement,
since it introduces high redundancy and is thus inefficient.
Boldyreva et al. [95] have suggested Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), where a user’s ID
is used to generate keys in order to access data. Sahai and Seyalioglu [96] have introduced
worry-free encryption, where a user can send files to others without worrying about
whether they have the right to access data. The solution uses functional encryption
with public keys. With all of these solutions, although the Cloud is assumed to be
untrusted, the authorised user is always assumed to conform to operations allowed by
the data owner. However, once the data is decrypted, the data owner loses control of
their data and the decryptor can do whatever he wishes with it, without being caught.
In these solutions, the data consumer is assumed to be fully trusted. Wang et al. [97]
presents a key management scheme based on hypergraphs. The solution, however, uses
rekeying which can be inefficient in terms of user revocation. Song et al. [98] proposes
a hidden mapping hyper-combined public key management scheme. Buchade et al. [99]
identifies, compares and applies state-of-the-art key management methods to various
Cloud environments.
2.3.1.3 Discussion
Table 2.3 shows a summary of the existing literature based on key management in the
Cloud. The works that were reviewed had a strong focus on preventing the need for
the data owner to be online at all times. Many of the works that were reviewed also
had a strong focus on preventing the Cloud from viewing any of the plaintext at all
times. However, in terms of achieving proper key management in the Cloud, some form
of redundancy had to be introduced in some of the works. Some of the works proposed
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Method Data/Key
Redundancy
Data Owner
online at all
times
Confidentiality
preserved
from CSP
Single point of
failure
Zhao et al. [90] Y Y Y Y
Lei et al. [91] N N Y Y
Huang et al. [18] Y N Y N
Sanka et al. [93] N N N N
Bennani et al. [94] Y N Y N
Boldyreva et al.
[95]
N N Y N
Sahai et al. [96] N N Y N
Wang et al. [97] Y N Y N
Song et al. [98] N N Y N
Y = Yes N = No
Table 2.3: Summary of related key management literature
solutions which had a single point of failure. In other words, if one component of their
system failed, the entire system also failed.
Proper key management can lead to more secure and confidential sharing of data in the
Cloud. A poor key management system can lead to the complete unreliability of the
Cloud, and can also diminish the trust of its consumers. Thus, it is imperative that
more research is undertaken on achieving more robust key management for the Cloud,
not only to attract more consumers and build trust but also to provide a foundation for
secure and private data sharing in the Cloud.
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2.3.2 Recent Approaches
In this section, we provide a review of the current literature on enabling secure and
confidential data sharing in the Cloud.
2.3.2.1 Attribute-Based Encryption
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) is an effective and promising technique that is used
to provide fine-grained access control to data in the Cloud. Initially, access to data in the
Cloud was provided through Access Control Lists (ACLs); however, this was unscalable
and only provided coarse-grained access to data [28]. Attribute-Based Encryption, first
proposed by Goyal et al. [22], provides a more scalable and fine-grained access control
to data, in comparison to ACLs.
Attribute-Based Encryption is an access control mechanism, where a user or a piece of
data has attributes that are associated with it. An access control policy is defined and
if the attributes satisfy the access control policy, the user should be able to access the
piece of data.
There are two kinds of ABE [28], which are described as follows.
Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE): The access control policy is stored with the user’s
private key and the encrypted data additionally stores a number of attributes associated
with the data. A user can only decrypt the data if the attributes of the data satisfy the
access control policy in the user’s key. The access control policy is usually defined as an
access tree, with interior nodes representing threshold gates and leaf nodes representing
attributes.
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Figure 2.3: Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE): Essentially the converse of KP-ABE. The ac-
cess control policy is stored with the data and the attributes are stored in the user’s
key.
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Figure 2.4: Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
ABE is also used for data sharing and collaboration. Tu et al. [24] have made use of
CP-ABE in the context of enterprise applications, and have also developed a revocation
mechanism that simultaneously allows high adaptability, fine-grained access control,
and revocation. The department assigns users a set of attributes within their secret
key, and distributes the secret key to the respective users. Any user that satisfies the
access control policy defined by the data collaborator, can access the data. When a
user’s access rights are revoked, the data is re- ncrypted in the Cloud, rendering the
revoked user’s key useless. The CP-ABE model is proven to be semantically secure
against chosen ciphertext attacks. However, the scheme is inelegant in the case of user
revocation, since the updating of ciphertexts following user revocation causes a heavy
computation overhead, even if the burden is transferred to the Cloud.
Li et al. [100] leverage ABE in the context of sharing personal health records (PHR)
in the Cloud. Their framework is comprised of a public domain consisting of users
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who access professional records, such as doctors, nurses and medical researchers, and a
personal domain consisting of users who are personally associated with the data owner,
such as family and close friends. Role attributes that represent their professional role are
assigned to the public domain users, and they retrieve their secret keys from an attribute
authority. This is effective, as the data owner need not be online at all times. In terms
of access control, data owners specify role-based fine-grained access control policies for
their PHR files. Using role-based access policies greatly reduces the key management
overhead for owners and users, as the owner does not have to manage keys for each user.
2.3.2.2 Proxy Re-encryption
Proxy Re-encryption is another technique that is fast becoming adopted for enabling
secure and confidential data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud.
Proxy Re-encryption [23] allows a semi-trusted proxy with a re-encryption key, to trans-
late a ciphertext under the data owner’s public key into another ciphertext, which can
be decrypted by another user’s secret key. At no stage will the proxy be able to access
the plaintext. Researchers have utilised Proxy Re-encryption in relation to the Cloud,
particularly for secure and confidential data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud.
We demonstrate a basic Proxy Re-encryption scheme with the diagram below. A user,
Alice, encrypts her data m, using her public key. When she wants to share the data with
another user, Bob, she sends the encrypted data to a proxy. The proxy then converts the
data encrypted under Alice’s public key into data that is encrypted under Bob’s public
key, and sends this to Bob. Bob can now use his private key to decrypt the ciphertext
and reveal the contents.
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Figure 2.5: A Basic Proxy Re-encryption Scheme
A number of researchers have proposed Proxy Re-encryption for enabling secure and
confidential data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud.
Tran et al. [25] use the idea of a Proxy Re-encryption scheme where the data owner’s
private key is divided into two parts. One half is stored on the data owner’s machine
while the other is stored in the Cloud proxy. The data owner encrypts the data with
half of his private key, which is then encrypted again by the proxy using the other half
of the key. Another user, who has been granted access rights, will then have the same
key divided with different parts. One half will be kept on the granted user’s machine,
and the other half stored on the Cloud proxy. The user who has access rights can then
retrieve the data, as the proxy will decrypt the ciphertext with half of the user’s private
key in the proxy, and then decrypt this again on the user’s side to retrieve the full
plaintext. When the data owner wishes to revoke a user’s data access, he simply informs
the Cloud proxy to remove the user’s key piece. The main strength with this scheme
is that it does not require re-encryption if a user’s rights are revoked and hence saves
on computation costs, especially when considering the large number of users in groups.
As with the PECE scheme described above [90], this scheme does not allow outsiders to
view the original plaintext at any point, as the data remains in an unreadable format
in the Cloud. Only users with granted access rights can view the original plaintext.
However, the main problem with this scheme is that of collusion attacks: if a revoked
user and the proxy collude, that user then has access to the other group users’ private
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keys. Furthermore, the proxy might suffer from too many encryption and decryption
operations. The model also assumes that the data owner has already given permission
to a number of users to access the data.
2.3.2.3 Hybrid ABE and PRE
ABE and Proxy Re-encryption have also been used in combination with each other to
provide extra security and privacy for data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud. A
number of works in the literature are taking advantage of combining the power of the
two schemes, to provide more robustness and guarantee further trust on the part of the
data owner, with regards to the secure sharing of data in the Cloud.
The work of Yu et al. [101] was one of the first to combine ABE, Proxy Re-encryption
and lazy encryption schemes for Cloud privacy and security. The scheme works through
the data owner encrypting his data using a symmetric key, and then encrypting the
symmetric key using a set of attributes according to the KP-ABE scheme. A new user
joins the system when the data owner assigns an access structure and its corresponding
secret key, and distributes this to the new user. To revoke a user, the data owner
determines the minimum number of attributes, which will never satisfy the revoked
user’s access structure, and updates these as necessary. All of the remaining users’
secret keys will also be updated. Due to the heavy burden on the data owner, which
could require him to be online at all times in order to provide key updates, proxy re-
encryption is introduced to allow the Cloud to carry out these tasks. Thus, most of the
computational overhead is delegated to the Cloud. The data owner’s data is kept secure
and confidential at all times, as the Cloud is only exposed to the ciphertext and not to
the original data contents.
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Yanjiang et al. [102] have also proposed a combination of the ABE and Proxy Re-
encryption schemes, to enable secure data sharing in the Cloud. The model involves
a data owner, Alice, encrypting data d with a random key k. Alice then determines
another random value k1 and using access control policy pol, encrypts k1 using ABE.
Alice then computes k2 using operations on k and k1, i.e., k2 = kk1, and encrypts
with her public key using Proxy Re-encryption. The two keys (ABE and proxy) and the
encrypted data are then stored in the Cloud. Using an authorisation list, if an authorised
user exists, he can then obtain the proxy key, which is then re-encrypted with the user’s
key. Using this, he decrypts the ABE key, then calculates k, i.e., k1 k2, and finally
obtains the decrypted file. This technique ensures that data is kept confidential and
is protected against any unauthorised users in the Cloud. In the scenario that a user’s
access rights are revoked, the data owner simply informs the Cloud to remove that user’s
entry in the authorisation list, which is computationally efficient. This scheme, however,
does not deal with the scenario in which a revoked user rejoins the group with different
access privileges. The revoked user still has the decryption keys corresponding to ABE
and can, in theory, regain unauthorised access to data.
Liu et al. [103] have proposed a clock-based proxy re-encryption scheme (C-PRE) and
combined this with CP-ABE to achieve fine-grained access control and scalable user
revocation. In C-PRE, the data owner and the Cloud share a secret key and this key
is used to calculate the PRE keys, based on the Cloud’s internal clock. The Cloud
will re-encrypt the ciphertext with the PRE keys. Each user is associated with a set
of attributes and an eligible time, which determines how long the user can access the
data. The data itself is associated with an access control structure by CP-ABE and
also has an access time. When a user requests file access, the Cloud determines the
current time using its internal clock and then uses the shared key to calculate PRE keys
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in time format, for all of the attributes in the access structure. The PRE keys are then
used to re-encrypt the ciphertext. Only users whose attributes satisfy the access control
structure and whose eligible time satisfies the access time, can decrypt the data. The
main benefit of this technique is that the re-encryption of all of the data is delegated
to the Cloud instead of the data owner and is thus efficient, from the data owner’s
perspective. The user revocation problem is also solved, since the data can only be
accessed if the user’s attribute satisfies the access control structure, and their eligible
time satisfies the access time. One problem with this technique, however, is that data is
re-encrypted each time a user makes an access request. Even though the re-encryption is
delegated to the Cloud, it is still not a very efficient solution, especially when considering
very large data sizes.
2.3.2.4 Self Management and Control Methods
Recent works have also focused on data that can manage and control keys and/or data
access, by itself. Chen et al. [33] have proposed bundling data with an access policy,
and sending this bundle to authorised users and untrusted applications. The proposed
architecture, DataSafe, enables the conversion of policy into hardware tags with parts of
data associated with them, such as parts of documents, electronic health records, etc.,
which helps to provide better access control. However, that data can only be accessed
on DataSafe machines with special hardware, limiting the ability of users to gain access
anywhere, at any time. Our system can be used on any hardware and on any operating
system, requiring only the Java Runtime Environment.
Sundareswaran et al. [104] also bundle the data with an access policy. Additionally, a
log file is also bundled with the data. Any operation that the user carries out will be
appended to the log file, and this log file will be periodically sent to the Cloud. A data
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owner can then access the log files to check whether data is being used appropriately.
This prevents man-in-the-middle attacks, as well as attacks related to disassembling the
bundled JAR file to read contents, as logs will make notifications of this. To prevent
the tampering of log files, a hash function is used to verify integrity. The problem with
this is that it does not deny the user the control to carry out illegal operations, such as
redistributing copies without permission. Our solution incorporates both log files and
data control against illegal operations.
Squicciarini et al. [32] use the idea of self-controlling objects (SCOs) to control how data
is used. Data policies, user-created policies and jurisdiction-based policies are encoded in
the SCOs, along with the data. The relevant permissions are also created with the SCO.
The solution uses CP-ABE [105] for policies; therefore, breaking and reverse-engineering
an SCO will still not retrieve plaintext data unless the user is authorised. However, the
user can still redistribute to other unauthorised users. The work presented in this paper
is based on SCOs; however, we go beyond the current solution and extend SCOs to
provide better data access control.
Kayem [106] provides a solution that prevents authorised users from illegal data ex-
change. The solution uses an invisible digital watermark, which is a hash of the en-
crypted data and key. However, it does not provide the data owner full control over
how data is to be viewed, or how many copies should be made. Burnap et al. [107]
propose a solution where parts of the data remain encrypted throughout its lifetime and
can only be decrypted if the user has access rights. Kirkpatrick et al. [108] describe
a solution that enables data access only to known, trusted devices. A unique device is
characterised by Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs). However, many users never
stick to one machine when working, and are likely to use a number of different machines.
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One of the distinct features of the Cloud is the ability to access data anywhere, at any
time, hence the need to provide more flexibility than this solution.
Zic et al. [109] and Nepal et al. [110] have proposed a technology called the Trust
Extension Device (TED), a USB-sized Single Board Computer (SBC), running Linux.
The SBC has the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) chip incorporated into it through
the use of an additional daughter board. The TED plugs into any untrusted machine
via a USB interface and enables secure transactions with an institution. One of the
benefits of this solution is that cryptographic keys are encapsulated within the device
and are never exposed. All cryptographic operations are done inside the TED via API
calls. Since it is a hardware-based TPM, this makes it extremely difficult to retrieve the
keys, compared to software implementations that can be bypassed.
2.3.2.5 Discussion
Table 2.4 shows a summary of the existing literature based on secure and confidential
data sharing in the Cloud. Many of the works reviewed place a strong focus on preventing
collusion attacks, as well as researching ways for the data owner to be online only when
required. In terms of user revocation, some of the reviewed literature demonstrates fast
methods of user revocation; for instance, where revocation involves simply removing a
key. Other works require the data to be re-encrypted and the keys to be re-distributed
in a secure method, and this mainly occurs with works that use ABE techniques.
Data sharing and collaboration in the Cloud remain a strong focus of research and in
particular, many works are focusing on solving the user revocation problem, as well as
ways to manage the sharing and collaboration of large data sizes.
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Method ABE PRE SMC Likelihood
of collusion
attacks
User re-
vocation
Tu et al. [24] Y N N N S
Li et al. [100] Y N N N F
Tran et al. [25] N Y N Y F
Yu et al. [101] Y Y N N S
Yanjiang et al. [102] Y Y N N F
Liu et al. [103] Y Y N N F
Chen et al. [33] N N Y N F
Sundareswaran et al. [104] N N Y Y F
Squicciarini et al. [32] N N Y Y F
Kayem [106] N N Y N F
Burnap et al. [107] N N Y N S
Kirkpatrick et al. [108] N N Y N F
Zic et al. [109] N N Y N F
Y = Yes N = No F = Fast S = Slow
Table 2.4: Summary of related literature
2.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a literature review of the work on enabling secure and
confidential data sharing and collaboration using Cloud computing technology. We
examined definitions related to Cloud computing and privacy. We then looked at privacy
and security issues affecting the Cloud, followed by what is being done to address these
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issues.
We then discussed why data sharing in the Cloud is important and the traditional
approach to data sharing in the Cloud. We discussed key management in the Cloud
and how proper key management leads to more secure and confidential data, which can
aid the secure and private sharing of data in the Cloud. We reviewed current, state-of-
the-art literature related to key management in the Cloud. We explained the different
techniques, namely ABE and PRE, currently used to enable secure data sharing in the
Cloud. We also reviewed current, state-of-the-art literature in relation to secure and
confidential data sharing in the Cloud and gave a brief overview of the future of data
sharing in the Cloud, where the data owner could have more control over the usage of
their data.
In the next chapter, we present a formal description of the problem and list the system
assumptions and the trust model upon which we will build our solutions in Chapters 4,
5 and 6.
Chapter 3
The Data Sharing Problem and
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we define the problem space in terms of sensitive data sharing in the
Cloud, and the preliminary concepts needed for our contribution.
3.1 Example of Cloud Data Sharing
To demonstrate the problems associated with data sharing in the Cloud, we showcase
a very simple system for private and secure data sharing in the Cloud. We take a very
simple scenario: a data owner stores data contents (for example, a document) in Cloud
storage (for example, Google Drive) and shares it with data consumers (e.g., workplace
colleagues).
Figure 3.1 below illustrates the basic architecture for how data sharing occurs in the
Cloud.
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CSP 
DO DC 
Untrusted 
Secure Data Sharing 
Middleware 
Key 
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Management 
Secure Data 
Sharing Protocol 
Figure 3.1: Basic Architecture for Data Sharing in the Cloud
Throughout our thesis, we develop solutions within the Key Management (Chapter 4),
Secure Data Sharing (Chapter 5) and Access Control (Chapter 6) components.
3.1.1 Key Components
• CSP: An Untrusted Cloud Storage Provider that is used to store data contents
on remote servers.
• Data-Sharing Middleware: The systems that are in place to ensure that the
data is kept private and secure. The middleware includes three components: Key
Management, Secure Data Sharing and Access Control.
• Key Management: Responsible for the management of encryption keys.
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• Secure Data Sharing: Ensures that the data is kept secure at all times, using
either software- or hardware-based mechanisms.
• Access Control: Ensures that the data is used as per the rules set by the data
owner.
• DO: The Data Owner responsible for generating and sharing data contents. The
DO stores encrypted data contents in the CSP and the encryption keys required
to access the data in the Key Management platform. The DO can also decide who
can access the data contents.
• DC: The authorised Data Consumer who wishes to access the DO’s data. The
DC downloads the data contents from the CSP and the corresponding encryption
keys from Key Management, and decrypts them locally on their machine.
3.2 Key Management
Key management consists of five different operations:
• Key Generation: How keys are created and for whom. For example, keys may
need to be generated for consumers, trusted key providers, and for various Cloud
Service Providers.
• Key Distribution: How keys are distributed to the required entities. It is crucial
that keys are distributed via secure and private channels, to prevent data leakage.
• Key Storage: The location where the keys are stored. Are the keys stored in the
Cloud provider’s storage, with a trusted key provider, or on the data owner’s local
machine? It is important that keys do not get lost, stolen or tampered with. It is
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common practice to keep keys protected and duplicated across various platforms,
to prevent data loss.
• Key Revocation: The process of removing a consumer’s key or rendering the
consumer’s key useless, when the data owner wishes to revoke consumer access to
their data.
• Key Update: How keys are refreshed and updated, to prevent leakage of the key.
Updating the key could introduce data re-encryption, which is costly and places a
burden on the data owner.
3.2.1 Broadcast Group Key Sharing Example
We present the algorithm of a simple Broadcast Group Key Management (BGKM) [111].
Setup(l): It initialises the BGKM scheme using a security parameter l. It also initialises
the set of used secrets S, the secret space SS, and the key space KS.
SecGen(): It picks a random bit string s ∈ S uniformly at random from SS, adds s to
S and outputs s.
KeyGen(S): It picks a group key k uniformly at random from KS and outputs the
public information tuple PI computed from the secrets in S and the group key k.
KeyDer(s, PI): It takes the user’s secret s and the public information PI to output
the group key. The derived group key is equal to k if, and only if, s ∈ S.Update(S):
Whenever the set S changes, a new group key k’ is generated. Depending on the con-
struction, it either executes the KeyGen algorithm again, or incrementally updates the
output of the last KeyGen algorithm.
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3.3 Secure Data Sharing Protocol
Secure Data Storage
Ek(d) 
DO  CSP KSP 
k 
DC 
d = generateData() 
k = keyGen() 
Ek(d) 
 
The DO first generates data and encryption keys. To securely store data in the Cloud,
the DO must first encrypt the data on their own machine. The encrypted data is sent to
the CSP for storage, and the encryption keys are sent to a trusted key service provider.
Note that the untrusted CSP has no knowledge of the encryption keys and thus the
stored data contents remain illegible.
Consumer Data Access
DO  CSP KSP DC 
k 
getData() 
Ek(d) 
 
getKey() 
Dk(Ek(d)) 
= d 
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Assuming that the DC is authorised to view the DO’s data, the DC can then download
the encrypted data from the Cloud. The DC can also securely retrieve the key from
the trusted key provider, via private communication channels (e.g., over the phone, in
person, etc.). The DC can then use this key to decrypt the data contents and view the
full plaintext.
3.4 Data Owner Access Control
One of the main drawbacks with data sharing in the Cloud is that the data owner loses
full control of his data when it leaves the confines of his personal machine. Current
approaches [112] to regain some degree of access control include, but are not limited to:
• Access Control Matrix: Uses a two-dimensional matrix to represent which
subject can access which data, and the operations that are allowed upon them.
D1 D2 D3
Bob R W RWD
Alice RW R
Dave W
From the table above, R denotes Read, W denotes Write, and D denotes Delete.
• Access Control Lists(ACL): In an ACL, data objects maintain a list of subjects
and the operations they can perform on the data contents. ACLs are widely used
as a form of access control.
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Data D3 
 
ACL 
Bob 
RWD 
Alice 
R 
Dave 
W 
Figure 3.2: Access Control List
Figure 3.2 illustrates a simple ACL for data D3. Bob can read, write and delete,
Alice can only read, and Dave can only write.
• Access Control Capability Lists(ACCL): The reverse of ACL, the subject
maintains a list of data objects and the operations that they can perform on each
of them.
Bob 
 
ACCL 
Data D1 
R 
Data D2 
W 
Data D3 
RWD 
Figure 3.3: Access Control Capability List
Figure 3.3 is an example of an ACCL for the subject, Bob, and the operations that
he can perform on each of the data contents D1, D2 and D3, respectively.
• Role-Based Access Control(RBAC): Similar to ACLs, roles are instead used
to associate users with permissions. For example, a user with a “manager” role
would have different access rights compared to a user with an “employee” role.
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• Attribute-Based Encryption(ABE): As described in Chapter 2, ABE provides
more fine-grained access control compared to the above. Attributes are stored
in the data or private key of the user. An access control policy enforces data
access, and uses attributes to determine whether data access should be permitted
or denied.
Access Control Matrices, ACLs, and ACCLs are simple to implement and can be used
to control how the data is to be used by subjects. However, if the number of subjects
is very large, in excess of thousands, it can be cumbersome to manage them. Especially
if permissions need to be changed often. RBAC makes this process easier since many
subjects can be grouped in roles based on similar attributes such as department. Thus,
permissions can be changed for a single role which will in turn control access to a group of
subjects. However, some complexities may arise if a subject requires more permissions
than what was assigned in their role(s). ABE is also similar to RBAC since it uses
attributes, however, it is not as easy to change attributes once the attributes have been
assigned to a user through the private key. Since ABE utilises encryption, it is most
suitable for data that is sent through the Cloud.
3.5 Secure Data Sharing Challenges
3.5.1 Key Management Issues
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the trivial solution to key sharing places a burden on the
data owner, as the data owner is responsible for the re-encryption and redistribution of
encryption keys to every member of the group, every time a data consumer is revoked.
In Chapter 2, we discussed current solutions that have aimed to mitigate these issues;
Chapter 3. The Data Sharing Problem and Preliminaries 64
however, many solutions still place some burden on the data owner, or the encryption
key is somehow revealed to the CSP with the assumption that it is trusted to keep the
key secret. The solutions presented also tend to have performance issues, especially due
to re-encryption.
• Poor management of encryption keys.
• Little to no focus on private sharing with a large number of users, in excess of
thousands to tens of thousands.
• Key information tends to be stored on CSPs that are assumed to be trusted, which
is a risky assumption.
In Chapter 4, we present an efficient method of managing keys for data sharing that
places little burden on the data owner.
3.5.2 Issues for Secure Data Sharing Protocols
There are a number of different security threats in the Cloud that prevent its widescale
adoption for data-sharing purposes. As discussed in Chapter 2, insider attacks continue
to represent the biggest threat, as insiders have direct and unrestricted access to the data.
Whilst the trivial solution (discussed in Chapter 1) helps to prevent insider attacks, it
does not guard against collusion attacks, whereby a consumer might intentionally or
unknowingly give away the data owner’s sensitive information to the Cloud provider.
Also, one of the main requirements of data sharing in the Cloud is that the data must
remain encrypted at all times. Any leakage of sensitive data can be devastating. Hackers
will always try to exploit any vulnerability that they can find. Thus, one of the biggest
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challenges is ensuring that data is always protected, no matter what, and that it should
only be accessed by those who have the necessary permissions.
The main issues include:
• Insider Attacks, as insiders have direct access to data owners’ data.
• Collusion Attacks between data consumers and Cloud providers.
• Other common security attacks, such as man-in-the-middle attacks, sniffing at-
tacks, etc.
In Chapter 5, we develop secure protocols and systems to allow for the more secure
sharing of data in the Cloud.
3.5.3 Access Control Challenges
While access control matrices, ACLs, ACCLs, RBAC and ABE provide solid control
over who can access the data and the types of operations that can be performed, they
still only provide the data owner with limited access control. Especially with the rapid
growth of data sharing in recent times, data owners have a stronger demand for greater
access control over their data, when sharing via the Cloud. For instance, malicious
insiders have full access to the data owner’s data. Also, authorised data consumers who
have read/write capability can then make another copy of the data and send it to their
friends, via email attachments or USB transfer, with little to no knowledge of the data
owner. Once the data contents reside on the consumer’s personal machine, they can do
anything they want with it. In current research, very little work has been done to fulfil
the data owner’s need to have stronger control over their own data, when sharing it in
the Cloud.
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Thus, the main issues are:
• Not fine-grained enough.
• Very little research on preventing unauthorised data sharing by authorised data
consumers via email attachments, USB transfer, etc.
• The data consumer can do anything with the data once in possession of it, and it
is difficult to hold them accountable.
In Chapter 6, we propose a solution that attempts to address these challenges.
3.6 Problem Statement
The problem statement that will be addressed within the thesis is as follows:
To prevent the leakage of the data owner’s protected data to unauthorised entities, after
access is given to one or more authorised data consumers (or recipients). The data
owner should be able to provide access to a large amount of recipients while also being
able to efficiently and effectively revoke recipients from data access, at any time. The
protected data should also be accompanied by a policy that states who, what, where, when
and how the data is to be accessed. The policy should be enforced during the lifetime of
the protected data.
In other words, a data owner should be able to share his or her data with millions of
users whilst ensuring that it is protected from unauthorised access and usage. The data
should remain encrypted from any unauthorised user or Cloud insider. The data owner
should also be able to revoke a user’s access on-the-fly, without having to re-encrypt and
re-distribute keys. Thus, key management needs to be efficient.
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In addition, the data owner should be able to specify a policy that enforces how the
data is to be used by the authorised data consumer. The data owner can use the policy
to enforce a wide variety of complex conditions. For example, a policy could state that
“the data can only be accessed by students for five days” or “the data can only be read,
but cannot be copied, modified or printed.” This gives the data owner greater access
control over their data.
We now provide a formal description of the above problem statement.
We consider a data owner do ∈ O where O represents the set of all possible users. The do
creates data d ∈ D where D represents all possible data. The data d can be distributed
and accessed by data consumers dc ∈ C where C is a subset of O chosen by the do. We
now provide the following restrictions:
1. The data d cannot be accessed by any entity outside of C.
2. The data d cannot be accessed by dc, without the permission of data owner do.
3. The data owner do can give permission to one or more data consumers dc ∈ C to
access the data d.
4. The data owner do can revoke the access of data consumer dc to the data d.
5. If a policy p ∈ P is associated with the data d and the data owner do gives
permission to the data consumer dc, d can be accessed by dc as long as p is
obeyed.
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3.7 Assumptions and Threat Model
We now describe the system assumptions and the threat model, which will be used
throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
3.7.1 System Assumptions
Throughout this thesis, we make the following assumptions:
• We assume data owners and data consumers to have some form of computing device
and an Internet connection in order to create, share and access data objects.
• We do not focus on shoulder-surfing types of attacks, such as stealing data via
peaking over-the-shoulder, taking a snapshot or video footage, etc. Such types of
attacks are outside the scope of this thesis.
• We assume that the data consumer is legitimate and does not hand over their
credentials/authentication mechanism to an unauthorised data consumer or entity.
• We assume the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to be honest-but-curious, in the
sense that the CSP will carry out the steps of the protocol as expected, but is
always curious and will look for ways to find out any information about the data
consumer.
• We assume that our developed mobile apps in Chapter 4 will keep any sensitive
information inserted by the user secure and private, and will not inadvertently
send information to the CSP or any other adversary, without the prior knowledge
of the mobile user.
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• In Chapter 4, we assume the data consumer to be trusted. In Chapters 5 and
6, we assume the data consumer to be semi-trusted. In other words, the data
consumer will access and use the data as expected, but may either intentionally
or accidentally leak data to other entities. For example, a data consumer might
send the data owner’s data to a friend via email attachments or USB, or might be
forced to hand over the data via law enforcement.
3.7.2 Trust/Threat Model
We now describe the trust model for our thesis. The main goal of an adversary is to
leak the data owner’s sensitive data. An authorised data consumer also poses a threat
and may leak the data owner’s sensitive data; therefore, the authorised data consumer
is an adversary. Adversaries may take advantage of public communication channels to
retrieve sensitive data. In this thesis, we do not consider the following threats:
• Vulnerabilities through the data consumer’s operating system, which may leak
sensitive data.
• Denial-of-Service attacks.
• Loss of data availability in the Cloud attacks.
• Malicious software, such as viruses.
• Hardware-based attacks.
• Memory-based attacks.
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3.8 Preliminaries
We will be using the following, preliminary technology terminology in the rest of this
thesis.
3.8.1 Symmetric Encryption vs Asymmetric Encryption
We use a symmetric encryption cryptography algorithm in our work, to protect the data
owner’s data from being accessed by untrusted Cloud servers. Note that in our work, we
do not specify which symmetric algorithm is used. In theory, any symmetric encryption
algorithm can be used, based on the level of sensitivity of the health data. Throughout
this thesis, the encryption algorithms that we make use of include ElGamal encryption
and CP-ABE (described in sections 3.7.2 and 3.7.3, respectively).
While asymmetric encryption may be more secure compared to symmetric encryption,
due to the greater degree of difficulty in guessing the key, symmetric encryption is far
better suited to data sharing in the Cloud. This is due to symmetric encryption using
the one key to encrypt and decrypt data, whereas asymmetric encryption uses two
keys. When sharing data with very large groups, sometimes in excess of thousands, key
management is more efficient when there is only key to protect. In our work, we make
use of both symmetric and asymmetric encryption. The symmetric key is used to protect
the data and the ElGamal-based asymmetric key is used to protect the symmetric key,
which also has the added benefit of bundling the user’s identity with the data.
One of the drawbacks of using symmetric encryption for data sharing is that the data
owner’s identity is not bundled with the data. This makes it difficult for the data owner
to claim ownership of the data. Since our solution also uses asymmetric encryption
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via the ElGamal algorithm, the data owner’s identity is also bundled along with the
symmetric key.
3.8.2 ElGamal Encryption
We take advantage of ElGamal encryption in Chapters 4 and 5, since the algorithm is
both simple and efficient and can provide simple consumer revocation with a low cost
and overhead. ElGamal encryption, invented by Taher Elgamal [68], is a public-key
cryptography system. One of the drawbacks of ElGamal encryption is that it is very
computationally inefficient and time-consuming to decrypt fairly large data. Thus, the
algorithm is best suited to the encryption and decryption of small data. In this thesis,
we mainly use ElGamal encryption to add a further layer of protection, by encrypt-
ing/decrypting another encryption key instead of the data itself.
There are three main steps to the ElGamal encryption algorithm:
• Initialisation: Given a prime p, a primitive root c of p, compute b = cxmod p,
where x is a randomly selected secret key. The public key is thus {p, b, c} and
private key is x.
• Encryption: Generate random value r and encrypt data m as follows:
E(m) = m · br mod p
= m · crx mod p
(3.1)
Also note: g = crmod p
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• Decryption: This decrypts m with secret key x as follows:
Dx(E(m)) = g
-x · E(m) mod p
= (cr)-x ·m · crx mod p
= c-rx ·m · crx mod p
= m mod p
(3.2)
3.8.3 CP-ABE
We make use of the CP-ABE algorithm in Chapter 5 to protect the data contents bundled
inside the SafeShare object. As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, ABE is a
promising technique for private and secure data sharing in the Cloud. Ciphertext-Policy
Attribute Based Encryption (CP-ABE) [105] involves encrypting data with an access
control policy. A user can decrypt data if, and only if, the attributes included in his
private key satisfy the access control policy. The scheme consists of the following four
algorithms:
• Setup: Using a security parameter L as an input, the Setup algorithm outputs the
public parameters PK and a master key MK. PK will be used for the encryption
of data and MK for the generation of user attribute private keys.
• KeyGen: Takes as input the set of User Attributes UA, the Master Key MK, and
outputs user attribute private key UK.
• Encryption: Takes as input the data D, an access control policy ACP, and public
parameters PK, and outputs the ciphertext E.
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• Decryption: Takes as input the ciphertext E, user attribute private key UK. If
the set of attributes in the key UA satisfies ACP embedded in E, it returns D
3.8.4 XML
Extensible Markup Language (XML) [113] is an open-source markup language that
is used to define rules for encoding documents that can be both human-readable and
machine readable. XML documents are generic, flexible and structured. It is mostly used
to share data around the world. Unlike HTML, XML does not specify fixed semantics
or tag sets. The semantics can be defined by users in a way that would be convenient
for sharing data. While we don’t directly make use of XML in this thesis, we leverage
XML via SOAP (described in 3.8.5) and also XACML (described in Chapter 6).
3.8.5 SOA
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style whose main aim is to
loosely couple services [114]. A service is defined as an atomic operation encapsulating
a particular business process [115]. The services can then be published and discovered
through a service registry (e.g, UDDI) by registering a WSDL (Web Service Definition
Language) file within that platform [115]. The WSDL is an XML-based file which
contains a description of the web service interface. SOA aims to make resources available
to participants in a network as independent services that are accessed in a standardised
way [116].
A web service is designed to support interoperable machine-to-machine software inter-
action over a network [117]. Web services are used to implement SOAs. One of the
core web service strategies is the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP). SOAP is the
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protocol specification for message exchange among web services and is based on XML
[118]. XML messages are sent to the called web services via different transport protocols
such as HTTP, FTP, etc. A SOAP message tends to be rather large due to the exten-
sibility nature of XML. In our work, we make use of SOAP to demonstrate the secure
and private sending of data via web services.
3.8.6 SCO
We leverage the idea of Self-Controlling Objects (SCOs) in Chapter 5, which was intro-
duced by Squicciarini et al. [32]. SCOs provide an effective way to protect data from
being illegally redistributed. Data contents and access policies are encapsulated and
bundled in these objects. The objects can then control who can access data and under
what conditions it can be accessed. To manage updates, such as data modification, SCO
Networks (SCONs) are used. They communicate with all of the identical copies around
the world to ensure that data is kept up-to-date for collaborating users. We leverage the
concept of SCOs in our work, to provide stronger yet flexible security protection that
allows data owners to share data with many users and prevents the leakage of data by
dishonest users.
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3.8.7 TED
Figure 3.4: TED
In Chapter 5, we extend our work on our software-based SafeShare object by using a
hardware device to provide stronger security and privacy of data contents. Zic et al.
[109] and Nepal et al. [110] have proposed the use of a small, self-contained USB-sized
computer that incorporated a hardware-based TPM. This device was called the Trust
Extension Device, or TED. This enables secure transactions to occur with an institution
using an untrusted machine. TED was not originally designed for Cloud-based applica-
tions. We leverage the use of TED in our work to demonstrate secure data sharing and
access in the Cloud environment, since it can help to prevent dishonest, authorised con-
sumers from illegally redistributing sensitive data to other consumers who do not have
the relevant permissions. Also, since TED is a hardware-based security mechanism, it
will provide a much stronger protection compared to software implementations, which
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can be easily bypassed. There are three components to the TED enterprise architecture
[109]:
• The TED Issuer and Manager that is responsible for generating digital keys, issuing
and revoking the TED, and possibly being responsible for the device’s manufacture.
• A Privacy Certifying Authority that is responsible for verifying that the TED is
valid and authentic.
• An Application Server, deployed within the enterprise, to perform the basic trans-
actions required from the customer.
Figure 3.5: TED’s Credentials managed by TED issuer and manager
3.8.7.1 TED issuer and manager
Thus, for a single TED, the TED manager will generate the following data:
• The TED Credential containing data that identifies the person/client to whom
the TED is issued by the enterprise. The details of the client are signed by the
enterprise (TED manager).
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• The Endorsement Credential includes the public part of the endorsement key that
is unique to each TED. The TPM manufacturer signs the endorsement key. This
is done by the TED manager in our enterprise architecture.
• The Platform Credential includes the TED’s operating environment consisting of
VM software and VM OS. In our architecture, the TED manager signs the details
of the platform. It is possible to have an independent third party supplying the
platform description.
• The Validation Credential includes service component descriptions consisting of
their digests, which are loaded into the TED. One could have an independent
validation manager. In our simple enterprise architecture, this is also achieved by
the TED manager.
Since the TED contains its own Linux-based OS and software, it can also run in-built
applications developed during the manufacturing of the TED device. In our work, we use
the TED to deploy our own application, which will carry out cryptographic operations
of symmetric keys, as explained in our protocol in the next section. The cryptographic
operations will be carried out without the knowledge of the host OS. We now discuss
the implementation details of TED.
3.8.7.2 Privacy Certifying Authority
The TCG uses a trusted third party, the privacy certification authority (Privacy CA), to
verify and authenticate the TPM. The same concept is used in the TED. Each TED is
issued with the credentials, including an RSA key pair called the Endorsement Key (EK).
The Privacy CA is assumed to know the credential details, along with the public parts
of the Endorsement Keys of all TEDs. That is, the TED manager supplies the credential
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details to the Privacy CA.Whenever a TED needs to communicate with the enterprise,
it generates a second RSA key pair, called an Attestation Identity Key (AIK), and sends
an identity key certification request to the Privacy CA, which contains: (a) an identity
public key; (b) proof of possession of identity for the private key; and (c) the endorsement
certificate containing the TED’s endorsement public key. The privacy CA checks whether
a TED issuer has signed the endorsement certificate. If the check is successful, the
privacy CA returns an identity certificate that is encrypted with the TED’s endorsement
public key. The TED can then provide this certificate to the application server to verify
and authenticate itself, with respect to the AIK. If the TED is reported as stolen or lost,
the Privacy CA can compute the corresponding public key and tag it as a rogue TED.
3.9 Summary
We first defined the problem statement of this thesis and then derived the formal de-
scription of the problem. We then detailed our system assumptions and also our trust
and threat model, which will be used to build upon in the remaining chapters of our
thesis. In the next chapter, we present our solution to the key management problem.
This allows the data owner to share data with many data consumer’s while being able
to efficiently revoke consumers on-the-fly.
Chapter 4
An Efficient Solution to the Key
Management Problem
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we describe and detail our solution to the key-management problem.
We develop a solution that will enable private and secure data sharing and collaboration
in the Cloud, which will allow for efficient data consumer revocation. In other words, we
develop a key-partitioning solution where the data owner can revoke a data consumer
without having to re-encrypt the data and re-distribute the new encryption key to the
remaining users. Thus, the burden on the data owner is significantly reduced. We
demonstrate our ideas in the health domain, using three different application scenarios.
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4.2 Our Approach
The main idea is that the data is encrypted using any AES symmetric encryption al-
gorithm. The encrypted data is then stored to the Cloud. The symmetric key used to
encrypt the data is then encrypted using the ElGamal public key. Thus, the only way
to decrypt the symmetric key is by using the ElGamal private key.
Plaintext Ciphertext Symmetric Key 
ElGamal  
Public Key 
Symmetric Key Encrypted 
Symmetric Key 
Encrypt 
Encrypt 
Figure 4.1: Encrypted data and key
Figure 4.1 illustrates data and key encryption. The data is first encrypted with a sym-
metric key and that symmetric key is then encrypted using the ElGamal public key of
the data owner. That is,
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Ek(d) = C
Gpub(k) = K
(4.1)
where k is the symmetric key, E is the symmetric encryption operation, C is the cipher-
text, G is the ElGamal encryption operation, pub is the ElGamal public key of the data
owner and K is the encrypted symmetric key.
Since the ElGamal algorithm represents its public and private keys as large numbers, this
makes key partitioning possible and hence, partial decryption is also possible.Therefore,
if we were to partition the ElGamal private key C into two parts A and B such that A + B
= C, the symmetric key could be partially decrypted using A and the partially decrypted
key can then be fully decrypted using B. Our combined symmetric and asymmetric
encryption scheme is highlighted in the diagram below:
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ElGamal  
Private Key 
Symmetric Key Encrypted 
Symmetric Key 
Partitioned 
ElGamal  
Private Key 
Symmetric Key Encrypted 
Symmetric Key Remaining 
ElGamal  
Private Key 
Decrypt 
Decrypt 
Decrypt 
Figure 4.2: Key Partitioning
Figure 4.2 illustrates the key-partitioning technique when decrypting the data. The
first example shows a standard ElGamal decryption without key partitioning. The
second example shows the same result with key partitioning. We provide a more formal
description, below:
Hpriv(K) = k (4.2)
priv = priv1 + priv2
Hpriv1(K) = Z
Hpriv2(Z) = k
(4.3)
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where priv is the ElGamal private key of the data owner, priv1 and priv2 are partitions
of priv, H is the ElGamal decryption operation, and Z is the partially decrypted key.
The above key partitioning is equivalent to Hpriv2(Hpriv1(K)) = k. We have separated
it out to show that the partially decrypted key Z can still be fully decrypted later, with
the remaining key partition priv2.
Thus, in our data-sharing example, if the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) obtains key
partition A and the data consumer obtains key partition B, secure data sharing can
occur as follows. The CSP first decrypts the encrypted symmetric key using A, revealing
a partially decrypted symmetric key. At this point, the CSP does not know the full
plaintext of the symmetric key; he still sees illegible ciphertext. It is also not possible
for the CSP to know the value of B without knowing the value of C. The CSP would
have to make a guess for B in order to decrypt the symmetric key and since B is
likely to be represented using a large number, the guessing is not as easy but is still
possible. In our work, we also prevent the CSP from knowing the value of A. We send
the partially decrypted symmetric key to the Cloud for storage, instead of just the
encrypted symmetric key.
The CSP can then send the partially decrypted symmetric key to the data consumer
and the consumer can decrypt the symmetric key using B. Note also that the consumer
does not know or cannot incur the value of A when he receives the partially decrypted
symmetric key, and only sees a jumble of ciphertext. Thus, a data owner can easily
revoke a data consumer simply by requesting the CSP to delete A. This ensures greater
efficiency in consumer revocation, as the owner does not have to re-encrypt the data and
re-distribute keys.
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4.3 Remote diagnosis of patients with cardiac arrhythmias
We now showcase our key-partitioning algorithm in a scenario where a patient wishes
to securely and privately send cardiac-related health data to doctors.
4.3.1 Introduction
Advancements in mobile technology have allowed mobile devices, such as smartphones
and tablets, to be used in a variety of different applications. With the added capability
of Bluetooth [119] and the Internet, and the fact that mobile phones are now a way of
life amongst people of all ages due to their ubiquitous nature, it is now becoming more
feasible than ever to use mobile technology for medical applications. A user can simply
connect a health monitor to a mobile phone via Bluetooth, to develop his or her own
personal health monitor and management system.
There is currently a strong need to advance the field of health informatics [120]. As
the world population ages due to increased life expectancy, this places pressure on the
government to fund spending associated with the ageing population, especially in terms
of health spending [121]. Consequently, the demand for cutting the cost of healthcare
has increased, and there is now a growing need for the remote care of patients at home,
particularly for the elderly and the physically disabled. By leveraging the capability of
mobile technology as well as Cloud computing, one can then develop a health monitoring
system where the patient can be assessed by doctors in a remote location, from the
comfort of their own home. There are an abundant number of mobile apps available
today, for mobile telecare [122],[123],[124].
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In recent times, there has also been a growing need for the sharing of health data between
healthcare teams that include doctors, nurses and family members. Some benefits of
sharing health information include safer and better health outcomes for the patient, as
the health professional obtains a more complete medical history. This is mainly due to
not having to repeat the medical history every time a health professional is consulted,
and also no more unnecessary tests. Sharing health information is also key to lowering
healthcare costs [125]. However, the main issue with sharing health information is the
privacy and security risks associated with it. Currently, there are not many mobile apps
that handle this situation, and we will attempt to address this problem in our work.
Building on advances in Cloud computing, we seek to go beyond the mobile health
applications, to enable the secure sharing of telecare data in the Cloud. The Cloud, as
an enabler for mobile telecare, can help to provide the effective treatment and care of
patients due to its benefits such as on-demand access anywhere and at any time, low
costs, and high elasticity. However, the Cloud is susceptible to privacy and security
attacks, many of which occur from within the Cloud providers themselves [17], as they
have direct access to stored data.
As discussed in Chapter 2, there is considerable work on protecting data from privacy and
security attacks. NIST has developed guidelines to help consumers protect their data in
the Cloud [73]. Encrypting data before storing to the Cloud is an effective way to prevent
unauthorised users from accessing sensitive data. However, plain encryption techniques
are not enough, especially when considering the scenario of sharing data among a large
group of users; for example, the trivial solution to data sharing as discussed in Chapter
1.
We present our security protocol that will allow private and secure sharing of data in
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the Cloud, within the context of mobile health applications. Moreover, we attempt to
address the problems of achieving efficient user revocation, especially when considering
large data sizes. First, we define a secure data sharing model and protocol. Second,
we demonstrate the feasibility of the protocol through our developed prototype, which
combines smartphone, Bluetooth and Cloud computing technologies. Our protocol is
generic and is not limited to only mobile health applications, since we leverage and
build on this protocol in Chapter 5. Our protocol will also be efficient, and handles the
problem of user revocation and large data sizes. We demonstrate the efficiency through
performance tests and we also run a few experiments on our prototype and evaluate it
for feasibility of use in the real world. To the best of our knowledge, no other work has
focused on the private and secure sharing of health data via the Cloud. Many other
works in mobile eHealth focus on securing communication over the Internet, and do not
consider data sharing [126], [127].
4.3.2 Related Work
Recently, there have been works that have focused on the integration of mobile and
Cloud technologies for health monitoring. Fortino et al. [128] introduced the BodyCloud
architecture, which enables the management and monitoring of body sensor data via the
Cloud. It provides the functionality to receive and manage sensor data in a seamless
way from a body sensor network (BSN). BodyCloud also comprises a scalable framework
that allows for the support of the multiple data streams required for running concurrent
applications.
Bellifemine et al. [129] and Fortino et al. [130] have presented the SPINE framework.
This open-source framework allows developers to rapidly prototype and manage BSN
applications. There are two main components of the SPINE framework: the coordinator
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side, which is implemented on a PC or smartphone, and the BSN node side. On the
coordinator side, SPINE provides application developers with an intuitive interface to the
BSN, while on the node side, SPINE provides developers with abstractions of hardware
resources such as sensors, and an architecture to customise and extend the framework
to support new physical platforms and services.
The scheme of Pandey et al. [131] integrates mobile and Cloud technologies with elec-
trocardiogram (ECG) sensors, to enable the remote monitoring of patients with heart-
related problems such as cardiac arrhythmias. The patient connects the sensors to their
body and then runs an app on a mobile device. The app connects to the sensors via
Bluetooth. The app will then periodically upload data to the Cloud. The user can
then download graphs from the Cloud, which represent the user’s health status. The
scheme also implements middleware in the Cloud. There are web services for users to
analyse their ECG and draw graphs, etc. The system is effective, as it allows the user
to adopt the “Pay-As-You-Go” methodology every time they require services to analyse
their health data. The limitation with the scheme, however, is that it can only monitor
ECG data and does not take into account monitoring other kinds of health problems,
such as pulse and temperature. Also, the current scheme does not handle security is-
sues, in particular, data sharing aspects. Our scheme builds on this scheme, to facilitate
a secure health-monitoring application that enables the user to share health data in a
secure manner with other doctors and nurses, and which will be able to efficiently revoke
users, without placing too great a burden on the user. Our system is also generic, in
that it is not limited to ECG monitoring and can also monitor other health data, such
as pulse and temperature.
AliveCor is a remote app-based ECG monitoring system [132]. The system is similar to
our system in that it allows a patient to monitor their ECG on their iPhone and also
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share their ECG data to whomever the patient wants. It provides a bundle of useful
features, such as recording, displaying, transferring and storing high quality ECG data.
However, the system was not developed with security in mind; therefore, it is possible
that an intruder will be able to steal health data with a certain amount of effort.
CardioComm Solutions have also demonstrated their remote patient ECG monitoring
service, HeartCheck Smart Monitoring [133]. The system allows for rapid access and
for physicians to better review the ECG data in order to assess how the patient should
be treated. However, it does not specifically focus on privacy and security aspects, such
as the confidentiality of data as it is being transmitted to the Cloud or as it is stored
within the Cloud.
Gradl et al. [134] have also developed an Android-based application that allows for
the real-time monitoring of ECG data, similar to our prototype, as well as automated
arrhythmia detection. However, the application also does not focus on privacy and
security aspects.
Xia et al. [135] address the usefulness of ECG data collected from patients themselves
using mobile devices, and the issues that this presents. They do not focus on the security
aspects associated with sending data to the Cloud.
Solutions are now tailored towards monitoring health using mobile devices; yet, not
many solutions focus on the security aspect of this. Our solutions leverage the mobile
health idea and additionally incorporate privacy and security mechanisms, to guarantee
patient confidentiality; a crucial requirement in today’s health industry.
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4.3.3 The Health Monitoring System
4.3.3.1 Scenario
Consider the scenario of an elderly patient who suffers from occasional heart problems.
The patient requires care on a regular basis. Due to age and distant geographical
location, however, the patient struggles to make regular trips to the clinic to visit the
doctor. Currently, the only option is to have a doctor or nurse visit the patient to
monitor their heart and check for cardiac arrhythmias. This is very costly in terms of
both time and budget for both the doctor and the elderly sufferer. On some days, the
doctor’s trip becomes unnecessary if the patient is coping well and on other days, the
doctor will be required more often but may not always be there. The elderly sufferer
would benefit from a system that not only allows for in-home monitoring but also for
monitoring by a doctor, without having to leave their room or without the doctor having
to leave the clinic.
4.3.3.2 System Requirements
Considering the scenario, we derive a number of requirements for the health-monitoring
system. Firstly, the system should allow a patient to monitor their health anywhere, at
any time. The system should also not depend on the patient or doctor’s geographical
location. The system should be scalable to handle many patients and healthcare teams
such as doctors and nurses, as well as different health devices and data formats. More
importantly, the system should be generic, in the sense that it should be able to monitor
different health scenarios. Finally, the system should be user-friendly and simple enough
for the elderly.
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4.3.3.3 System Functionality
The functionality of the system is described as follows. The patient connects the sen-
sors to their body and starts the sensor monitor. The patient then runs an app on a
mobile device. The mobile app establishes a connection with the sensor via Bluetooth.
Once a connection is made, the sensor streams real-time health data to the app. The
patient then inputs his or her email and password into the app, chooses a time interval,
and presses the “Upload” button. The app will send these credentials, details and the
health data to the web service deployed in the CSP. The web service will then check the
credentials in the database held by the CSP. If the user exists, the web service will store
the health data corresponding to the user in the CSP. The app will periodically send
the credentials and health data to the web service, and this will be repeated until the
user stops the app.
When a doctor wants to view the patient’s health data, they simply run an application on
their computer. The application makes calls to the web service to retrieve the authorised
patient’s health data. The doctor can then view, interpret and analyse the patient’s
health and recommend any further actions to take. The geographical location of the
doctor is not important; as long as they have a computer, an Internet connection and
the simple application, they will be able to view the data nearly anywhere, and at any
time.
Chapter 4. An Efficient Solution to the Key Management Problem 91
4.3.3.4 Data Schema
User 
User ID       String 
Password       String 
First Name       String 
Last Name       String 
Email       String 
DOB       Int (in form DDMMYYYY) 
Address       String 
Phone       String 
Role       String 
Service 
Service ID            String 
Name            String 
Patient ID            String 
Doctor ID            String 
Device ID            String 
Upload frequency   Int (in form DDMMYYYY) 
Data frequency        String 
Start Time            String 
End Time            String 
Data 
Service ID            String 
Time Sample            Long 
Data            String 
Device 
Device ID            String 
Device Type            String 
MAC Address            String 
1..* 
1..* 
1 
1 
1 
1..* 1 
Figure 4.3: Health Monitoring Database Schema
Fig. 4.3 illustrates our schema for the health-monitoring system. Note that the data
model is a generic, medical data service for the proof of concept, and is not focused on
one particular medical service, such as a heart intensive care service.
The “User” table contains all of our system users, including patients and doctors. The
email and password is used for authentication and the role determines whether the
user is a doctor or a patient. The “Device” table contains information about a health-
monitoring device connected to this system, such as the name and type of the device
and its unique MAC address. The “Service” table creates a new service record every
time a user runs the app on the mobile device. It contains information such as the
doctor that is authorised to view the data associated with the service, the device used,
the patient being monitored, and the start and end times of the service. The “Data”
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table contains health data records that are generated every time steps 8 and 9 are called
from the system functionality. A data record can only be one part of a service.
4.3.3.5 Privacy Issues using a CSP in Remote Healthcare
Since the Cloud is at the forefront of many privacy and security attacks, and many
privacy attacks come from within the CSP itself, as insiders usually have direct access
to data and may steal data to sell to third parties in order to gain profit, the entire
database in the CSP needs to be encrypted. This means that the data needs to be
encrypted before sending the data “over-the-wire.” This will prevent any malicious
outsider, as well as the CSP itself, from gaining any useful data without the decryption
key.
Since our focus is on data sharing with doctors and nurses, simple encryption techniques
are not enough. As discussed, if we have many doctors and nurses authorised to view
the patient’s data, and the patient decides to revoke a specific doctor’s access rights to
their data, the patient has to re-encrypt their data using another key and send the new
key to all the other doctors and nurses. This is computationally inefficient and places
a burden on the patient to re-encrypt and distribute new keys, each time they revoke
a doctor or nurse’s access rights. It also places a burden on the remaining members
of the group, as they constantly have to update their key set in order to keep up-to-
date with all of their patient’s data. The main reason why the patient would need
to re-encrypt the data with a new key is that the revoked doctor still holds the key
and can still theoretically access the data, even if he is not allowed to. It cannot be
assumed that the doctor or nurse will never view the patient’s data or that they will
always keep the key a secret. For example, in the health domain, there are standards
such as HRIPA which is followed in NSW, Australia [56] or HIPAA (Health Insurance
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Portability and Accountability Act) which is followed in the US [55]. These standards
aim to protect and enforce the confidentiality of a patient’s health-related data and keep
the data confidential from anyone unless authorised by the patient. In other words, any
entity should not access a patient’s health information without the patient’s consent.
As a result, hospitals and health organisations are reluctant to adopt Cloud technology
as a privacy breach can be devastating, especially in terms of cost [136]. In our work, we
provide a solution which leverages the Cloud to help ensure health data is kept private
and secure.
4.3.4 Data Model and Protocol
Figure 4.4: Health Monitoring Data Sharing Model
We now introduce our secure model and protocol that will enable data sharing amongst
a group of users specified by the data owner. Our technique is not limited in any way
to medical applications and can be applied to other Cloud applications. Our protocol
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builds on the work of Tran et al. [25], as described in Chapter 2, and handles the
collusion problem.
4.3.4.1 Data Model
Figure 4.4 enhances the eHealth monitoring system illustrated in Figure 4.3, by adding
a security layer that enables efficient and secure data sharing. The original web service
now represents the Cloud Data Service (CDS), and we add another web service called
the Data Sharing Service (DSS) that handles the data-sharing aspects of the system.
We assume that the DSS is fully trusted. However, this makes it particularly vulnerable
to attackers; therefore, the DSS itself needs to be protected. In order to achieve this,
the DSS can be modelled as a trusted private Cloud provider that is protected using
traditional mechanisms such as Internet firewalls. There are also a number of proxy
services to store key pieces for members of the group, and a Key Service (KS) to store
the encrypted keys of the health data and the keys of the data consumers (DC).
To briefly summarise how the model works, we assume that each user in the group,
including the data owner (DO), has a key that can decrypt the appropriate keys in the
Data Key Database (DKDB). However, their keys are partitioned into n+1 parts, where
n parts are stored in each proxy and the user keeps the extra part. In this way, none
of the users know the full key required to decrypt the keys in the Data Key database.
When the user requires data access, they call the DSS. The DSS then decrypts the key
in the DKDB using all of the key pieces in the proxy database that correspond to the
calling user. The key is then used to decrypt the data in the Cloud. When the data
owner requests that a user’s access is revoked, their key pieces in the proxies are simply
removed and the original data need not be re-encrypted, nor does there need to be any
re-distribution of keys to remaining users. None of the other data consumers will be
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affected by the revocation, since their corresponding key pieces still remain intact in the
proxies and also with themselves. We will explain this in detail, in the next section.
4.3.4.2 Protocol
We now discuss our data-sharing protocol in detail. The protocol has four steps: initial-
isation, consumer authorisation, authorised data access, and consumer revocation. It is
also important to note that we assume the DSS to be fully trusted, in that it will always
honestly follow the protocol. As mentioned in Chapter 3, we also assume the CSDB to
be honest-but-curious, in the sense that that it will carry out the steps of the protocol
as expected, but is always curious to find out any sensitive information. We make use of
ElGamal encryption in our work and build upon the work of Tran et al. [137] to provide
a more secure platform for data sharing. The following table contains brief definitions
of the abbreviations used in our protocol.
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DO Data Owner The owner of the data; decides who has access
permission to the data
DC Data Consumer Any user who has permission to access data
given by the DO
DSS Data Sharing Service The trusted service that carries out most of the
data-sharing functionality in the protocol (see
model)
CDS Cloud Data Service The service that allows calls to be made to the
Cloud storage (see model)
KS Key Service The service that allows calls to be made to the
Cloud key service, to obtain and store encryp-
tion keys (see model)
CSDB Cloud Storage Database The database containing encrypted data (see
model)
DKDB Data Key Database The database that stores encryption keys which
are themselves encrypted (see model)
UKDB User Key Database The database that stores all users, including DC
and DO private keys (see model)
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Initialisation
1 DO → DSS {key request}
2 DSS Generate key x
b = cxmod p
3 DSS Generate x1 + x2 + x3 + ...+ xn + xn+1 = x
Generate uDO
4 for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i {uDO, xi}
5 DSS → DO {uDO, xn+1, {p, b, c}}
6 DO Generate symmetric key k
Ek(m)
Generate r, γ = crmod p
E{p,b,c}(k) = (cr, crx.k mod p)
7 DO → DSS {uDO, Ek(m), E{p,b,c}(k) }
8 DSS Generate dm
9 DSS → CDS → CSDB {uDO, dm, Ek(m)}
10 DSS → KS → DKDB {uDO, dm, E{p,b,c}(k)}
The DO first sends a request to the DSS to upload data to the Cloud (1). The DSS
then generates a random private key x and its corresponding public key {p, b, c}, using
ElGamal encryption (2). The DSS then partitions x into n + 1 pieces (3) and stores
each piece in each of the n proxy servers (4). The DSS also generates a new user
identification for the data owner (3). The DSS then sends the user identification, the
remaining partitioned key piece, and the public key, to the DO (5). The DO then
generates a random symmetric key k and encrypts his data with it (6). The symmetric
key is then encrypted itself by the DO, using the public key {p, b, c} generated by the DSS
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(6). The DO then sends his user identification, the encrypted data and the encrypted
key, to the DSS (7). The DSS generates a data identification for the data (8). The DSS
then sends the data identification and the encrypted data to the CDS (9) for storage.
The DSS finally sends the data identification and the encrypted key to the KS (10).
Consumer Authorisation
1 DC → DO {access request, dm}
2 DO → DSS addUser(uDO, dm, xn+1)
3 DSS ↔ CDS Verify uDO, dm exists. If not, exit here.
4 for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i {uDO, key piece request}
proxy i → DSS xi
5 DSS Compute x1 + x2 + x3 + ...+ xn + xn+1 = x
Generate xu1 + xu2 + xu3 + ...+ xun + xu(n+1) = x
Generate uDC
Generate {pDC, bDC, cDC}, xDC
6 DSS → KS → UKDB {uDC, uDO, dm, {pDC, bDC, cDC}}
7 for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i {uDC, uDO, dm, xui}
8 DSS → DO → DC {uDC, xu(n+1), xDC}
When a DC wishes to access the DO’s data m, he sends an access request to the DO
along with the data identification of the data he wishes to gain access to (1). Assuming
the DO approves, he sends a request to the DSS and sends the request along with his user
identification, the data identification, and key piece (2). The DSS then verifies whether
the data identification and data owner identification exist, with a call to the CDS (3).
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If the CDS returns false, then the DSS notifies the DO that the data does not exist and
exits the protocol (3). If the CDS returns true, the DSS then retrieves the DO’s key
pieces from the proxy (4) and computes the secret key x by adding all the key pieces
together (5). The DSS will then generate new key pieces for the new DC that, when
combined, are equivalent to the secret key x (5). The DSS will also generate a random
user identification as well as a public/private key pair, using ElGamal encryption for
the DC (5). The DSS will then send the DC’s user identification, the public key and
identifiers such as the DO user identification and data identification, to the KS (6). The
KS will then store this in the UKDB (6). The newly generated key pieces corresponding
to the DC are then stored in each of the proxy servers (7), and the remaining piece is
sent to the DO along with the private key of the DC (8). The DO finally sends this to
the DC in a secure manner (8).
Authorised Data Access
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1 DC → DSS {uDC, uDO, dm, xu(n+1)}
2 DSS → KS → DKDB getKey(uDO, dm)
3 DKDB → KS → DSS E{p,b,c}(k) = (cr, crx.k mod p)
4 DSS → proxy 1 getKeyPiece(uDC)
5 proxy 1 → DSS xiu
6 DSS Dxiu(E{p,b,c}(k)) = (cr, (cr))−xiu .crx.k mod p)
= (cr, (cr))x−xiu .k mod p)
7 Repeat 4-6 for proxies 2...n Remaining cipher: (cr, (cr)x−x1u−x2u−...−xnu .k mod p)
8 DSS Dxu(n+1)((c
r, (cr)x−x1u−x2u−...−xnu .k mod p))
→ (cr, (cr)−xu(n+1) .(cr)x−x1u−x2u−...−xnu .k mod p)
→ (cr, (cr)x−x1u−x2u−...−xnu−xu(n+1) .k mod p)
→ (cr, k mod p) since x = x1 + x2 + x3 + ...+ xn + xn+1
9 DSS → CDS → CSDB getData(uDO, dm)
10 CSDB → CDS → DSS Ek(m)
11 DSS Dk(Ek(m)) = m
Generate k1
Ek1(m)
12 DSS → KS → UKDB getUserKey(uDC)
13 UKDB → KS → DSS {pDC, bDC, cDC}
14 DSS Generate rDC, γDC = cDC
rDCmod pDC
E{pDC,bDC,cDC}(k1) = (cDC
rDC , cDC
rDCxDC .k1 mod p)
16 DSS → DC {E{pDC,bDC,cDC}(k1), Ek1(m)}
17 DC DxDC(E{pDC,bDC,cDC}(k1))
= (cDC
rDC , (cDC
rDC)−xDCcDCrDCxDC .k1 mod p)
= (cDC
rDC , k1 mod p)
Dk1(Ek1(m)) = m
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When a DC wishes to access data, he sends his key piece to the DSS along with identifiers
to the data (1). The DSS obtains the encrypted key from the DKDB via a call to the
KS (2, 3). The DSS then calls each proxy server to obtain the corresponding key piece
of the DC (4, 5), and decrypts the encrypted key using each key piece (6, 7). The DSS
then uses the DC’s key piece from step (1) and decrypts the remaining encrypted key
to reveal the full key (8). The DSS then obtains the encrypted data from the CSDB
via calls to the CDS (9, 10). The encrypted data is then decrypted with the full key,
to reveal the full plaintext (11). The DSS then generates another arbitrary symmetric
key and encrypts the data with this key (11). The DSS obtains the corresponding DC’s
public key from the UKDB (12, 13) and encrypts the symmetric key using the public
key (14). The encrypted data and the encrypted key are sent to the DC (16). The DC
can then decrypt the key using his earlier distributed private key (17). Once the key is
decrypted, the DC can then decrypt the data itself, to reveal the full plaintext (17).
Consumer Revocation
1 DO → DSS removeUser(uDO, uDC, dm)
2 for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i removeKeyPiece(uDO, uDC, dm)
proxy i Remove xuDCi
When the DO decides to revoke a user’s access rights to data, he simply calls the DSS
to request the revocation of the user’s rights to the specified data (1). The DSS will
then remove the corresponding key pieces of the user in each of the proxy databases (2).
Note that the data does not need to be re-encrypted and none of the other users will
be affected, since only the key pieces corresponding to the user are removed. All other
key pieces corresponding to other users remain in the proxy database. Since the data
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does not need to be re-encrypted, nor does there need to be any key re-distribution, the
model is efficient and has a runtime of O(n), where n is the number of proxies.
4.3.4.3 Security Analysis
From the description of our data sharing model and protocol, we now provide the model
and protocol from a security perspective.
1. Collusion between user and proxy – If a non-revoked user colludes with all of the
proxies, in theory, he can retrieve the secret key x by combining his xu with his
key pieces in the proxies. This will enable him to decrypt E{p,b,c}(k) to reveal the
key k and then decrypt the data itself to reveal m. If only one proxy was used, as
with the work of Tran et al. [25], the likelihood of a user compromising a proxy
would be high. However, the main distinguishing characteristic of our security
model is that it supports multiple proxies, and the actual number of proxies used
in a system depends on its security requirements. Therefore, the chance of a user
colluding is much lower if more proxies are used, because each proxy database can
be modelled as different CSPs in different locations around the world.
2. Privacy of data against the Cloud – There is no stage in our data model where
the Cloud stores the plaintext of the data m or the key k. This ensures the data
remains private from both the CSP and unauthorised users. Thus, it also ensures
that health standards are abided by [55]. The Cloud would need the secret key x
to be able to retrieve key k and then later retrieve m. Even if the Cloud is able
to retrieve all of the key pieces of all of the users from every proxy, it still cannot
reveal the secret key x without colluding with a user. However, this is also very
difficult, as there is a low chance that the Cloud will be able to compromise all
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proxies. In principle, the more proxy databases there are, the more secure the
system will be against privacy attacks. However, too many proxies can reduce the
reliability of the whole system. Thus, there is a trade-off between data privacy
and the reliability of the data service, which is beyond the scope of this work.
3. Consumer Revocation – When a DC is revoked access rights to the data, his
corresponding key pieces are simply removed from all of the proxies, which is
efficient when compared to having to re-encrypt data and re-distributing keys to
the remaining users. The revocation scheme has an efficiency of O(n) where n is
the number of proxy databases. At no point does the DC know the data key k or
the full secret key x. Also, even if a revoked user colludes with all of the proxies,
he will not be able to retrieve all of the keys, since his pieces have been removed.
Even if he steals another user’s key pieces he still cannot recover x; consequently,
the system is secure against revoked users colluding with the proxies.
4. Large Data Sizes – The work of Tran et al. [25] does not handle large data sizes
effectively, as the ElGamal cryptography algorithm discussed can only provide
cryptography operations with data up to a certain size. Since our focus is within
the context of health applications, and data within the health domain tends to
be very large, the protocol discussed in [25] is unsuitable. Our protocol extends
this and handles large data sizes effectively. The DO generates the symmetric key
k that will be able to handle the encryption of the large data. This key can be
any type of symmetric key, such as RSA, AES, etc. Large data sizes are handled
effectively and efficiently, since ElGamal cryptography is used to encrypt/decrypt
the symmetric key itself, as the symmetric key is unlikely to be too large.
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4.3.5 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, we will describe our implementation of the system, followed by a security
evaluation of our system. Finally, we carry out a number of performance tests and
provide an evaluation of the developed system’s performance.
4.3.5.1 Implementation
We implemented this system using Java. The Java Android SDK was used to develop
the mobile app and was deployed on an ASUS Eee Pad Transformer Prime TF201 Tablet
[138]. The tablet is capable of reading Bluetooth data from a variety of sources. The
app, called “HeartBeatSense”, was developed in such a way that it can be deployed
and run on any Android device, regardless of the type and/or size of the mobile device.
This provides more convenience for everyday users and provides a greater reach for more
users to gain benefits from using our system. Figure 5 illustrates our app carrying out
the monitoring of a patient’s ECG.
The web services were created using Java and Axis2. We deployed our web services
using Apache Tomcat 7. We used MySQL 5.5 to represent the Cloud storage database
backend. For the client side application, which is used by either the patient or doctor,
we created a simple Java application that simply makes calls to obtain and receive data,
as well as authenticate the users. %Figure 6 displays a snapshot of our system in action.
For the sensors, we used the AliveECG Heart Activity Monitor [139] with Ambu sensors
[140]. The sensors connect to the Heart Activity Monitor to measure the person’s ECG
activity. ECG stands for electrocardiogram and can be used to measure the electrical
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activity of the heart. The Heart Activity Monitor can then send the ECG data to an
SD card or other devices, via Bluetooth technology.
Figure 4.5: HearbeatSense app
4.3.5.2 System Security
We now evaluate the security of our mobile-based prototype.
1. Privacy violation – In our prototype, the email and password are both stored
with an additional random salt and consequently hashed. The hash values are
then stored in the Cloud database. They are not stored in full plaintext form and
hence administrators themselves would not know the full credentials of the user.
These credentials are required for using the system. Also, all data is encrypted
before sending to the Cloud for storage and it remains encrypted at all times. This
prevents unauthorised users from being able to retrieve any sensitive information
whether the data is in transit and/or on the Cloud.
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2. Mobile stealing – Even if an attacker steals a mobile phone in the hopes of finding
any valuable, confidential data, they will not find anything of value, since nothing
will be stored on the mobile phone. Once data is received from the health device,
it is sent straight to the Cloud. Thus, an attacker will not be able to find any trace
of health data on the mobile device, even when stolen.
3. Sniffing attacks – It is possible for an attacker to retrieve data as it is being sent
from the mobile client to Cloud storage. However, our system first encrypts data
using a symmetric key, and the symmetric key itself is then encapsulated via the
user’s public key. The attacker would have to know the user’s secret key (unknown
even to the user) to decrypt the symmetric key and consequently the data, making
our system attractive to use in such scenarios.
4.3.5.3 Performance Tests
We carried out a number of performance tests on our system, primarily the uploading
and downloading of ECG data. The purpose of the performance test was to test whether
such a system will be feasible for use by everyday people. Each of the performance tests
were carried out on 10 seconds of ECG data, or 3,000 samples of ECG data points. For
the tests, we used an ASUS Eee Pad Transformer Prime TF201 to run the app, and a
dual-core ASUS laptop with 2GB memory, 350GB storage and Windows Vista operating
system.
For the uploading tests, we measured how long it would take for a patient to upload
their ECG data to the Cloud. We measured the time it took from the moment the
patient presses the upload button on their app, to the storage of data in the database.
We carried out 10 test cases and for each test case, we measured the time it took for the
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patient request to reach the Cloud service and then from the service to Cloud storage.
We also carried out the test cases using the secure data-sharing protocol and then again,
without the secure data-sharing protocol. Our results are shown in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Uploading times
We found that in both cases, with and without using the security protocol, it took
significantly longer for the app to send the data to the Cloud service, compared to the
service storing the data to Cloud storage. This is expected, since the mobile device first
carries out operations on the data and then needs to transmit and connect via WiFi
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with the Cloud service. With the security protocol in place, the delay is even longer,
which is due to the keys being generated and data being encrypted before it is sent to
the Cloud.
For the downloading tests, we measured how long it would take a patient to retrieve
their data. We also carried out 10 test cases and for each test case, we measured the
time it took for the patient request to reach the Cloud service, and then the time it
took to retrieve the data and return it to the patient. Similar to our uploading tests, we
carried out the test cases using the secure data-sharing protocol, and then again without
the secure data-sharing protocol. Figure 4.7 illustrates our test case results.
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Figure 4.7: Downloading times
From our results, we found that this time, it was much quicker for the patient request to
reach the Cloud service. Although the time taken to retrieve data from Cloud storage
and return it to the user was slightly longer, it still returned the results in less than one
second.
The total uploading and downloading times are highlighted in Figure 4.8. We measure
the overhead introduced with the security protocol in place, compared to a system with
no security mechanism whatsoever.
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Figure 4.8: Uploading and Downloading Overhead
From our results, the security protocol introduced significantly more overhead compared
to without the security protocol. We also found that uploading times in general took a lot
longer, compared to download times when the security protocol was in place. Without
the security protocol, the difference was negligible. The average time taken to upload
data to the Cloud was 17.27 seconds, with a standard deviation of 7.40 seconds, with
the security protocol in place. Without the security protocol in place, the average time
was 8.89 seconds, with a standard deviation of 8.92 seconds. With the security protocol
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in place, retrieval times took approximately 1-2 seconds. With the security protocol in
place, the average download time was 1.00 second, with a standard deviation of 0.21
seconds; without the security protocol, the average was 0.05 seconds, with a standard
deviation of 0.01 seconds.
4.3.5.4 Evaluation
From the performance tests, uploading took much more time, on average, than down-
loading times. The main reason uploading times took longer was due to the fact that
a mobile device was used to send large packets of data. The patient retrieves data on
a desktop PC and since a PC has much more powerful processing capabilities than a
mobile device, processing times were much quicker. During our testing, the downloading
client and the web service were running on one machine, which also explains our quicker
running times when downloading. Also, the data is packaged in an XML document and
is sent to the web service via SOAP, which could have contributed to the slow uploading
times. Although uploading times could be improved, it is not crucial to the feasibility
of the system, since a patient does not usually care how long the data takes to store in
the database. However, patients, and especially doctors, might be concerned regarding
the time it takes to download data from the database, as they may not want to wait
for long periods of time to retrieve ECG data for analysis. From the performance tests,
the downloading times were very small and thus efficient, making our system feasible
for deployment in the real world.
Also, when comparing the overhead of our security protocol, only the uploading times
had a significant overhead. Downloading times were similar and almost negligible. The
uploading times took longer due to the symmetric key generation and the encryption
of the data, as well as the encryption of the key itself with the ElGamal public key.
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However, patients will not usually care about uploading times, as they will mainly be
in a resting position while their ECG is being monitored. When downloading data,
it is more important that data arrives quickly so that doctors can provide more rapid
treatment options. Hence, this makes our solution feasible for use in the real world.
To further improve our performance tests, we could run test cases for different sizes of
ECG data, e.g., 30-second intervals, one-minute intervals, five-minute intervals, and so
on. Since we are still prototyping the system and not yet using a Cloud database, we
rely on MySQL as our database, which does not handle very large data string sizes.
4.4 Secure eHealth Self Management in the Cloud
We now apply our key-partitioning technique in the environment of eHealth self-management.
We further improve on the previous section by involving doctors and potential users of
our system, in the context of mental health. The following work is based on the paper
published in JMIR [141].
4.4.1 Introduction
A new type of socio-technical challenges has arisen with the advent of eHealth and Big
Data technologies. For example, ubiquitous and wearable health systems collect data
through sensors and mobile apps, and store it in the servers of multiple commercial
service providers. Furthermore, a growing number of people share this sensitive medical
information through social networks such as Facebook and Twitter. This is significantly
different to the traditional health service, where service providers kept tight control over
patient data.
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It has been argued that these new technologies can lead to positive health outcomes, as
they are evidence of people self-managing their illness [142]. Some of the ways in which
self-management can have a positive impact include supporting the patient’s motivation
to look after their health, greater levels of engagement and understanding about the
condition.
Furthermore, these new technologies may help improve population health by helping
researchers learn about the drivers of different pathologies, or how people’s behaviour is
affected by social influence and public health promotion campaigns [143]. The informa-
tion posted to social networks can prove invaluable to assisting doctors and counsellors
to better understand patient behaviours and symptoms, and can help to provide support
and/or consultation. Social networks are now being leveraged to provide people with a
better lifestyle and health, without the need to continually visit the doctor’s clinic.
However, privacy [144], trust and security issues associated with health data make pa-
tients hesitant to post sensitive health information and share it with health providers
[78]. Since data is not ephemeral, it will be stored in servers and shared, and all stake-
holders need to worry about its lifecycle; not just who can access and manage it at a
particular point in time, but also who will be able to do so in the future. There is a
strong need to provide patients with a guarantee that their sensitive health information
will only be visible to the doctors and/or counsellors, or others they wish to share it
with at a particular point in time.
Microsoft HealthVault [145][146] provides a next step to allowing patients to store and
manage their health and fitness information, as well as share the data securely with
their friends and family. The encryption is done within HealthVault and does not rely
on the patient to generate and distribute keys. The patient can decide who specifically
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can view his health information. In comparison, our system gives the patient greater
control over their health information and they can choose to store their health data
on any Cloud service provider that they wish. The patient can distribute encryption
keys themselves to people they wish to share the data with, and do not need to rely on
commercial services, which may be untrustworthy.
4.4.1.1 Mental Health Scenario
For the evaluation discussed in this study, we created a fictitious, but quite common
scenario: collecting data and providing support.
The best way of designing and then evaluating a security feature is through a minimum
viable application in a realistic scenario. The security feature would be applicable in
other scenarios, but the reification into concrete terms with users, and evaluate the
design on scalability and non-functional requirements. Our application emulates one
where data is collected to provide support to people at risk of mental health issues in
the workplace.
We chose this scenario because it was relevant to our research and because of its signif-
icance. There is evidence of increased work stress, sleep disorders and depression in the
workplace [147]. As a result, there is a need for the means through which an organisa-
tion can provide support and feedback in a convenient and secure manner. In order to
detect people at risk, information is needed. This information may come from the people
themselves or their friends, reporting problems at home or at work that are affecting
their lives and their mental state. It could also come from managers, OH&S reports, or
other sources such as other eHealth systems. Regrettably, in many cases, people fail to
seek help when they need it due to a number of reasons, including the lack of time or
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access to resources, stigma, and trust. For example, regularly visiting a clinic can be
costly for patients and doctors. For patients, this also involves the time and effort spent
visiting the clinic, particularly for rural and disabled patients. For doctors, eHealth may
allow them to prioritise differently and tend to patients who cannot travel. Others have
highlighted the possibility of using eHealth services to reduce healthcare costs [148].
We also speculated that certain aspects, characteristic of mental health issues, would
make the importance of trust and privacy more relevant to users. Trust and stigma
also make it harder for people to seek help or share information about their mental
health. In workplace wellbeing programs, for example, employees might be less likely to
share information if they feel that it could be used by their employers. Trust is in great
measure a consequence of the software design of systems and apps used to collect and
manage the data.
Figure 4.9 highlights the methodology we used to carry out our work. Our method was
based on the waterfall model. We first define the requirements of our work. That is, to
develop a system that allows patients to share their personal health information securely
and privately, while ensuring the system is usable. We use a fictitious scenario to assist
in defining the requirements of the system. We then review state-of-the-art literature to
explore the existing works/technologies that attempt to address this. We then build on
these works and develop new technology. Finally, we test our developed system through
performance and scalability tests and evaluate the system in terms of usability.
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Requirement Analysis 
Literature Review 
Development 
Testing & Evaluation 
Figure 4.9: Development Method
In this project, we evaluate the security model through a prototypical smartphone app.
Using a mobile phone app, patients can report and receive help, wherever they are. In the
field of mental health, for example, studies have also shown that the use of smartphone
apps can support significant reductions in depression, stress and substance use [149].
Our contribution is a new way of protecting data, without revealing the full encryption
key to both the user and the Cloud provider. We propose a system that is designed to
be highly scalable, providing the ability to share data with many users, such as doctors
and nurses, while allowing the simple revocation of a user without the need to re-encrypt
the data every time a user revocation occurs. We focus on creating a secure and usable
system that will enable patients to share mental health information with doctors and
mental health specialists, from the comfort of their own home.
4.4.2 Data Model
Figure 4.10 demonstrates our system data model.
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Patient 
Doctor 
Social Network 
Figure 4.10: Data Model
The model we used to test our application assumes a patient who monitors and tracks
their health and activity data through a smartphone app. The app may then connect
to, and store the data in, a social network such as Facebook, Fitbit or other Cloud-
based service provider using an Application Programming Interface (API). An authorised
doctor can log into and retrieve the patient’s data, and use it for analysis and diagnosis.
We use a social network to demonstrate our ideas. The patient and doctor are then
assumed to have logged in to their social network account using their credentials.
For the sake of our evaluation, we have simplified the application so that it provides
the most common features found in commercial products. Our prototype app allows
the patient to enter a text value (e.g., the description of an activity), a number value
(e.g., the amount of time spent) and an image. The app also includes a button used to
encrypt the text, number and image and send the data to a Cloud server which is used
to represent the social network. In our work, we developed a local Cloud server that
does encryption/decryption operations.
One of the main limitations of our work is that current social networks cannot auto-
matically carry out encryption/decryption. However, we mainly wanted to demonstrate
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the potential capability of our system should a social network provide this feature in
the future. Another limitation of our work is that, once the doctor has fully decrypted
the patient’s health data, there is no way to revoke access. This is currently beyond the
scope of our paper. The doctor however, would not be able to view any further health
information posted by the patient.
One of the main goals of our system is to make it simple to use for both patients
and doctors. Our system is not designed to replace existing health record systems but
provide a convenient way for patients and doctors to communicate with each other
remotely whilst ensuring privacy and security of health data. In terms of privacy, we
offer a solution that enables the patient to define who can access their personal health
data. We do not focus on the other aspects of privacy such as determining when the data
was accessed, how the data was accessed, and to what extent the data is communicated.
In terms of security, we provide solutions to availability through the use of the Cloud
and confidentiality in terms of allowing only authorised doctors to access the data. We
do not focus on integrity or accountability in this work.
4.4.3 Protocol
To describe the protocol, we assume that the patient’s public and private key pair has
already been generated and stored in the app.
Data Storage
The patient first runs the prototype app and inputs a text string and a number value,
and uploads an image onto their smartphone. When the patient presses the “Send”
button, the app will then generate an arbitrary symmetric key and encrypt the text,
number and image. The symmetric key will then be encrypted using the public key. The
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encrypted data contents and encrypted symmetric key will then be sent to the social
network, for storage.
INPUT: message, rating, image 
Patient App CSP 
k 
Ek(message,rating,image) 
Epub(patient)(k) 
priv(patient) = x1 + x2 
Dx1(Epub(patient)(k)) 
Ek(message,rating,image), Dx1(Epub(patient)(k)) 
Figure 4.11: Data Storage Protocol
Data Sharing
When the patient decides to share the data with a doctor, they press the “Share” button
on the app and enter the doctor’s social network username. The app will then partition
the patient’s private key into two random parts. The first partition will be sent to the
social network and the other will be sent to the doctor. By doing this, the untrusted
social network has no knowledge of the full private key, since the other partition is stored
on the doctor’s local machine.
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Patient App CSP 
INPUT: username 
x2 =  x3 + x4 
credentials, username, x3 
Doctor 
 username 
x4 
verifyCredentials(credentials) 
getUserId(username) 
store(user_id,  patient_id, 
doctor_id, x3) 
Figure 4.12: Data Sharing Protocol
Data Access
When the doctor wishes to access the patient’s data, they simply call the social network
to retrieve the data. The social network partially decrypts the symmetric key using the
partial key supplied by the patient, and sends the encrypted data contents and partially
decrypted symmetric key to the doctor. The doctor uses the partial key supplied by
the patient to fully decrypt the symmetric key and finally decrypt the data contents.
The standard method of accessing data involves the data consumer downloading the
encrypted data from the Cloud and decrypting the data on his own machine, using the
encryption key supplied by the data owner. In our protocol, the data consumer does
not have access to the other half of the key, which prevents the data consumer from ever
knowing the full encryption key.
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Ek(message,rating,image), Dx3(Dx1(Epub(patient)(k))) 
App CSP Doctor 
 getData(patient_id) 
Ek(message,rating,image) 
Dx3(Dx1(Epub(patient)(k))) 
 message, rating, image 
 patient_id 
Dx4(Dx3(Dx1(Epub(patient)(k)))) = k 
Dk(Ek(message,rating,image)) 
= message, rating, image 
Figure 4.13: Data Access Protocol
Access Revocation
When the patient decides to revoke a specific user’s access to his eHealth data, the
patient sends a request to the social network platform to remove the doctor’s partial key
entry from storage. If the doctor attempts to download the data from the social network,
he will only see the encrypted text (“ciphertext”). The doctor will not be able to fully
decrypt/read the data without the partial key. In the trivial solution described earlier,
the data owner would have to re-encrypt the data and re-distribute the new encryption
key to all of the remaining consumers in the group, thus placing a burden upon the data
owner. In our solution, since the data consumer has no knowledge of the other half of
the key partition stored in the Cloud, the data owner would simply have to delete that
key partition. Thus, he need not worry about re-encryption and the re-distribution of
keys.
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removeUser(credentials, doctor_id) 
removeUser(credentials, doctor_id) 
Patient App CSP 
Delete(patient_id, doctor_id, x4) 
Figure 4.14: Access Revocation Protocol
4.4.4 Security Analysis
Formal Analysis
To verify the security of our protocol, we have used an automatic cryptographic verifier
tool called ProVerif [150], which has been used extensively in research work [151]. The
tool tests the protocol against all types of adversary attacks, such as man-in-the-middle
attacks. Our protocol was found to be secure against such attacks. We tested the
storage of eHealth data by the patient and the retrieval of data by an authorised doctor.
Specifically, we tested the Data Storage and Data Access phases of our protocol. We
also note that the protocol phases we test here are similar to the protocol phases in
Section 4.3.4.2. The differences mainly being the scenario and technology used.
We first modelled the behaviour of the symmetric and asymmetric encryption, ElGamal
encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. Below is an example of how we modelled
the ElGamal encryption and decryption, as well as key partitioning.
fun elgenc(bitstring, epkey): bitstring.
reduc forall m: bitstring, esk: eskey, elpk: epkey;
elgdec(elgenc(m,epk(esk)), esk, elpk) = m.
reduc forall e: eskey, e1: eskey; add(e1, sub(e, e1)) = e.
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We then modelled the DO by following the logic of the protocols defined in this chapter.
In other words, we modelled the DO generating a new symmetric key k and encrypting
the data s with that key. We then modelled the DO encrypting the symmetric key
with the ElGamal public key epkey. The DO then partially decrypts the symmetric key
using the key partition els1. The DO sends a bundle that includes the encrypted data
a and partially decrypted symmetric key e to the Cloud, via a public communication
channel c. The DO partitions the already partitioned key els2 into two parts and sends
this along with the ElGamal public key elpA and client identification x to the Cloud for
storage, and sends the remaining key partition elsCc directly to the DC, via the private
channel w. The code below shows how this was modelled in ProVerif.
let dataOwner(pkA:pkey, skA:skey, pkB:spkey, elsA:eskey, elpA:epkey) =
new k:key;
let k1 = tobitstring(k) in
let a = senc(s, k) in
let b = elgenc(k1, elpA) in
new els1:eskey;
let els2 = sub(elsA, els1) in
let e = elgdec(b, els1, elpA) in
new data_id: bitstring;
let d = bundle(a, e, data_id, els1) in
out(c, d);
in(w, x:bitstring);
new elsCs:eskey;
let elsCc = sub(els2, elsCs) in
let o = consumerBundle(x, elsCs, elpA) in
out(c, o);
out(w, elsCc).
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The Cloud provider model simply retrieves the encrypted data bundle and consumer key
bundle from the DO, via the public communication channel c. When requested by the
DC, it would further partially decrypt the encrypted symmetric key h using the DC key
partition that was sent in the clientBundle. Another bundle containing the encrypted
data and the new, partially decrypted symmetric key will be sent to the DC via the
public communication channel v.
let Server(pkB:spkey, skB:sskey, pkA:pkey) =
in(c, f:bitstring);
let g = getData(f) in
let h = getKey(f) in
let i = getDataId(f) in
let prk = getPartialKey(f) in
out(v, i);
in(c, clientBundle: bitstring);
let cid = getConsumerData(clientBundle) in
let csk = add(prk, getConsumerKeyPartition(clientBundle)) in
let cpk = getConsumerPubKey(clientBundle) in
let k = elgdec(h, csk, cpk) in
let l = bundle(g, k, cid, csk) in
out(v, l).
Finally, the DC model retrieves the key partition cek from the DO via the private
communication channel w. The DC then retrieves the encrypted data bundle after
making a request, and uses the key partition cek to fully decrypt the partially decrypted
symmetric key and then fully decrypt the encrypted data to reveal s. The code, below,
highlights this exact process.
let Client(client_id:bitstring, elpA: epkey) =
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in(v, data_id:bitstring);
out(w, client_id);
in(w, cek: eskey);
in(v, serverBundle:bitstring);
let n = getData(serverBundle) in
let enc_key = getKey(serverBundle) in
let partk = add(cek, getPartialKey(serverBundle)) in
let r = elgdec(enc_key, partk, elpA) in
let t = tokey(r) in
let (=s, k:key) = sdec(n, t) in
0.
Each of the processes of the DO, Cloud provider and DC were run simultaneously, to
simulate realism.
( (!dataOwner(pkA,skA,pkB, elsA, elpA)) | (!Server(pkB,skB,pkA)) |
(!Client(client_id, elpA)) )
The figure below illustrates the security mechanisms used in our system. The mobile
app requires username and password credentials in order to be able to use our system.
All health data that is sent to the social network is encrypted and is sent securely via
HTTPS/SSL. The social network also has privacy controls which the patients can adjust
to suit their needs.
Chapter 4. An Efficient Solution to the Key Management Problem 126
Social Network Mobile Device 
HTTPS/SSL 
- Username 
- Password 
- Encrypted Application Data - Privacy controls 
Figure 4.15: Secure Communication Paths
Informal Analysis
We now provide a brief security risk analysis of our work.
• Insider Attacks - Our protocol prevents insider attacks since the data is never
fully decrypted in the untrusted Cloud at any circumstance. The data remains
encrypted at all times on the untrusted Cloud Servers as well as on untrusted
public communication channels.
• User Revocation - Revocation of a doctor from data access can be achieved effi-
ciently without having to re-encrypt the data each time. The doctor’s key partition
is simply removed from the Cloud storage. This way, if the revoked doctor now
attempts to access the health data, he will not be able to retrieve the full plaintext
without the remaining key partition.
• Update Secrecy - Since health data is constantly changing, the patient may wish
to update their health data. This is made possible in our protocol, as long as
the updated version is encrypted with the same symmetric key that was used to
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encrypt the original health data, the patient may update their health data any
number of times as they wish. Hence making our solution feasible to be deployed
in a real-world scenario.
• Mobile Stealing - In the event someone steals the patient’s smartphone, they will
not be able to access the personal health information as they would need to know
the patients credentials such as email id and password in order to access the smart-
phone app. Hence, a patient does not need to be tied down to only one smartphone
device and can keep changing their device as often as they would like without any
loss of personal health information.
4.4.5 Usability Analysis
In total, we recruited 5 medical professionals and 15 students to carry out the usability
testing of our eHealth application. According to Nielsen [152], the minimum number of
participants required in a usability study is 5. We chose to recruit medical professionals,
due to their experience with patients and health issues. They were also the most likely
potential users of our system. The medical professionals included two doctors, two
medical officers and one medical intern. We chose also chose young people (ie. students)
since they were the most likely to use smartphones and would be likely potential end
users of the system. We recruited students aged over 18. 17 were over 25 (85%) and 3
were within 18 - 25 years of age (15%). We obtained ethics approval to carry out the
study. All students reported having a fair amount of experience using mobile apps.
To carry out the usability tests, we provided participants with a 4” LG smartphone with
Android OS and a 10” ASUS Eee Pad tablet, which contained our secure eHealth app.
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We also launched our web service, which would interact with the smartphone to store
and retrieve eHealth data and enable the sharing with, and revocation of, other users.
All 20 participants were given the same demo. Each participant was first introduced to
the main idea of our secure eHealth system. We then asked the participants to carry
out simple tasks such as:
• Report current mood,
• Share information with another user,
• Show that the other user can view the user’s mood submission,
• View mood submissions, etc.
Each participant was told that their mood submission was encrypted, and they were
shown the backend of their stored mood submission. Participants then carried out our
trust and usability questionnaire.
We asked the participants to think aloud while taking notes. Finally, participants an-
swered a short questionnaire, with questions related to trust and security [153] [26],
and usability (the USE questionnaire [154]). The questionnaire asked the participant to
assess our system based on trust and security, ease of use, and satisfaction, based on a
7-point Likert scale.
We investigated the relationship between how trustworthy and secure our system is and
how useful our system is to everyday users.
We have illustrated the user interface of our MindFeedback prototype app in Figure 4.16.
The figure displays the screenshots of the login view for both patient and doctor (a),
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Question Demographic Questions
1 What is your age range?
2 Are you male or female?
3 What is your ethnicity?
4 What is the highest level of school you have completed or how the highest level of
degree you have received?
7 Point Lickert Scale Questions
Trust and Security
5 When I’m connected to the Internet, I am concerned about exposing my health
information to the public.
6 I am not too concerned about what others see when I post my health-related
information on the Internet.
7 This system has made me more aware of what I may be exposing to others on the
network.
8 I feel safer when using the system.
9 Personal information which I input is managed carefully and will not be leaked to
the outside.
Ease Of Use
10 It is easy to use.
11 It is user-friendly.
12 It requires the fewest steps possible to accomplish what I want to do with it.
13 Both occasional and regular users would like it.
14 I can use it successfully every time.
15 The app is tedious.
16 I require written instructions to use it.
17 It is difficult to recover from mistakes.
Satisfaction
18 I am satisfied with it.
19 It works the way I want it to work.
20 The app could be better.
21 The app wasn’t as satisfactory compared to other health apps.
Feedback
18 Would you like to provide any other feedback on our system?
the patient view when entering the mood information (b) and the doctor view when
receiving the patient data and optionally providing feedback (c).
Evaluation by Potential Users
We conducted a quantitative-based usability evaluation. Figures 4.17 to 4.19 illustrates
the responses from potential users for trust/security, ease of use and satisfaction respec-
tively. The X-axis represents the weighted average of responses from potential users.
Values above 5 indicate that participants agreed and values below 5 indicate they dis-
agreed.
From our trust and security results, 10 out of 15 participants (67%) had at least some
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(a) a (b) b
(c) c
Figure 4.16: Screenshots of Mindfeedback app with login view (a), patient view (b)
and doctor view (c).
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concern over what others see when they post health-related information on the Internet.
12 out of 15 participants (80%) felt that their data would be kept private and secure
when using our system, and were also made more aware of the type of information that
they may be exposing over the Internet. In regards to whether their personal information
will be managed carefully and not leaked to the outside, nearly half of the participants
agreed. Participants did mention that some form of training or a video demonstration
would have communicated the security of the system a lot more effectively.
Figure 4.17: Security Responses from potential users
From our ease-of-use responses, we found that 11 out of 15 participants (73%) found our
system easy to use and learn, user-friendly, and were able to use it successfully, every
time. However, 4 out of 15 participants (27%) did find the app a little “tedious” to
work with initially, and required some of instructions to understand the system a little
better. Overall, the satisfaction of the app was mostly positive. 13 out of 15 participants
(87%) were satisfied with our app and found that it worked in the way they wanted it to.
However, most agreed that the app could have been improved. For instance, participants
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provided feedback that the app could have had a better looking and a more intuitive
interface.
Figure 4.18: Ease-Of-Use Responses from potential users
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Figure 4.19: Satisfaction Responses from potential users
Evaluation by Medical Professionals
We also performed an identical usability evaluation with the five medical professionals.
Figures 4.20 to 4.22 illustrate the responses from medical professionals for trust/security,
ease of use and satisfaction respectively. Similarly, the X-axis in these figures represent
the weighted average of responses from medical professionals. Values above 5 indicate
that participants agreed and values below 5 indicate they disagreed.
From our trust and security results, 2 out of 5 participants (40%) were strongly con-
cerned about exposing health information over the Internet while the rest were partially
concerned. After using our app, 4 out of 5 participants (80%) felt that the personal
information they entered into the app would not be leaked to the outside. Results were
mainly positive about feeling safer when using the system and being more aware of what
they might be exposing to others on the network. In terms of feedback, participants
reported that users would not understand the key process and that it might need to
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be accompanied with images, for better understanding. We needed to better showcase
the trivial solution of data sharing, as described in the introduction, and how our sys-
tem solves the issues of the solution. Another participant reported that the two-part
encryption was ideal.
Figure 4.20: Security Responses from medical users
In terms of ease of use, 3 out of 5 participants (60%) agreed that the app required the
fewest steps possible, in order for them to accomplish what they wanted to with the app.
Results were also mostly positive, in terms of the app being user-friendly, easy to use,
and the ability to use it successfully, every time. However, a few participants agreed
that some form of written instructions was needed to make this app usable. Overall,
medical professionals found our system satisfactory. 4 out of 5 participants (80
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Figure 4.21: Ease-Of-Use Responses from medical users
Figure 4.22: Satisfaction Responses from medical users
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Similar to the potential users, 2 out of 5 medical professionals (40%) also felt that the
app could have been better. For instance, most of the feedback involved improving the
user interface. Doctors reported that a notification system for the app would have been
very handy. The notification system could pop-up or beep and alert a patient when
a doctor has provided feedback. For more serious medical problems, the notification
system could forward the patient’s request to an emergency unit or mental health crisis
team, in the event that the doctor cannot respond out of hours. Most doctors provided
positive feedback about the security of the app. One participant noted that the two-part
encryption might be frustrating for older patients, and that such a system perfectly suits
teenage patients.
4.4.6 Performance Tests
As measure of performance we tested the overhead introduced in our system, regarding
the storage and retrieval of eHealth information, with simple AES encryption/decryption
of similar text data. In regards to the eHealth information, we entered dummy data to
the MindFeedback app. Figure 4.16 contains the screenshots of the dummy data we
used. We carried out 20 test cases and measured the time taken for each test case. To
carry out the tests, we used the ASUS Eee Pad Transformer Prime TF201 Tablet [138]
with Android OS, to run our MindFeedback app. We used a HP Notebook running
Windows 8 with Intel Core i5 and 4GB RAM, to run the AES encryption/decryption
operations and to also interface with our app, in order to retrieve performance time
information from MindFeedback.
In our performance tests, we measured the overhead introduced by our system compared
to a simple AES encryption and decryption operation. We first measured the overhead
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introduced by uploading the patient’s health data to the Cloud server. Figure 4.23
illustrates the results of our upload performance tests.
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Figure 4.23: Upload Overhead
The diagram clearly highlights the overhead of our system compared to a simple AES
encryption solution. The mean time for the simple AES symmetric encryption was 0.18
seconds, with a standard deviation of 0.006 seconds. However, the mean time for the
MindFeedback tests was 0.485 seconds, with a standard deviation of 0.09 seconds. The
overhead is accounted for the additional encryption of the symmetric key, followed by
the partial decryption of the symmetric key through the ElGamal encryption algorithm.
There was also some network latency overhead.
We also measured the overhead introduced by our protocol for the download or retrieval
of the patient’s health data. Figure 4.24 highlights the results of our performance tests.
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Figure 4.24: Download Overhead
As seen in the diagram, the system only had a slight overhead compared to a simple AES
decryption operation. The mean time of the AES decryption tests was 0.001 seconds,
with a standard deviation of 0.0003 seconds. The mean time of the MindFeedback
download tests was 0.961 seconds, with a standard deviation of 0.332 seconds. Note
that the patient’s encrypted key used to protect health data is first partially decrypted
in the Cloud server and then fully decrypted on the patient’s smartphone. This is then
followed by an AES symmetric decryption using the key on their smartphone, thus
accounting for the overhead.
4.4.7 Scalability Analysis
In the scalability tests, we measured the maximum load distribution that our locally-
deployed SOAP web service could handle. We used a scalability tool that made calls to
the login and getData methods of our Cloud service. The maximum number of threads
we were able to run concurrently without the system becoming a bottleneck, was 200.
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We carried out the tests on a HP Notebook running Windows 8 with Intel Core i5 and
4GB RAM.
Below is our scalability distribution over the 200 threads, for both calls to login and
calls to retrieve the data from the Cloud service.
Figure 4.25: Distribution of login performance
Figure 4.26: Distribution of data access from Cloud performance
The diagrams highlight the near-ideal bell curve distribution. Our system could with-
stand up to 200 concurrent calls to our web service, which makes it more feasible for use
in a real-world scenario.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a solution to the key-management problem. We first
described our key-partitioning technique and then applied our solution to a number of
real-world scenarios. Our technique is simple and practical enough to be deployed in
a real-world scenario. We showed that our solution does not require the data owner
to re-encrypt and re-distribute keys, every time a data consumer is revoked. Through
our scenarios, we also showed that doctors and potential users found our system to be
private and secure, an important factor when sharing health-related data. Our approach
not only reduces the burden on data owners, but also prevents malicious insiders from
stealing critical data from the data owner.
Chapter 5
Secure Protection of Outsourced
Data
5.1 Introduction
In this section, we provide solutions to prevent security attacks related to data sharing
in the Cloud. The following section is based on the work published in [155].
5.2 SafeShare
There is now a growing demand from data owners to have better access control over their
data. This includes being able to control how and where their data should be accessed,
viewed, modified and distributed. Once the data is outside the perimeter of the data
owner’s local machine, the data owner will no longer be able to have any control over
their data. When a data owner sends a file to a recipient, he cannot guarantee that the
recipient will use the data in the way that is expected by the data owner. For instance, a
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dishonest recipient can easily redistribute the data to other, unauthorised users via email
attachments and USB drives. Furthermore, in Cloud storage, data is usually replicated
a number of times and stored in multiple locations around the world, to account for
greater availability, which at the same time makes data destruction nearly impossible to
guarantee.
In terms of access control, many works focus on using a promising technique called
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), where users with certain attributes can access the
data if those attributes satisfy the access control policy set out by the data owner
[102][24][101][100]. However, once the data is decrypted at the user’s site, that user can
then redistribute the decrypted data to other users, relatively easily. This limitation
hinders the convenience of data sharing and collaboration in distributed environments.
In our solution, we attempt to make the access control and monitoring as transparent
as possible to the user.
5.2.1 The SafeShare System
We now introduce our SafeShare architecture and in particular, discuss our secure data
sharing model and protocol.
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Figure 5.1: SafeShare Data Sharing Model
5.2.1.1 Model
Our secure data sharing model is highlighted in Figure 5.1. Table 1 summarises the role
of each entity in our data sharing model. We assume that the DSS is honest-but-curious,
in the sense that the system will follow the protocols strictly, but is always curious to
find out any information about stored data. Note that in our data model, we assume the
CDS, DSS, and Proxy Services to be semi-trusted, making our solution attractive for use
in a real-world scenario. We also assume the DC to be a semi-honest user, since it will not
be possible to completely prevent the DC from redistributing data to other unauthorised
users, as the DC can find other avenues, such as taking screenshots, photographs, etc.
However, we attempt to make it difficult for the curious DC to redistribute data based
on commands from the software stack, such as copy/paste. Hence, the DO can feel
comfortable to some degree that in most cases, their data will not be misused by curious
DCs. We also note that our work makes use of obfuscation techniques to help prevent the
curious DC from sharing the DO’s data without the DO’s knowledge. Code obfuscation
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DO Data Owner The owner of the data and decides who has access
permission to the data
DC Data Consumer Any user who has permission to access data given by
the DO
SSA SafeShare Application An application the DO runs to generate a SafeShare
object and store to Cloud (see model)
DSS Data Sharing Service The service that carries out most of the data sharing
functionality in the protocol (see model)
CDS Cloud Data Service The service that allows calls to be made to Cloud stor-
age (see model)
CS Cloud Storage Database The database containing encrypted data (see model)
α Symmetric Encryption Symmetric encryption algorithm
δ Symmetric Decryption symmetric decryption algorithm
β CP-ABE Encryption CP-ABE encryption algorithm
θ CP-ABE Decryption CP-ABE decryption algorithm
γ El-Gamal Encryption El-Gamal encryption algorithm
τ El-Gamal Decryption El-Gamal decryption algorithm
Table 5.1: Abbreviations
is a weak protection mechanism and hence the assumption of a curious DC; however,
we attempt to address this in future work.
As the basis of our work, we make use of SCOs as used in the work of Squicciarini et
al. [32], and we call this object SafeShare. We build upon SCOs and add a mechanism
within the object that will prevent users from carrying out operations denied by the
DO. Figure 5.2 illustrates our SafeShare object. Each SafeShare object encapsulates
encrypted data contents using both symmetric key encryption and CP-ABE. We also
make use of ElGamal encryption to enable efficient user revocation, which cannot be
achieved by CP-ABE alone. Each SafeShare object also contains an access control
policy governing which users can access data, what users can do with the data, and any
jurisdiction policies associated with the data. A hash is also kept of the original data for
integrity purposes. Finally, a log file is kept, which logs user operations on the data for
auditing and accountability purposes. Each SafeShare object also contains operations
such as access to data and/or makes copies of the data, if permitted by the data owner.
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Figure 5.2: SafeShare object
5.2.1.2 Overview
We now provide a brief overview of our system. First, the DO stores his data in the
Cloud by running the SSA and inputting his data and access permissions. The SSA
carries out the encryption of the data and access control policies, and encapsulates them
into a SafeShare object along with secret keys, hash value, log, etc. The SafeShare object
is then sent to the DSS and consequently the CDS, for storage.
When a DC requests access to the data and the DO approves, the DO calls the SSA to
authorise the DC. The SSA calculates new, private key pieces for the DC, which add up
to the private key used to decrypt the data. Each proxy server stores a part of the DC’s
key partition, and the remaining key partition is sent to the DC through a medium of
the DO’s choosing, such as USB, email, telephone, etc.
Once the SafeShare object is decrypted, the DC calls the Open() method to access
data, and provides his CP-ABE private key, as well as his supplied key partition. The
SafeShare object verifies with the ACP which operations are allowed on the data, and
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decrypts the data and keys, if the attributes in the CP-ABE key satisfy the policy set
out in the encrypted data.
Once the conditions have been met, the background process will then begin, which
monitors for any unauthorised operation (see next section).
When a DO wishes to completely revoke a particular user’s access to his data, he simply
calls the DSS to remove the DC’s corresponding key partitions in the proxy servers.
5.2.1.3 Background monitoring
The background monitoring process aims to prevent a curious DC from carrying out
unauthorised operations on the DO’s data. Unless specified by the DO in the ACP, the
background process does not allow the DC to modify, copy and/or paste the file to a
USB or another folder, for sharing.
The background process first creates a temporary folder and stores the decrypted file
in the folder. The folder is made available to the DC. When the DC attempts to make
a copy of the decrypted file through usual commands, such as Ctrl-C on Windows,
the background process checks with the ACP whether the operation is allowed, and if
not, immediately deletes the file in the temporary folder, leaving the clipboard empty.
Similarly, when the DC is not allowed to make modifications to his file, the background
process continually checks whether the file is modified. If the file is modified, the new
file is immediately deleted and the user would need to run the SafeShare object again, to
retrieve the original file. A log file is also kept if the DO requires additional control and
is periodically flushed to the Cloud, to prevent large data sizes on the DC’s machine.
The log file contains information such as the DC id, IP address and the data operation,
such as READ or WRITE. The DO can then retrieve the log file from the Cloud,
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for auditing and/or accountability purposes. The log file can be sent daily, weekly or
monthly depending on what the DO requires.
While the background monitoring helps to reinforce stronger access control of the data,
it is not very difficult to circumvent the process. For example, the DC could read the file
using a number of methods at the system level, command level and even in backup. Our
background monitoring process only controls unauthorised operations only from the UI
and clipboard and thus is more suitable for the everyday user. We acknowledge that
this is a limitation of our work and we will build upon this limitation in Section 5.3.
5.2.1.4 Protocol
We now discuss our SafeShare protocol in detail. The protocol has five stages: data
storage, data retrieval, consumer authorisation, authorised data access, and consumer
revocation.
Data Storage
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1© DO → SSA INPUT: FILE, P , PK
2© Generate {p,b,c}, x
3© Hash(FILE)
4© Generate log and key k
5© αk(FILE) = m
6© βp(m) = M
7© γ{p,b,c}(P ) = ACP
8© γ{p,b,c}(Hash(FILE)) = H
9© γ{p,b,c}(log) = L
10© γ{p,b,c}(k) = K
11© Create SafeShare object SS
12© SSA → SS ACP,H,L,K,M, xn+2
13© Obfuscate SS file
14© DO → DSS credentials, SS
15© DSS → CDS verifyCredentials(credentials)
16© CDS → DSS uDO
17© DSS Generate dFILE
18© DSS → CDS → CS uDO, dFILE, SS
At the data storage stage, the DO first inputs his file, policies and public parameters
from ABE to SSA on his PC 1©. The application will generate public and private key
pairs from the initialisation stage of the ElGamal encryption algorithm 2©. A hash of
the file will then be calculated 3©. An empty log file will also be generated, as well
as a symmetric key 4©. The file will first be encrypted by symmetric key k 5© and
then, using the access control policy, by the CP-ABE public key 6©. The access control
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policy, data hash, log file and symmetric key will also be individually encrypted by the
ElGamal public key 7© - 10©. The application will then generate and store the encrypted
file along with the encrypted access control policy, data hash, log file and symmetric
key, in an object file that we call SafeShare 11© - 12©. Also, one partitioned key piece
will also be stored in a variable in the source code of the SafeShare object (12), and
will then be obfuscated 13©, so that it will be extremely difficult to reverse engineer the
code to find out the key piece value. This can only be found out through the running of
the executable. The DO then sends the SafeShare object, along with its credentials, to
the DSS 14©.The DO keeps the secret key x on his machine. The DSS verifies the user
credentials 15© - 16©, and then generates a data identification 17©. The SafeShare object is
then sent to Cloud storage 18©. Note that we assume that the DO exists in the database
with a user identification. If the DO does not exist in the database, intuitively, the data
will not be stored.
Consumer Authorisation
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1© DO Calculate x− xn+2
2© Generate xu1 + ...+ xu(n) + xu(n+1) = x− xn+2
3© DO → DSS auth(credentials,email, dFILE, {xu1, ...xu(n)})
4© DSS → CDS verifyCredentials(credentials)
5© CDS → DSS uDO
6© DSS → CDS verifyUserExists(email)
7© CDS → DSS uDC
8© for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i {uDC, uDO, dFILE, xu(i)}
9© DO Generate attribute set and corresponding private key
pkDC
10© DO → DC pkDC, xu(n+1), {p, b, c}
The DO first calculates the secret key value x minus the key partition value stored in
the SafeShare object 1©. The DO partitions this value into n+ 1 random pieces, where
n represents the number of proxy servers 2©. The DO sends his credentials, the DC’s
identifier (i.e., email), the data identification and n key partitions, to the DSS 3©. The
DSS, after verifying whether the DO and DC exist 4© - 7©, then stores the DC’s key
partitions to each of the proxy servers 8©. Finally, the DO generates a private key using
the CP-ABE KeyGen algorithm, to generate a key for the DC that provides access to
the data 9©. The CP-ABE key, along with the remaining key partition and public key,
is sent to the DC, and he now gains access rights 10©.
Data Retrieval
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1© DC → DSS credentials, dFILE
2© DSS → CDS verifyCredentials(credentials)
3© CDS → DSS uDO
4© DSS → CDS uDO, dFILE
5© CDS → DSS SS
6© for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i uDC, dFILE
proxy i → DSS xu(i)
7© DSS → SS update( xu(i))
8© SS τxu1(ACP )
= τxu1(γ{p,b,c}(P ))
= (cr, (cr)−xu1 .crx.P mod p)
= (cr, (cr)x−xu1 .P mod p)
Similarly for H, L and K
9© Repeat step 7© for RP = Remaining ACP cipher:
all n key pieces (cr, (cr)x−x1u−...−xun .P mod p)
RH = Remaining cipher of H:
(cr, (cr)x−x1u−...−xun
.Hash(FILE) mod p)
RL = Remaining cipher of L:
(cr, (cr)x−x1u−...−xnu .log mod p)
RK = Remaining cipher of key:
(cr, (cr)x−x1u−...−xnu .k mod p)
10© DSS → DC SS
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At this stage, the DC (or DO) downloads the SafeShare object from the Cloud, ready to
be accessed. The DC sends his credentials and data identification to the DSS 1©. The
DSS verifies whether the user is legitimate 2© - 3© and if so, calls the CDS to retrieve
the SafeShare object 4© - 5©. The DSS will also retrieve the DC’s key partitions from
the proxy servers 6©. The DSS then calls the update() method of the SafeShare object
and also sends the key partition value 7© - 8©. The object then uses the key partition
to decrypt the access policy, data hash, log file and symmetric key. The object then
updates itself with these new values 9©. The SafeShare object, containing the partially
decrypted contents, are then sent to the DC 10©.
Authorised Data Access
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1© DC → SS Open(xn+1, pkDC)
2© SS τxu(n+2)(τxu(n+1)(RP ))
= (cr, (cr)x−x1u−...−xu(n+2) .P mod p)
= (cr, (cr)x−x.P mod p)
= (cr, P mod p)
3© Similarly, repeat step 2 for RH, RL and RK:
P, Hash(FILE), log, k
4© θpkDC(βP (m)) = m = αk(FILE)
δk(m) = δk(αk(FILE)) = FILE
5© Create monitoring folder F
6© SS → F FILE
7© monitorInBackground()
8© IF (operation violates ACP)
Delete FILE immediately
9© IF (ACP contains doLog=true)
log each operation to log file.
Periodically upload log to DSS and clear log in SS
At this stage, the DC accesses the data encapsulated within the SafeShare object. The
DC simply runs the Open function of the object, passing on his stored key piece and CP-
ABE private key 1©. The SafeShare object then decrypts each of the metadata contents
using the DC’s key piece and then later, the key piece stored within the source code, to
reveal the full metadata as well as the fully decrypted symmetric key 2© - 3©. Note that
this key value is stored in the executable binary as it is running, hence it is extremely
difficult for the DC to ever find out this key value. The SafeShare object will use the
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fully decrypted symmetric key to decrypt the file. If the attributes of the private key
satisfy the ACP, then the file will be decrypted to reveal the data encrypted by k. The
data is then decrypted fully by k 4©. The SafeShare object, after checking whether the
user is authorised to access the data, will generate a temporary folder and store the file
in that folder 5© - 6©. The SafeShare object will then monitor the file and temporary
folder in the background, simulating a watchdog 7©. If an operation violates the ACP,
such as no copying or no modification, the file will be deleted immediately 8©. If the
DO explicitly states in the ACP that logging should be enabled, the watchdog will log
any operations to the log file and update the object with the latest log. The SafeShare
object will periodically flush the log file to the DSS, to ensure that the file sizes do not
exceed a maximum range 9©.
Consumer Revocation
1© DO → DSS deleteUser(credentials, uDC, dFILE)
2© DSS → CDS verifyCredentials(credentials)
3© CDS → DSS uDO
4© for (all proxy i)
DSS → proxy i removeKeyPiece(uDO, uDC, dFILE)
proxy i → DSS Remove xui
When the DO decides to revoke a user’s access rights to data, he simply calls the DSS
to request that the user’s rights to the data are revoked 1©. The DSS will then verify
the credentials of the user 2© - 3© and then, provided that the user exists, remove the
corresponding key pieces of the user in each of the proxy databases 4©. Note that the
data does not need to be re-encrypted, and none of the other users will be affected, since
only the key pieces corresponding to the consumer are removed. All other key pieces
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corresponding to other consumers still remain in the proxy database. Since the data
does not need to be re-encrypted, nor does there need to be any key re-distribution, the
model is efficient and has a runtime of O(n), where n is the number of proxy servers.
5.2.2 Security Analysis
We now analyse our model and protocol from a privacy and security perspective.
1. Data confidentiality – Data remains encrypted at all times, whether it is in transit,
within the Cloud provider, or on the DC’s machine. The only time the data is
decrypted is when the Open() method is called, since the class file contains the
remaining key partition. Since the SafeShare object is obfuscated, the value of the
key partition will be hard to reverse engineer. Without the key partition value,
even if the attacking user has all of the other partitions, he still does not possess
knowledge of the full ElGamal private key and cannot decrypt the data. Since key
partitions are stored in different proxy servers (possibly modelled and implemented
on different CSPs), unauthorised data access becomes extremely difficult. This is
due to the fact that compromising all CSPs is almost impossible [156].
2. Unauthorised redistribution – The symmetric key is also encrypted with the El-
Gamal private key, and also requires the key partition value in the obfuscated
source code to retrieve the full CP-ABE key needed to decrypt data. When the
object method is run, and the user has fulfilled all other requirements needed for
the object, the object will decrypt the data itself and then monitor operations on
the decrypted data in a background process, as a watchdog. If the ACP denies
redistribution, the watchdog code will prevent the DC from copying the decrypted
data to another folder; for instance, sending an email attachment. This can also
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help prevent attacks related to covert channels. The watchdog is non-intrusive
upon user behaviour and only monitors actions on the relevant data owner’s files,
to check for any unuathorised operation. It does not interfere, nor log the user
actions on other files and applications.
3. User revocation – User revocation involves simply removing a DC’s key partitions
from the proxy. By doing so, the DC can never recover the full ElGamal private
key. The key partition stored on the DC’s machine will be rendered useless without
the other key partitions. The DC also never knows the full value of the private
ElGamal key, unless it is leaked by the DO. Without the full key, it is nearly
impossible to decrypt the CP-ABE key needed to decrypt the data. The attacker
would have to guess the final key partition in order to fully decrypt the CP-ABE
key. Similarly, without the full key, it is also extremely difficult to decrypt the
metadata information such as the ACP, hash value and log file.
4. Auditing/Accountability – If the DO has highly confidential data, for extra security,
he can explicitly state that all operations on the data are logged. All operations
on the data will be noted by the watchdog and appended to the log file. The log
file will be periodically sent to the DSS web service, which the DO can access at
any time, from anywhere, to keep track of the usage of his data and to satisfy his
auditing/accountability requirements.
5. Data Integrity – While the watchdog is running in the background, the updated
hash value can also be periodically sent to the DSS. The DSS will update the
previous hash value to the current one in the database. The DO can later check
whether his data has been tampered with, and can also hold accountable whoever
tampered with the data.
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5.2.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We now provide the implementation details of our system, followed by experimental
results and an evaluation.
5.2.3.1 Implementation
We developed our prototype of the system using the Java programming language. The
DSS, CDS and Proxy servers were developed using Java, Apache Tomcat and Apache
Axis2. We also used MySQL for data storage. The CP-ABE scheme, developed by
Wang [157], implements the work of Bethencourt et al. [105]. The code was developed
using the Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (jPBC library) [158]. To implement
the SafeShare object, we made use of executable JAR files. The SSA was implemented
using Java. ProGuard [159] was used to obfuscate and shrink the JAR file.
5.2.3.2 Experimental Results
We carried out a number of performance tests on our system. In particular, we measured
the overhead introduced in our SafeShare object, in comparison to sharing data using
only the CP-ABE scheme. We measured the performance of generating and opening
SafeShare objects. The purpose of these tests was to determine whether our system
would be feasible for use in a real-world scenario. To carry out the tests, we used a dual-
core ASUS laptop with 2GB memory, 350GB storage and Windows Vista Operating
System, as well as a Dell XP 8500 PC with Intel Core i7 and 8GB memory, running
Windows 8.
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For each of the tests, we used a number of files with sizes ranging from 1KB to 100MB, to
reflect different application requirements. The files used in the tests ranged from simple
text files, to documents, and also different image formats. For larger files, we used video
files with different formats and 3D graphics files. For each file, the performance tests
were run a number of times. The average time was then calculated, and displayed in
the figures below. Using the same set of files, we also measured performance for the CP-
ABE scheme of Bethencourt et al. [105]. This allowed us to measure the performance
overhead of our SafeShare object.
Figure 5.3: Data encryption overhead
Figure 5.3 highlights the results of our first tests. From the figure, it is clear that
SafeShare objects took much longer, compared to a simple CP-ABE encryption scheme.
This is due to the SafeShare object having to encrypt the access control policy, hash and
log file, as well as the data itself, and then package all these contents into a JAR file.
Most of the time was spent in the generation and packaging of contents to a JAR file.
As file sizes increased, the data generation times increased considerably for SafeShare
objects, with the largest file size taking 50 seconds, while the CP-ABE scheme only
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demonstrated a small increase in time. The slight dip in the overhead of files around the
10MB mark, is accounted for by testing carried out in different times; it is nevertheless
still similar to all of the file sizes below 10MB.
Figure 5.4: Data access overhead
The overhead introduced when a user carried out data access was also measured, using
the same set of files. Figure 5.4 illustrates the results of our tests where again, we mea-
sured our SafeShare scheme with the CP-ABE scheme. This is the result of running the
Open operation of the SafeShare object. We found that for files up to 10MB in size,
the overhead in access times was nearly negligible. However, once the file sizes became
larger, the access times increased exponentially, leaving a large overhead compared to
the CP-ABE scheme. For files with sizes of 60MB, the user would have to wait approxi-
mately five minutes each time, to access data. The access times for the CP-ABE scheme
remained minimal, no matter how large the file was.
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5.2.3.3 Evaluation
From the performance tests, we found that our SafeShare object was comparably slower
to encrypt and decrypt. Regarding the encryption, this is mainly to do with the genera-
tion of JAR files. Data access times increase exponentially for larger data sizes; however,
as processing power increases and the generation of JAR files optimises, access times
will improve in the near future. Also, in the near future, it may be possible to split the
process and run them in parallel threads to significantly improve performance times. In
our current solution, users may be willing to wait a little longer for highly confidential
data to generate and access data. For instance, a business user might be willing to
wait for a little more than a minute to access 15MB of highly confidential paperwork.
This makes our solution highly attractive to users who are more concerned with privacy
rather than performance times.
5.3 Hardware data encapsulation using TED
We now improve on the software-based SafeShare and leverage a hardware device called
the TED, for the stronger privacy and security of data. Hardware-based mechanisms
are generally more difficult to attack compared to software-based mechanisms, as this
would require some form of physical effort. The work in this section is based on [160].
5.3.1 Introduction
The Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) [161] concept is a growing trend that allows
enterprise employees to bring their own devices, such as laptops, smartphones, and
tablets, to their workplace, and use the devices to access sensitive data within the
Chapter 5. Secure Protection of Outsourced Data 161
organisation. Key management and key stealing issues associated with the Cloud can
be addressed using BYOD, since the employee device contains one key that is unique to
the device and uses that key for secure sharing. However, when applying BYOD to data
sharing in the Cloud, a number of issues are introduced [161][162]. If the employee’s
device contains malware, it could inject the malware into enterprise servers. Also, it is
possible that the employee’s device could leave traces of very sensitive enterprise data,
later on.
The main vulnerabilities of introducing BYOD to data sharing in the Cloud include:
• Key management - Storing keys and certificates inside the device is complex and
unsafe. Since there is no control over the consumer’s device, it is not guaranteed
that the keys stored inside the device will never be revealed to outsiders.
• Data protection - Once the consumer obtains the data, there is no guarantee that
the consumer will then redistribute the data to other unauthorised consumers,
such as friends or family.
In our work, we focus primarily on the former, and leave the latter as an aspect of
future work. We make use of a small, self-contained USB-sized computer which incorpo-
rates TPM, called the Trust Extension Device (TED) [163], in order to address the key
management limitations of BYOD. The attractive part of our solution is that the con-
sumer’s untrusted computer can simply be viewed as IO, while the secure data-sharing
operations are carried out inside the TED. From the consumer’s perspective, the TED
is viewed as a black box. Although BYOD is currently a more cost-effective approach
compared to TED, we foresee that in the future, most smartphones, tablets and note-
books will have similar capabilities to the TED. Our system is heterogeneous, in that it
can be used under any operating system, platform, etc.
Chapter 5. Secure Protection of Outsourced Data 162
DO The owner of the data; decides who has access permission to the data
DC Any consumer who has permission to access data provided by the DO
DSS The untrusted data sharing Cloud service used to store and retrieve data (see
model)
TTI The Trusted TED Issuer service that manufactures TED devices and dis-
tributes them to DCs, oﬄine
PCA The trusted service that verifies whether a DC is who they say they are
TED Physically-based TPM model used to attest and retrieve encrypted data from
the DSS
Table 5.2: Entities
5.3.2 Security Model and Protocol
We now introduce our system architecture and in particular, discuss our secure data
sharing model and protocol. Our model and protocol is not limited to a specific appli-
cation, but can be applied to a variety of different application scenarios. Our system
is heterogeneous and is not limited in terms of operating system, platform, etc. Our
system is also transparent, in the sense that the data consumer can use it as an “out-of-
the-box” tool, without having to run any configuration. Note that all operations carried
out by the TED are completely transparent to the host OS. The host OS will never be
able to retrieve any information from the TED.
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5.3.2.1 Model
Figure 5.5: Data Model
Our secure data sharing model is highlighted in Figure 5.5. The Data Sharing Service
(DSS) is an untrusted Cloud Service Provider used to store the Data Owner’s (DO)
data. The Trusted Ted Issuer (TTI) manufactures TED devices with the embedded
cryptographic keys that are needed to decrypt data for Data Consumers (DC), provided
that DCs have bought/registered the DO’s data. A Private Certificate Authority (PCA)
is called by the TED device, whenever the DC requires data access. The PCA verifies
that the DC really is who they say they are, as well as registered to access the data. If
successful, the PCA grants data access. A number of DCs will use the TED to securely
connect with the TTI and PCA, to be authenticated and verified, and if successful,
retrieve the data. Zic and Hardjono [164] propose a similar model where they leverage
the use of TED to measure the integrity of client devices when they access Cloud-based
applications and services. Whereas, in our work, we leverage TED to ensure that the
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authorised DC is able to access the data without ever knowing the key used to decrypt
the data.
We assume that the DSS is honest-but-curious, in the sense that the system will follow
the protocols strictly but is always curious to find out any information about stored
data. Note that in our data model, we assume the PCA and TTI to be trusted. We
also assume the TED to be trusted. We assume the DC to be a semi-honest consumer,
since it will not be possible to completely prevent the DC from redistributing data
to other unauthorised consumers, as the DC can find other avenues, such as taking
screenshots, photographs, etc. However, we attempt to make it difficult for the curious
DC to redistribute data. Hence, the DO can feel comfortable to some degree that in
most cases, their data will not be misused by curious DCs.
5.3.2.2 Protocol
We now discuss our secure data sharing protocol in detail. The protocol has four stages:
Data Storage and Set Up, Data Consumer Registration, Data Access, and Consumer
Revocation.
Data Storage and Setup
1© DO x = x1 + x2
2© Ek(data)
3© E(p,b,c)(k)
4© Dx1(E(p,b,c)(k))
5© DO → DSS {Ek(data), Dx1(E(p,b,c)(k))}
6© DO → TTI x2
Chapter 5. Secure Protection of Outsourced Data 165
Data Storage and Set Up: First, the DO generates an ElGamal public and private
keypair and then partitions the private key into two parts 1©. The DO then generates
a random symmetric key and encrypts data with it 2©. The symmetric key is then
encrypted with the public ElGamal key 3©, and is then partially decrypted by the first
half of the key partition 4©. The encrypted data and encrypted key are then sent to the
DSS for storage 5©. The DO also sends the second key partition to the TTI, to enable
data sharing 6©. It is assumed that the DO sends the key partition value through a
secure medium, as decided upon by the enterprise, such as email, over the telephone, by
mail, or in person, to name a few.
Data Consumer Registration
1© DC → TTI register(credentials, did)
2© TTI x2 = xa + xb
3© TTI → PCA {credentials, did, xa}
4© TTI → TED {credentials, EC, xb, ...}
Data Consumer Registration: The DC registers with the TTI using his creden-
tials, in order to gain data access 1©. We do not detail the registration process, since
it is outside the scope of this work. We assume that registration can simply involve,
for example, the DC purchasing the data item through a website. The website is also
assumed to have knowledge of the DC, via credential information. The TTI partitions
the DO’s supplied key piece, again, into two parts 2©. One of the two parts is generated
randomly; therefore, both pieces will always be different for each consumer. The TTI
then sends the DC credentials and one of the newly generated key partitions, to the
PCA for storage 3©. The TTI will then manufacture, oﬄine, a TED device embedding
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Data Access
1© DC → TED Open()
2© TED pubAIK , prvAIK
3© TED → DSS {credentials, pubAIK , sign(EC, prvTTI)}
4© DSS → PCA {credentials, pubAIK , sign(EC, prvTTI)}
5© PCA verify(sign(EC, prvTTI), pubTTI) =
EC = {pubEK , did, TPMmodel, ...}
6© verifyCredentials(credentials)
7© sign(pubAIK , prvPCA)
8© PCA → DSS {did, xa, sign(pubAIK , prvPCA)}
9© DSS Dxa(Dx1(E(p,b,c)(k)))
Dx1+xa(E(p,b,c)(k))
10© DSS → TED aenc({Dx1+xa(E(p,b,c)(k)), Ek(data),
sign(pubAIK , prvPCA)}, pubAIK)
11© TED adec(aenc({Dx1+xa(E(p,b,c)(k)), Ek(data),
sign(pubAIK , prvPCA)}, pubAIK), prvAIK)
12© TED verify(sign(pubAIK , prvPCA), pubPCA)
13© TED Dxb(Dx1+xa(E(p,b,c)(k)))
= Dx1+xa+xb(E(p,b,c)(k))
= Dx(E(p,b,c)(k))
= k
14© TED Dk(Ek(data))
= data
15© TED → DC data
the credentials, endorsement credentials containing the endorsement keys, data identi-
fication, TPM model, manufacturer, etc., as well as the second key partition generated
by the TTI 4©. The TED device will then be shipped to the DC’s physical address.
Data Access: The data consumer runs the secure application in the TED device, to
access data 1©. The TED device carries out the attestation protocol (see section 3.2).
First, the attestation key pair is generated 2©. TED then sends its credentials, public
attestation key, and signed endorsement credentials to the PCA via DSS 3©, 4©. The
PCA verifies the signature to retrieve the endorsement credentials, and hence knows
which TED device made the call 5©. The PCA also verifies the consumer’s credentials
to ensure that the correct consumer is using the TED device 6©. The PCA then signs
the public attestation key to reveal the attestation identity certificate 7©. The PCA
retrieves the data identification and key partition from the consumer’s database entry,
and sends this along with the signature, to the DSS 8©. The DSS uses the key partition
to decrypt the partially decrypted key, to result in a further partially decrypted key 9©.
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The DSS encrypts the encrypted data, partially decrypted key and attestation identity
certificate with the public attestation identity key, and sends this to the TED device 10©.
The TED application decrypts this using the private attestation identity key stored in
the TED device 11©. The application verifies the signature of the attestation certificate
12© and if verified, it uses the key partition stored in the TED storage to decrypt the
partially decrypted key, in order to reveal the fully decrypted symmetric key 13©. The
symmetric key is then used to decrypt the data 14©. Finally, the data is sent to the DC
through the secure application 15©.
Consumer Revocation
1© DO → TTI revokeConsumer(credentials, did)
2© TTI → PCA remove(credentials, did)
3© PCA delete(credentials, did)
Consumer Revocation:
When the DO wants to revoke a particular DC, the DO simply calls the revoke operation,
sending a consumer credential such as the DC id or username to the TTI 1©. The TTI
passes the credentials to the PCA, ordering the removal of the consumer 2©. The PCA
locates the consumer credentials in the database and deletes the entire row, including
the key partition, hence rendering the data completely useless to the DC 3©.
5.3.2.3 Security Evaluation
• User Revocation - In our protocol, user revocation can be achieved efficiently
without the need to re-encrypt the data each time. The DC’s key partition, as
well as credential information associated with the data, is simply removed from
the trusted PCA’s database. This way, if the revoked DC attempts to access the
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data, their corresponding TED will fail to be attested and, furthermore, will never
be able to be decrypted without the key partition.
• Collusion between DC and DSS - In the event that a dishonest DC and the un-
trusted DSS collude, the DC will only be able to retrieve the encrypted data and
the partially decrypted symmetric key. Without the remaining key partition, it
is extremely difficult for the DC to decrypt the data, as the data decryption key
will still remain illegible. Since the remaining key partition is encapsulated within
the TED device, the DC would have to carry out hardware-based attacks in order
to retrieve the remaining key partition. Hardware-based security mechanisms are
much more difficult to attack; therefore, our protocol handles collusion attacks
between DC and DSS.
• Man-in-the-Middle Attacks - Our protocol handles man-in-the-middle attacks,
since every time a DC requests access to data, the TED application always at-
tests with the DSS and PCA, using the attestation identity key. The encrypted
data and keys are returned to the TED device with a signature from the PCA
attesting that the TED device is legal and valid.
• Update Secrecy - When the DO wishes to replace his current stored data with a
newer, updated version, he simply encrypts the data with the same symmetric key
and sends it to the DSS to be replaced. Note that nothing else in the protocol needs
to be changed, thus making our solution practical for deployment in a real-world
scenario.
• Losing TED - In the event that a DC’s TED device is physically lost or stolen, the
DC immediately notifies the TTI (using his credentials) that the device has been
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stolen. The TTI verifies the credentials, and notifies the PCA to remove the entry
containing the DC’s credentials and key partition.
• Insider Attacks - Our protocol is also secure against insider attacks, since there
is never a stage in our protocol where the data is decrypted in the Cloud. The
data remains encrypted at all times on the untrusted Cloud servers, as well as on
untrusted public communication channels.
• Unauthorised Data Redistribution - In our protocol, we also attempt to prevent
the unauthorised redistribution of data by friends, family, etc. It is impossible to
completely prevent a dishonest DC from redistributing the data, since the TED
eventually returns the full plaintext data. The DC can still redistribute the data
using the plaintext. However, it is now more difficult to let an arbitrary number of
unauthorised users from accessing and using the data. Also, the DC can physically
hand over their TED to another user, which is outside the scope of this work. We
will attempt to address this in future work.
5.3.3 Implementation and Evaluation
We now provide the implementation details of our system, followed by experimental
results and an evaluation.
5.3.3.1 Implementation
We implemented our TED application using the C language. To run the TED applica-
tion, we connected the TED device to a PC, and then created a simple Java application
that is used to invoke and return commands to and from the TED device.
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5.3.3.2 Evaluation
We measured the overhead introduced by the encryption and decryption of data using
TED. The purpose of these tests was to determine whether TED would be feasible for
use in a real-world scenario, with regards to secure data sharing. The host machine we
used was an Intel Core i5 HP Pavilion Notebook with 4GB memory, 1TB storage, and
64-bit Windows 8 operating system.
To carry out the performance test, we first measured the time taken to encrypt a simple
text file using AES encryption. We then measured the time taken to encrypt the text
file using our simple Java application named “SecureShare,” which follows the protocol.
We carried out the test cases a number of times and calculated the average times. Using
the encrypted text file, we then measured the time taken to decrypt the file using AES
decryption, and the time taken to decrypt the file using TED.
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Figure 5.6: Encryption overhead
Figure 5.6 highlights the results of our first tests. From the tests, the overhead introduced
Chapter 5. Secure Protection of Outsourced Data 171
by our Java application, “SecureShare,” is slightly higher than simple AES encryption.
The average time taken to encrypt the text file using a simple AES encryption algorithm
was approximately 0.19 seconds. The average time to encrypt the same text file using
SafeShare was approximately 0.24 seconds. However, since the encryption process is
under half a second, everyday users will find it feasible to use our SafeShare application
to protect their files.
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Figure 5.7: Decryption overhead
Figure 5.7 illustrates the overhead introduced by decrypting data using the TED device.
From the figure, it is clear that the overhead of decrypting data using the TED is
significantly higher than decryption using a simple AES algorithm. The average time to
decrypt the text file using AES decryption was approximately 0.27 seconds, while the
average time to decrypt the same text file using the TED, was 551.41 seconds.
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5.3.3.3 Performance and Size Limitations
The poor performance of the decryption is mainly due to the limited resource and capa-
bility of the existing TED that was prototyped a few years ago, instead of our approach
itself. For example, the data size that the TED currently supports is approximately
2-3KB. Simply adding larger CPU and memory to the TED devices will see drastic
improvements in performance and size limitations. We foresee that in the near future,
devices such as the TED will have greater capabilities, which will in turn drastically
improve performance times. Furthermore, we envisage such capabilities to be incorpo-
rated into smartphones and notebooks, which will further enhance the usability of our
system.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we first designed and implemented SafeShare, a software object that
encapsulates both data and policy and allows private and secure sharing without leaking
the data to the Cloud. SafeShare also incorporates a background monitoring mechanism
that aims to prevent dishonest consumers from leaking data to other, unauthorised users.
We then improved on SafeShare, and leveraged hardware data encapsulation via the
TED. This was shown to provide stronger privacy and security compared to SafeShare,
due to data being decrypted within the hardware device and not the host OS.
Chapter 6
SelfProtect Object
Our previous solutions have focused on providing private and secure data sharing, by
addressing key management and security attacks. However, we assumed that the data
consumer is honest and will not leak the data to unauthorised outsiders. Once the data
is given away to the Cloud and/or data consumers, the data owner effectively loses full
control over their own data. The data consumer can copy, modify and distribute the
data to friends and family, without the knowledge of the data owner. Thus, there is now
a strong demand for data owners to regain some degree of control over their own shared
data, no matter where the data is stored and accessed. In this chapter, we present
technologies that we have developed to allow the data owner to regain some level of
control over their data. This chapter is based on the work published in [165].
6.1 Introduction
The amount of content being generated and shared is increasing at a rapid pace [1][12][166].
The types of content include photos, movies, music, eBooks, business documents, health
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data, etc. While content sharing provides many benefits, content owners lose almost full
control of their content once it is given away to consumers. Currently, Digital Rights
Management (DRM) is used to give the content owner some form of control [167]. The
unauthorised use of contents can be:
• Unauthorised and unlimited access - Consumers are able to access the content as
many times as they wish and can access the content from anywhere, at any time.
• Unauthorised copy - Consumers can make a copy of the content without the per-
mission of the content owner.
• Unauthorised modification - Consumers can modify the content in any way that
they wish, without the permission of the content owner.
• Unauthorised distribution - Consumers can illegally distribute the content to friends,
family or peers, via USB transfer or email attachments.
Thus, there is a strong demand for content owners to have some degree of control over
their content at any time, and from any location.
Some solutions exist in the literature and industry. However, these solutions and tech-
nologies have various limitations, including:
• Vendor specific - Solutions that require specific hardware and/or OS just to access
the data. The content cannot be accessed anywhere else and is thus limited.
For example DataSafe [33] requires specific hardware, and Microsoft’s password
protection only works on Microsoft products [168].
• Non-structured - These solutions focus on protecting one resource only and not an
entire folder (or folders) of resources. For example, Tchao and Serugendo [169]
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have proposed SmartContent, which aims to protect one resource. Munier [170]
has proposed the idea of self-protecting documents. This protects content within
the document and does not apply to other content types, such as movie files.
• Non-flexible - Access control implemented in these solutions does not use standard
policy language. For example, Squicciarini et al.[32] have proposed a SCO that
uses JAR files, which results in weaker security, even when obfuscated.
6.1.1 Scenario
We envisage a scenario where patients can share health documents with doctors from
different hospitals, in a new way. Our work in previous chapters has focused on en-
suring that the data is only accessible by those who have permission to do so (via key
management), and protecting the data from security attackers (via secure data-sharing
protocols). However, patients have little control over enforcing exactly how the data
is to be used by authorised doctors. A doctor may inadvertently or intentionally dis-
tribute the patient’s private health information to other unauthorised entities, without
the knowledge of the patient. The patient might also wish to have their medical infor-
mation only available within the confines of the hospital.
Thus, patients need a way to specify relatively complex rules; for example, ensuring
that the documents can only be accessed by doctors in specific hospitals and also during
working hours. In addition to allowing the patient to specify these policies, mechanisms
need to be put in place to ensure that these policies are enforced at all times. The
patient’s ability to create his own policies for how his medical data should be used, as
well as his ability to enforce them, will go a long way to improving patients’ trust in
using the Cloud for sensitive data-sharing purposes.
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6.2 Overview
In our work, we introduce SelfProtect Object (SPO), a software object that bundles
content and policy files. The DO first runs a tool to specify the exact rules for how the
data is to be used. For example, specifying the IP addresses to indicate the location
from which the data can be accessed and/or the times that the data can be accessed.
The tool will then convert these rules into an XACML-based policy file. The DO then
runs the SPO generator tool and inputs the data content(s) that is to be protected, as
well as the XACML policy file. The SPO generator creates an SPO file bundling both
the data content(s) and policy file. The SPO file can now be distributed everywhere.
The SPO file encapsulates both the content and policy file, and data access can only
occur through an API call. An application, such as Microsoft Word, will contain a
plugin. The plugin will make the API call to the SPO to request data access. When
a call is made to access the data, the SPO will first verify whether the policy has been
followed. It will retrieve attributes needed for decision making, such as the current time
or IP address. If the policy conditions are adhered to, the SPO will release the data
contents to the calling application. If the policy is not adhered to, then the SPO will
deny access to the calling application.
For example, consider a policy inside the SPO, stating that a Microsoft Word document
can only be accessed during business hours. An authorised DC then opens Microsoft
Word and makes a call to request access, via the plugin to access the data during business
hours. The SPO will first obtain the current time from the DC’s machine and evaluate
it with the policy. The SPO will then release the document to Microsoft Word, and the
DC now has access. If the DC again attempts to access the data outside of business
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hours, the policy evaluation will result in a “Deny” and the SPO will not release the
document to Microsoft Word. Instead, a popup will be displayed, informing the DC
that access to the document has been denied.
6.3 Design
We now provide the SafeProtect architecture, the key components of SafeProtect, and
API design.
6.3.1 Architecture
Figure 6.1 illustrates the architecture for our SelfProtect object and its application.
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Figure 6.1: SPO Architecture
6.3.2 Key Components
Each of the components in the SPO architecture are described as follows:
• Policy: Specifies a set of rules and conditions that must be abided by, in order
for the SPO to release the resource to the calling applications. The policy can be
written in XACML policy language [29].
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• Resource: Data contents that the user wishes to protect. These can include
documents, images, music files, movie files, etc.
• SPO Generator: Takes the policy and resources as inputs and generates an SPO
object as output.
• User: The subject who wishes to access resources contained in the SPO. It can
be a username/password as well as a security token.
• Application: Used to access the resource. Can be any applications, such as Word
to edit documents, or Media player to play movies and music files.
• Verification Service: A web service used to store persistent data, supporting
the policy evaluation and enforcement in the SPO.
• SPO: The SelfProtect Object containing the policy and resources with access
control mechanisms:
– PEP - The Policy Enforcement Point. This obtains the request from the
application and forwards it to the PDP, to obtain a decision. Once a decision
is retrieved, it then acts upon that decision.
– Environment attributes - These contain information such as play times, IP
address, time and date.
– Context Handler - Converts the request into XACML format and forwards it
to the PDP. It also makes queries for environment attributes, to help PDP
make a decision.
– PDP - The Policy Decision Point. This evaluates the request by the appli-
cation with the policy, and makes a decision on whether to permit access or
deny access.
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– API - The abstract interface used by the application. It contains two methods
(described in the next section) that are used by the calling application to
access the resource.
We assume the user’s operating system to be trusted, as well as the verification service.
6.3.3 API design
We now briefly describe the methods in our API.
• getResourceList - Outputs a structured list of all of the available resources
contained within the SPO.
• getResource(subject, action, resource) - Takes as input a request with pa-
rameters subject, action and resource. If the policy is adhered to, the data contents
will be output as a file stream.
6.4 Implementation
In this section, we detail the implementation of SPO by first discussing the technologies
we used to build SPO, and then describing the protocol for content access within the
SPO.
6.4.1 Selected Technologies
• XACML: We incorporate XACML policy language in our work. XACML [29]
is a generic, open-source access control policy language built on XML. We chose
XACML for our policy, since it can specify the complex conditions upon which the
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data contents can be accessed. The policy language allows the content owner to
develop a policy; for example, one that allows the data content to be accessed in a
specific country, or within a specific time range within a day. We build a tool that
allows the content owner to freely specify a wide range of conditions over their
data.
• .NET: To prove our SPO concept, we built a SPO prototype on the .NET plat-
form. All of our source code was compiled on C#. The SPO object itself is
represented as a file with a .dll extension. We chose to build our system with
.NET instead of Java, since Java would introduce privacy issues. If we were to
have compiled the system with Java, the SPO object would have been represented
as a JAR file. Contents in a JAR file are relatively easy to extract, even when
obfuscated. For example, Squicciarini et al.[32] proposed Self-Controlling Objects
that also use JAR files, which results in weaker security, even when obfuscated. In
our previous work, we proposed SafeShare, which also used JAR files [155]. On the
other hand, the contents in a DLL file are more private and secure, since it rep-
resents the contents as a binary. The data contents in the SPO can be encrypted
persistently and decrypted on-the-fly, to provide another layer of protection at the
cost of performance.
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6.4.2 Protocol
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Figure 6.2: Resource access workflow within SPO
Figure 6.2 details the messaging sequence within the SPO, when the application makes
a request to obtain a resource. The API sends the request to the PEP and similarly,
to the context handler. The context handler evaluates the context and the request, and
obtains environment attributes from the web server, if required. The context handler
then uses the request parameters and environment attributes, and finally converts this
to a native XACML request format. The native request is sent to the PDP. The PDP
evaluates the request against the policy document and returns a decision of permit or
deny. The decision is returned back to the context handler. The context handler then
obtains the resource and returns it back to the PEP. The calling application obtains the
file stream of the resource from the PEP if permitted.
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6.5 Demonstration
We provide a demonstration of our system.
6.5.1 Policy Generation
We now provide a basic example of our system. Consider a policy as illustrated by our
custom policy generator, in Figure 3. The content owner specifies that subjects Donna
and John are allowed to access the document testWord.docx between 9am - 11am and
1pm - 5pm. Also, the document can only be accessed within the specified date range.
Additionally, the content owner specifies that the document can only be accessed from
machines with IP addresses 127.0.0.1 or 130.155.202.27, as well as only being able to
access the resource a maximum of five times. When the content owner presses the
“Generate XACML” button, an XACML policy file will be generated. Below is a simple
example of our XACML policy file showing subjects, actions and resources, as well as a
play-time condition.
<Subjects>
<Subject>
<AttributeValue DataType="...#string">
Bob
</AttributeValue>
</Subject>
</Subjects>
<Resource>
<AttributeValue DataType="...#string">
testWord.docx
</AttributeValue>
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</Resource>
<Action>
<AttributeValue DataType="...#string">
read
</AttributeValue>
</ActionMatch>
</Action>
<Condition FunctionId="...">
<EnvAttrDesignator AttributeId="play-times" DataType="...#integer" />
<AttributeValue DataType="...#integer">5</AttributeValue>
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6.5.2 SPO Generation
Figure 6.3: The Policy Generator
The content owner then generates an SPO with the SPO generator, and supplies the
policy and the resource testWord.docx (shown in Figure 6.3. A new SPO will be gener-
ated, containing the policy and the document. The content owner is now free to store
the SPO in the Cloud, or anywhere they wish.
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6.5.3 SPO Consumer Access
Figure 6.4: Microsoft Word SPO plugin
Subject John then uses Microsoft Word, which contains our custom plugin (as shown
in Figure 6.4), to select the SPO and access the document. The plugin then sends a
request to the SPO by calling the method getResource in the API. The SPO evaluates
the request and either returns testWord.docx or Deny. If John’s request fulfils the policy
requirements, the SPO will permit access and return the document to Microsoft Word.
We also have a video demonstration on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
zB34wYtD4tE.
6.6 Summary
We designed and implemented SPO, which would allow data and policy to be encapsu-
lated within a software object, similarly to SafeShare. The main difference with Safe-
Share was that SPO was represented as a DLL file, which provided far more security
than SafeShare’s JAR file. Also, SPO allowed a wide range of complex policies to be de-
fined, due to being driven by XACML technology. SelfProtect was shown to be flexible,
open, generic and structured.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Conclusion
In this chapter, we outline our contributions and present future work.
7.1.1 Key Management
As discussed in Chapter 2, key management involves anything to do with a key, besides
encryption and decryption, and covers the creation/deletion of keys, activation/deacti-
vation of keys, transportation of keys, storage of keys, and so on. Most Cloud Service
Provider’s provide basic key encryption schemes for protecting data, or they might leave
it to the user to encrypt their own data.
There is a strong need to encrypt data involved in the Cloud, in order to prevent ma-
licious insider or outsider attackers from stealing the data. How do we handle the keys
that are used for the encryption? Where should the keys be stored, and who has access to
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those keys? How do we recover data if keys are lost? Both encryption and key manage-
ment are very important to help keep data private and secure in the Cloud. Particularly
in recent times, there has been a strong need for Cloud providers to adopt a robust key-
management scheme for their services. However, there are still key-management issues
affecting Cloud computing, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
The trivial solution to data sharing in the Cloud places a huge burden on the data
owner, especially in terms of user revocation. If a data consumer has their access to the
data owner’s data revoked, the data owner would be forced to re-encrypt the data and
re-distribute the keys to all of the remaining users in the group. This would be even
more problematic if the group size was large, in excess of thousands. Thus, better key
management is crucial to ensuring efficient data sharing in the Cloud that places little
to no burden on the data owner.
We presented a key-partitioning technique that would allow efficient key management.
To briefly describe the key-partitioning technique, the encrypted data key is partitioned
into two (or possibly more) parts. The Cloud provider keeps one partition and the
data consumer keeps the other. When a data consumer requests data access, the Cloud
provider partially decrypts the data with the key, and sends this to the data consumer.
The data consumer then fully decrypts, using the remaining key partition. This ensures
that neither the Cloud provider nor the data consumer knows the fully decrypted key.
We presented our idea through an application scenario involving the remote diagnosis
of patients with cardiac arrhythmias, as well as a scenario involving the monitoring of
mental health patients and providing them with feedback. In both scenarios, the per-
formance overhead for storing and retrieving health information through our developed
prototypes was negligible and thus feasible to use in a real world scenario. We also
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carried out usability tests and scalability tests for the scenario involving the monitor-
ing of mental health patients. The usability tests demonstrated the security, ease of use
and satisfaction of our prototype app amongst potential users and medical professionals.
The scalability tests showed that our system could handle a large number of concurrent
requests.
7.1.2 Secure Data Sharing Protocol
As described in the literature review, malicious insiders remain the biggest threat when
sharing data in the Cloud. This is due to insiders having direct access to the data
contents. A CSP may try to steal the data to sell to third parties, in order to gain
profit. Security hackers, or malicious outsiders, also remain a problem. They may
carry out various security-related attacks, such as collusion attacks, man-in-the-middle
attacks, sniffing attacks, etc. They try to expose vulnerabilities in the system in order
to retrieve critical data. Thus, when sharing data in the Cloud, it is crucial that data is
kept secure and private from both malicious insiders and outsiders, and that only those
intended to access the data are able to do so.
We presented SafeShare, which leverages the concept of self-protecting objects by en-
capsulating the data and a policy file in a software object, and allows private and secure
data sharing to occur. The data would only be revealed if the policy is adhered to.
Once the data is revealed, a monitoring mechanism built into SafeShare monitors every
operation of the revealed data, and either attempts to prevent an action from occurring
or immediately notifies the data owner (via the Cloud) that an unauthorised operation
has occurred. There were limitations with this work in terms of background monitoring
and slow performance times. We then improved the SafeShare solution, and presented a
hardware-based solution leveraging the use of the Trusted Extension Device (TED). A
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data encryption key would be encapsulated inside the physical TED. The TED can be
plugged into a computer via a USB. The TED will then attest that the device is legal
and valid, with a trusted certifying authority. If proven to be valid, it downloads the en-
crypted data from the Cloud and decrypts inside the physical TED, and is displayed on
the connected machine. In comparison to SafeShare, the performance was significantly
improved in terms of encryption time but remained similar in terms of decryption time.
However, this was mainly due to the limited capability and resources of the TED pro-
totype at the time. Simply adding larger CPU and memory to TED would see drastic
improvements in performance and size limitations.
7.1.3 Self-Controlled Data
Data owners lose full control over their own data once they are shared with other data
consumers. Data consumers are free to do anything they want with the data owner’s
data. For instance, a dishonest authorised data consumer can easily take the data
owner’s data and send it (via email attachments and/or USB transfer) to their peers or
colleagues, who do not have access permission. Furthermore, data owners may want to
create more complex control over their own data, such as only allowing access to the
data for a maximum of five times. Thus, there is a strong need for data owners to regain
a degree of control over their own data contents.
Some current tools that data owners have at their disposal include access control ma-
trices, ACLs, ACCLs and RBAC, to name a few. These can be used to provide control
over who can access the data and what generic operations they are allowed to carry
out on the data. They still lack complex control mechanisms. More recent research
projects have introduced the concept of self-protecting objects, which encapsulate data
and policies. Data is released from the object if, and only if, the policy is adhered to.
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We created a software solution called SelfProtect Object (SPO), which similarly bundles
data and policy files in software objects. SPO allows for the creation of a large variety
of different, complex conditions since it uses XACML to represent the policy. The SPO
can be loaded into an application (e.g., Microsoft Word) via a plugin, and the SPO will
only release the data if the policy is adhered to.
We developed the SPO as well as the plugin to Microsoft Word which was used to
communicate with the SPO and retrieve data if the policy was abided by. This was used
to demonstrate the feasibility of our idea and we also carried out a demonstration at
CCGrid 2015. This work was well recognised and achieved the Best Poster Award in
CCGrid 2015.
7.2 Future Work
Throughout this thesis, we have provided various approaches to increase the trust of data
owners in sharing data privately and securely with data consumers. We now highlight
some future directions that potential researchers might be interested in exploring.
• Our key-partitioning technique allows data owners to securely share with, or re-
voke, consumers as they wish. Even though the consumer has no knowledge of
the full ElGamal private key, they still obtain the symmetric key that was used to
encrypt the data. The ElGamal key was used to encrypt the generic symmetric
key and not the data, due to the inefficiency of encrypting relatively larger data
sizes. Thus, if the symmetric key was exposed, the consumer could always decrypt
the data, regardless of whether or not the data owner revokes the data consumer’s
access to the data. Further research could find ways to protect the symmetric key
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from being exposed at the consumer end. Key management is also another po-
tentially interesting area for further research. With the growing amount of shared
data, both the Cloud provider and the data consumer could have an abundant
number of keys, which might be difficult to manage. Further research could look
for ways to better manage those keys and handle cases where keys are lost, stolen,
etc.
• We used SafeShare as a way to securely share data in the Cloud and carry out
monitoring of the data, no matter where it is accessed. We then further extended
SafeShare and leveraged the hardware-based TED for stronger security. However,
both SafeShare and TED had their own shortcomings. For instance, SafeShare is
built using JAR files, which are not secure, and the background monitoring is too
coarse-grained from only carrying out monitoring at the directory level. Future
research could propose an alternative means of building SafeShare and carrying
out more thorough monitoring, perhaps at the OS level. Since the TED has its
own OS and storage component, this could perhaps involve having applications
run in the TED, which will access the decrypted data, and using SafeShare to
carry out monitoring inside the TED.
• Although our research work on self-controlling data objects helps to give data
owners some confidence in terms of access control over their data, our work does
not fully guarantee that the policy will be adhered to. Future research could look
to further extend the SPO and allow more functionality. For example, the data
owner could charge a small amount to access their data contents. This could
benefit the creator of the content, as they are rewarded for the effort they put into
creating their content. Also, SPO was built using the .NET platform. A potential
researcher could compare the .NET platform with other platforms with regards
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to representing the SPO, and find out which platform would further improve the
security of the data contents inside SPO. Another future work could also explore
data provenance or “permission of permissions”. There is a need to protect the
privacy and security of data that is derived from source data and passed on for
future manipulation by other users.
To conclude, in this thesis, we researched and developed methods and technologies that
would allow the data owner to confidently carry out the secure and private, sharing and
collaboration of sensitive data, with data consumers.
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